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Cover
A detail from “The Far East” (der ferne
Osten), map 76 of the Stielers Hand-Atlas,
10th (centennial) edition, a collection of
254 copperplate maps produced under
the editorial supervision of Prof. Dr. M.
Haack and published by the firm of
Justus Perthes, of Gotha, Germany, in
1926–27. It is a reminder of how strik-
ing, as well as informative, maps drawn
and engraved by hand could be. It is an
equally striking reminder of the re-
gional geostrategic realities underlying,
and implications of, the recent events
examined in our lead article, “The
United States, North Korea, and the
End of the Agreed Framework,” by a
leading East Asia scholar, Jonathan D.
Pollack.
Produced by courtesy of the Naval War
College’s Henry E. Eccles Library, in
particular the generous assistance of
Ms. Julie L. Zecher, reference librarian.
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Rear Admiral Rempt is a 1966 graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy. Initial assignments included deploy-
ments to Vietnam aboard USS Coontz (DLG 9) and
USS Somers (DDG 34). He later commanded USS
Antelope (PG 86), USS Callaghan (DDG 994), and
USS Bunker Hill (CG 52). Among his shore assign-
ments were the Naval Sea Systems Command as the ini-
tial project officer for the Mark 41 Vertical Launch
System; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) staff as the
Aegis Weapon System program coordinator; director of
the Prospective Commanding Officer/Executive Officer
Department, Surface Warfare Officers Schools Com-
mand; and Director, Anti-Air Warfare Requirements
Division (OP-75) on the CNO’s staff. Rear Admiral
Rempt also served in the Ballistic Missile Defense Orga-
nization, where he initiated development of Naval
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, continuing those ef-
forts as Director, Theater Air Defense on the CNO’s
staff. More recently, he was Program Executive Officer,
Theater Air Defense, the first Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy for Theater Combat Systems, the first
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Missile Defense,
and Director, Surface Warfare (N76) on the CNO’s
staff. Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as the
forty-eighth President of the Naval War College on 22
August 2001.
He holds master’s degrees in systems analysis from
Stanford University and in national security and strate-
gic studies from the Naval War College.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
We are not training students to deal with issues and challenges
that we expect them to encounter. We are educating them to react
positively to the unknown, to develop and analyze competing op-
tions, and to implement solutions that have the greatest probabil-
ity of success.
ON A RECENT FLIGHT FROM THE WEST COAST I was seated next to an
articulate young business executive, who asked me, “Why does the Navy have a
war college?” As a businessman, he was wondering about the “return on invest-
ment” that the American taxpayers get for the portion of the Navy’s budget that
we consume each year. It was a fair question, and I think the answer I gave to this
impromptu question is worth sharing with you.
What Do We Do?
Contrary to some opinions, we don’t train our students—we educate them.
Training is conducted to provide such skills as flying an airplane or driving
ships. Generally these skills can be used to deal with the challenges that we ex-
pect to encounter. The education we provide is more along the lines of “mind
shaping” that attempts to equip students with the ability to react effectively to
unforeseen circumstances. The “bumper sticker” says that we train for the known
and educate for the unknown. This is especially important as today’s crystal ball
for national security studies is getting cloudier instead of clearer. It is harder and
harder to predict what will be required of us in the years ahead.
How Do We Do It?
The Naval War College curriculum is based upon three core courses of study and
a multidisciplinary Electives Program. Courses in each of these four areas are
designed to provide depth and perspective to the study of conflict, its causes, and
its resolution.
• Strategy and Policy is designed to teach students to think strategically. The
theory and application of warfare from the time of Athenian seapower
9
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through the present are studied, and a set of strategic themes—the most
central being the relationship between a nation’s policy ends and how its
military means are used in pursuit of those ends—is considered.
• National Security Decision Making courses are uniquely designed for the
military and civilian Defense Department executive. They consider the
economic, political, and military factors common to decision making in the
national security arena. Case studies exploring major contemporary
nuclear, conventional, and contingency force-planning issues challenge
students to develop personal frameworks for integrating the many, often
competing, demands involved in planning, choosing, and obtaining future
military forces.
• Joint Military Operations focuses on the planning and conduct of joint and
combined military actions in support of national and coalition strategic
goals. Stress is placed on effective planning processes and concepts used in
the employment of military forces across the full spectrum of conflict. The
operational level of war is examined through the use of real-world case
studies and war gaming.
• Electives provide students with the means to explore subjects of
professional significance not included in the core curriculum or to
investigate in greater detail specific elements of that curriculum. Elective
subjects range from military theory to area studies, from international
relations to professional ethics, and from international law to media
relations.
What Is the Payoff?
It is often the case that the real worth of an education is not recognized until long
after the diploma on the wall has faded and yellowed. Major General William G.
Pagonis, a highly decorated Army logistician, writing thirteen years after his
graduation, stated: “I was admitted to the Naval War College[,] . . . and put sim-
ply, this was one of the great experiences of my life. The instructors were fantas-
tic, and the subject matter uniformly absorbing. We were immersed, for
example, in military history. We studied the Peloponnesian Wars, the campaigns
of Napoleon, the strategies of Bismarck, the writings of Clausewitz; we steeped
ourselves in the tactics of Alexander the Great and Rommel.”
This, then, is the true value of a Naval War College education: to provide his-
torical perspective and teach the principles of war in the context of past, present,
and future conflicts; to expose minds to new ideas, expand horizons beyond the
familiar; to sensitize students to cultural differences; to hone analysis and deci-
sion skills; to establish a network of fellow scholars that can be useful for decades
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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to come; to challenge the conventional wisdom; to reinforce values and encour-
age ethical behavior; and to prepare tomorrow’s leaders to deal with an uncer-
tain future. We are not training students to deal with issues and challenges that
we expect them to encounter. We are educating them to react positively to the
unknown, to develop and analyze competing options, and to implement solu-
tions that have the greatest probability of success.
This “future focus” has always been a hallmark of the Naval War College ex-
perience. Under Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, the class of 1897 consid-
ered “the naval problems arising in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico out of
French interest in an isthmian canal.” In the 1930s, students studied the poten-
tial for war in the Pacific and developed the plans that were to serve as the blue-
print for the Allies’ ultimate victory in that theater. During the Cold War, the
College was an active participant in analyzing, gaming, and teaching security
concepts ranging from mutually assured destruction through guerrilla warfare.
Today, we are helping to shape the future through our work with Sea Power 21
and the nuances of the Terror War. Our focus is ahead, but our vision includes
the hard-learned lessons of the past.
While the greatest payback to the nation on its investment in Naval War Col-
lege graduates will likely come sometime in the future, the College is having a
positive impact in the near term as well. In fact, many leaders of today’s military
completed their educations here, five, ten, or even fifteen years ago. Recent grad-
uates and former faculty members are commanding several Army combat bri-
gades on the ground in Iraq. Others command ships, Air Force squadrons, Army
divisions, entire fleets, and large joint forces. Alumni serve as ambassadors in the
capitals of major allies, as congressional staffers on Capitol Hill, and even in or-
bit around the earth.
Even more visible are the numerous faculty members and alumni who appear
regularly in print and in the electronic media as columnists and advisers, using
their expertise to interpret military actions for the larger civilian audience.
How Well Are We Doing?
It is always difficult to gauge the success of an educational program, but some of
our alumni have expressed their evaluations of how successful the program has
been over a number of years. Admiral Gregory Johnson, commander of U.S.
naval forces in Europe, recently wrote, “I would also note the year at Newport is
really about an ‘experience’ and not just the education. It is a fantastic ‘experi-
ence’ and every one of our most competitive officers must be exposed; it will
make our Navy much better. It’s about intellectual stimulation and curiosity;
camaraderie with fellow officers from other communities, services, and nations
as well as the faculty; and a general opening and maturing of the professional
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 7
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aperture that will enable each one of our officers to be that much more effective
when they return to the fleet.”
General Charles Wilhelm, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), has described the value
of the College in his own distinguished career:
I’ve finally figured out exactly where the War College fits in the long and challenging
journey we call a military career. Whether we sail a ship, drive a tank, fly a plane or
help those that do[,] . . . for the first half of a 30-year career the physical part of our
vocation dominates the intellectual part. During those first 15 years, we spend the
majority of our time actually sailing the ship, driving the tank, flying the plane or di-
rectly supporting those who do. In a like manner, during the first half of our careers
we are heavily invested in enforcing regulations and learning and applying doctrine,
tactics, techniques and procedures. During the second 15 years the process reverses
itself, and the intellectual pursuits largely dominate the physical. Rather than sail the
ship, drive the tank or fly the plane we design, test, or buy them. And we become less
concerned with enforcing regulations and applying doctrine and more concerned
with their conception and articulation. I have come to think of the Naval War
College as the mid-career bridge that allowed me to pass over the gully separating the
physical and intellectual segments of my career.
We are committed to ensuring that the College will continue to serve as a rele-
vant and career-critical step in the professional development of our officers. The
evidence of our success will be in the actions of graduates in positions of great
responsibility as they correctly apply the principles of war to preserve the peace.
RODNEY P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Dr. Pollack is director of the Strategic Research Depart-
ment in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the
Naval War College, where he also directs the College’s
Asia-Pacific Studies Group. After earning his doctorate
in political science from the University of Michigan and
completing a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard Uni-
versity, he worked for the RAND Corporation (succes-
sively as member of the research staff, head of the
Political Science Department, faculty affiliate of the
RAND Graduate School, director for international pol-
icy, and senior adviser for international policy). He has
taught at the University of California at Los Angeles and
at Brandeis University. His recent publications include
The United States and Asia: Towards A New U.S.
Strategy and Force Posture (2001, contributor), Pre-
paring for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implica-
tions (1999, senior author), The Future of Chinese and
Japanese Naval Power: Implications for Northeast
Asian Maritime Security (1998, senior author), In
China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese
Foreign Policy and Military Development (1998, co-
editor), Assembled in China: Sino-U.S. Collaboration
and the Chinese Aviation Industry (1998, senior au-
thor), and The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
(1997, contributor), as well as numerous journal articles
and book chapters on U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy, Chinese
political and strategic developments, and East Asian
international relations.
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THE UNITED STATES, NORTH KOREA, AND THE END
OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK
Jonathan D. Pollack
Between October and December 2002, with American policy makers preoccu-pied by the growing possibilities of war with Iraq, a more immediate and un-
anticipated confrontation loomed between the United States and North Korea.
With stunning rapidity, Washington and Pyongyang unraveled close to a decade
of painfully crafted diplomatic arrangements designed to prevent full-scale nu-
clear weapons development on the Korean Peninsula. By year’s end, both coun-
tries had walked away from their respective commitments under the U.S.-DPRK
Agreed Framework of October 1994, the major bilateral accord negotiated be-
tween Washington and Pyongyang during the 1990s. North Korea finalized its
break with the earlier agreement by announcing its immediate withdrawal from
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 January 2003, becoming the
first nation ever to withdraw from the treaty, simultaneously severing all nuclear
inspection arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The abrupt collapse of the Agreed Framework, in the absence of alternative
arrangements to constrain North Korea’s nuclear weapons potential, triggered
major international concern over the longer-term consequences for the global
nonproliferation regime. The renewed confrontation between the United States
and North Korea also exacerbated the most serious tensions in the fifty-year his-
tory of the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, quite possibly laying the
groundwork for a major regional crisis unparalleled since the Korean War.
Though a worst-case scenario is not inevitable, a peaceful outcome that prevents
an avowed DPRK nuclear weapons capability seems far from assured, and an
agreement acceptable to both states that would supplant the discarded 1994
agreement remains out of reach.
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The Agreed Framework froze Pyongyang’s activities at its Yongbyon nuclear
complex, including the operation of a plutonium reprocessing facility. Left un-
constrained, the reprocessing facility would have enabled North Korea to sepa-
rate substantial quantities of weapons-grade plutonium from the spent fuel
removed from its operational graphite-moderated reactor. Had its ongoing ac-
tivities not been halted, North Korea would have ultimately developed the
means to fabricate significant numbers of nuclear weapons, as well as enabled
Pyongyang to market weapons-grade plutonium to other parties. In return
for mothballing its operational
reactor and related facilities, the
United States agreed to provide
heavy fuel oil to the North and to assume leadership of a multinational project to
build two “proliferation resistant” light-water reactors (LWRs). These reactors
were intended to replace the North’s extant power reactor and forestall the com-
pletion of two larger reactors that would have enabled production of far greater
quantities of weapons-grade plutonium.
As North Korea’s nuclear activities increased during the late 1980s and early
1990s, the U.S. intelligence community devoted growing attention to Pyong-
yang’s nuclear weapons potential. The reporting on the North’s nuclear weapons
program varied little during the 1990s, but estimates released since 2001 have
been highly inconsistent. In 1993, the Central Intelligence Agency first con-
cluded that in the late 1980s “North Korea . . . ha[d] produced enough pluto-
nium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons.” This judgment was
reaffirmed in all unclassified intelligence assessments throughout the latter half
of the 1990s, up to intelligence reporting in mid-2001.1 Though the CIA assess-
ment was widely interpreted as evidence that North Korea had one or two nu-
clear weapons in its possession, neither the intelligence community nor any
senior U.S. official offered a definitive statement to this effect during the re-
mainder of the 1990s. However, the intelligence community assessment shifted
noticeably in December 2001, when an unclassified version of a National Intelli-
gence Estimate (NIE) asserted that “[t]he Intelligence Community judged in the
mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.”2
Subsequent intelligence reporting further altered earlier estimates. In an unclas-
sified assessment provided to the Congress on 19 November 2002, the CIA stated:
“The U.S. . . . has assessed since the early 1990s that the North has one or possibly
two [nuclear] weapons using plutonium it produced prior to 1992.”3
The initial Bush administration intelligence estimates thus offered more de-
finitive claims about North Korean nuclear capabilities. They also moved back
the date that intelligence analysts believed North Korea had fabricated one or
two weapons, or the supposed date when the CIA made this determination.
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However, a CIA estimate provided to the Congress in January 2003 reverted to
the more equivocal language of the 1990s, asserting that “North Korea probably
has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear
weapons.”4 The January 2003 document did not reiterate the assertions of late
2001 and late 2002 that Pyongyang already possessed one or two weapons, let
alone claim that the intelligence community arrived at this judgment at a much
earlier date. Intelligence inconsistencies and uncertainties concerning the
North’s nuclear program were not surprising. However, decade-old estimates
were now being sharply recast, with direct implications for future U.S. policy to-
ward Pyongyang.
In addition, the U.S. intelligence community concluded in the summer of
2002 that North Korea had undertaken a covert uranium-enrichment program,
most likely initiated in the late 1990s. According to the CIA, activities associated
with this program surfaced definitively during 2001, including extensive pur-
chases of materials for construction of a gas-centrifuge enrichment facility.5
Though the CIA contended in November 2002 that the facility was at least three
years from becoming operational, intelligence analysts believed that a com-
pleted facility could ultimately produce sufficient fissile material for “two or
more nuclear weapons per year.”6 In the CIA’s judgment, an enrichment facility
would provide the North an alternative source of fissile material to substitute for
the plutonium reprocessing activities frozen under the Agreed Framework. In
addition, the November 2002 intelligence estimate did not preclude the possibil-
ity of Pyongyang’s reactivating its plutonium separation program.
U.S. officials asserted that North Korea’s enrichment activities violated the
spirit and the letter of the 1994 accords, through which both states pledged to
keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons and to redefine political and
economic relations between the two countries. As stated by President Bush in his
6 March 2003 press conference, “My predecessor, in a good-faith effort, entered
into a framework agreement [with North Korea]. The United States honored its
side of the agreement. North Korea didn’t. While we felt the agreement was in
force, North Korea was enriching uranium.”7 Under the Agreed Framework,
Pyongyang had pledged to “consistently take steps” to implement the January
1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which
obligated the South and North not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, pos-
sess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons,” as well as committing both countries
“not [to] possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” Dur-
ing 2001, senior administration officials had acknowledged that North Korea
had upheld its obligations under the Agreed Framework.8 But the United States
now confronted the possibility of a covert fissile material program not covered
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by the 1994 agreement, thereby enabling Pyongyang to circumvent its declared
nonproliferation commitments.
After reviewing the intelligence data and weighing American policy options,
the Bush administration in early October 2002 dispatched a presidential emis-
sary, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, to
Pyongyang. Assistant Secretary Kelly informed senior North Korean officials of
the summer 2002 intelligence findings, without furnishing specific or detailed
evidence to substantiate them. He made clear that these developments had in-
troduced a “precondition” to any possible improvement in U.S.–North Korean
relations, and that North Korea would need to verifiably dismantle its covert nu-
clear activities before the United States would consider the resumption of
high-level exchanges with the DPRK.9 According to State Department officials,
North Korean officials first denied the U.S. allegations. However, in a final meet-
ing with Assistant Secretary of State Kelly, a senior North Korean official, First
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju, reportedly admitted the existence
of a clandestine nuclear weapons program, while asserting a sovereign right to
develop nuclear weapons and “more powerful things as well.” Kang also alleg-
edly informed his American interlocutors of the North’s intention to terminate
the Agreed Framework.10
A fuller rendering of policy developments prior to the Kelly visit and subse-
quent events suggests a more complex and more troubling story. North Korean
scientists had engaged in activities that contravened or skirted declared obliga-
tions under the Agreed Framework, but neither Washington nor Pyongyang dis-
tinguished itself in reacting to the
intelligence claims. Leaders in
both capitals were increasingly
dissatisfied with the 1994 accord,
though for very different reasons. Pyongyang complained repeatedly that the
United States was lagging far behind the scheduled completion of the LWR pro-
ject, and Washington faulted the North for delays in clarifying its prior nuclear
weapons activities. Neither government saw compelling reasons to sustain the
1994 accord. The intelligence findings thus enabled both governments to deem
their prior obligations null and void. With both countries putting forward max-
imal, nonnegotiable policy positions, the subsequent collapse of the Agreed
Framework was virtually foreordained, though it unfolded with far greater ra-
pidity than U.S. officials probably anticipated.
This article will focus primarily on the factors that led to the breakdown of
the Agreed Framework. This requires analysis at four principal levels: U.S.–
North Korean relations under the Clinton administration; early Bush adminis-
tration policies and how these policies may have affected North Korean political
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and security calculations; an assessment of the nuclear enrichment activities un-
dertaken by North Korea; and how Washington and Pyongyang responded to
the U.S. disclosure of North Korea’s renewed nuclear activities, leading to the
policy impasse and ultimate collapse of the Agreed Framework in late 2002 and
early 2003. These larger issues first necessitate some observations on the North
Korean system, its current circumstances and political-military orientation, and
the North’s negotiating strategies.
UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH KOREAN SYSTEM
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the world’s most self-
referential political system and America’s longest-running political-military
adversary. The United States has continuously deployed major military forces
on the peninsula for a half-century to prevent a second Korean war and help de-
fend South Korea in the event of deterrence failure. The North continues to ad-
here to a national mythology reinforced by a dynastic succession from father
(Kim Il Sung) to son (Kim Jong Il). It is the world’s sole surviving Stalinist state,
with an undiminished cult of personality surrounding Kim Jong Il. Indeed,
nearly a decade after Kim Il Sung’s death, the position of president remains un-
filled, enabling the elder Kim to be designated president in perpetuity.
North Korea is also the world’s most militarized regime. Its massive conven-
tional forces, rocket launchers, and artillery deployed immediately north of the
thirty-eighth parallel pose an inherent risk to thirty-seven thousand U.S. mili-
tary personnel stationed in the ROK, as well as to the well-being and security of
South Korea as a whole. The North maintains large stockpiles of chemical and
biological agents; the primary research and production facilities are contiguous
to the Chinese border, thereby rendering them far more problematic to target
during wartime.11 Hundreds of Scud B and C missiles (some estimates range as
high as six hundred) are deployed at various locations in the DPRK, from which
they are able to strike targets throughout the peninsula; hundreds of these mis-
siles have also been exported to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South
Asia. Lesser numbers of Nodong 1 and 2 missiles (generally estimated at about
thirty, though other estimates range lower as well as higher) are reportedly de-
ployed at missile bases in the North; they have a range up to 1,300 kilometers and
are therefore able to reach targets throughout Japan.12 Given the North’s capabili-
ties and the South’s geography and highly concentrated population centers, any
significant armed conflict would be extremely violent and destructive; this possi-
bility has long sobered senior U.S. and ROK officials.
North Korea is also a society experiencing acute internal privation. Despite
some limited evidence of experimentation with market-based reforms, its econ-
omy remains almost totally detached from the dynamism of the ROK and
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China. The North’s dysfunctional economic policies led to a horrific famine and
humanitarian crisis during the mid-1990s, likely resulting in the deaths of as
many as 2.5 million people, or more than 10 percent of the country’s total popula-
tion.13 Having lost its Cold War subsidies provided by the former Soviet Union,
and to a lesser extent by China, North Korea is sustained principally by interna-
tional aid programs (especially for food and energy); tourism and joint venture
activity provided by the South; and revenue from sales of ballistic missiles and
from illicit economic activities. Its ultimate goal appears to be regime survival,
even as it continues to present itself as the sole legitimate embodiment of Korean
nationalism.
Despite (or because of) its grim isolation and horrendous internal circum-
stances, North Korea has proven extraordinarily resourceful in eliciting interna-
tional assistance and in holding its own in negotiations with the outside world.14
It consistently punches above its weight and derives much of its political legiti-
macy from the international attention it has garnered from various major pow-
ers, which it then conveys to its own populace and within the North Korean elite.
It has parlayed its vulnerabilities, nuclear weapons and ballistic missile pro-
grams, and the ever-present threat of a second Korean war into a finely honed
negotiating strategy. In so doing, it has withstood international pressure and
prevented the outside world from imposing political and diplomatic outcomes
on the North that Pyongyang deems unacceptable.15 Through insistence on
norms that foreign interlocutors seldom grasp but to which they are frequently
compelled to accommodate, North Korea has remained within its protective po-
litical cocoon, repeatedly frustrating international efforts to induce major
change in its internal and external behavior. These considerations shaped what
the Clinton administration deemed possible in its diplomacy with the North, as
well as the subsequent policies of the Bush administration.
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE AGREED FRAMEWORK
From its initial promulgation in October 1994 until its ultimate demise, the
Agreed Framework was widely judged an incomplete and flawed policy docu-
ment but one that did achieve measurable results.16 It reflected the inherent pe-
culiarities in U.S.-DPRK relations, including Pyongyang’s expectation that the
United States serve as its near-exclusive nuclear interlocutor and tacit guarantor
of the North’s sovereignty and security. The events of late 2002 and early 2003
suggest clear parallels with the U.S.–North Korean negotiations of the early
1990s, though the outcome of the latter confrontation has thus far been decid-
edly different.17 The predominant concern of the Clinton administration was to
forestall North Korean plutonium generation and reprocessing activities uncon-
strained by international inspections and in defiance of international norms.
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These worries shaped the administration’s primary objectives in its bilateral ne-
gotiations and identified the relevant pressure points that North Korea sought
to exploit. The missing pieces in the Agreed Framework (in particular, North
Korea’s undeclared nuclear facilities and the prior history of the DPRK’s repro-
cessing activities) and the inability or unwillingness of both governments to ful-
fill their respective commitments under the agreement ultimately proved the
source of its undoing. However, the Bush administration has yet to propose
an alternative strategy to rebuild what the Agreed Framework successfully
achieved.
The history of ensuring North Korean compliance with its nonproliferation
commitments is a long and checkered one, antedating high-level U.S. negotia-
tions with the North by well over a half-decade.18 Virtually all agreements have
involved protracted negotiations, with many understandings repeatedly subject
to reversal or threatened breakdown. Depending on how North Korean inten-
tions are viewed, this record illustrates Pyongyang’s intense fears and outright
paranoia toward the outside world, or it highlights North Korea’s exceptional
skill at evading full disclosure and
wringing concessions from very
powerful adversaries. (A satisfac-
tory answer entails elements of
both factors.) Responding to sustained pressure from Soviet officials who were
otherwise unprepared to furnish larger nuclear-power reactors to the North, the
DPRK signed the NPT in late 1985. However, it was not until the spring of 1992,
nearly five years longer than stipulated by IAEA requirements and following the
unilateral withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula in
September 1991, that North Korea ratified a safeguards agreement, including
the declaration of seven principal nuclear sites. Following a series of inspections
during the latter half of 1992, the IAEA uncovered significant discrepancies in
the data provided by North Korea, leading the agency in February 1993 to de-
mand special inspections at two plutonium storage facilities at the Yongbyon nu-
clear complex, approximately seventy-five kilometers north of Pyongyang. The
following month, North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT,
a decision that was suspended once negotiations with the United States began in
June 1993.19
Although North Korea did grant IAEA inspectors access to some of its de-
clared nuclear sites, it continued to deny requests to visit the plutonium repro-
cessing facility. North Korean technicians also began to remove spent fuel rods
from the five-megawatt research reactor at Yongbyon without inspectors being
present.20 Fearful of the consequences for proliferation should Pyongyang ulti-
mately reprocess the thousands of spent fuel rods stored at Yongbyon, the
P O L L A C K 1 7
President Bush’s remarks were a rebuke to Kim
Dae-jung, [who] reportedly took ample offense.
21
War College: Summer 2003 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
Clinton administration in the spring of 1994 reportedly undertook detailed
planning for an air attack on the North’s principal nuclear complex. An attack
would have been designed to entomb the plutonium in the reactor and to de-
stroy the reprocessing facility, even though (as senior U.S. officials assumed) the
attack would trigger full-scale war on the peninsula.21 Opinions remain divided
on whether the Clinton administration was fully prepared to undertake these
military operations, in view of the risks, uncertainties, and potential conse-
quences of a major attack. But President Carter’s June 1994 visit to Pyongyang
abruptly altered these circumstances. In discussions with the former American
president, Kim Il Sung offered to freeze the North’s nuclear activities in ex-
change for renewed talks with the United States and a negotiated understanding
with Washington, forestalling the immediate possibility of a major regional crisis.22
The Agreed Framework, signed on 21 October 1994, entailed an overlapping
set of joint and national-level obligations, many of which remained unfulfilled
at the time of the unraveling of the accords in late 2002.23 The United States and
DPRK pledged to normalize economic and political relations, including the ulti-
mate exchange of ambassadors. North Korea was expected to fulfill its commit-
ments under the South-North denuclearization agreement of 1992; for its part,
the United States was obligated to “provide formal assurances” not to threaten
or use nuclear weapons against the DPRK. The United States agreed to establish
and lead the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a
multinational consortium that would oversee the financing and construction of a
pair of thousand-megawatt light-water reactors to replace the North’s existing or
planned graphite-moderated reactors. Building directly on the Agreed Frame-
work, KEDO and the DPRK signed a contract for two LWRs in December 1995.
The principal U.S. concern was focused on a fifty-megawatt reactor then un-
der construction at Yongbyon and a two-hundred-megawatt reactor then under
construction at Taechon. Had these projects become fully operational, they were
expected to yield approximately 275 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium
each year.24 Depending on the assumed requirements for fabricating a pluto-
nium weapon, this amount of fissile material would have provided North Korea
the annual potential to produce more than forty nuclear weapons.25 The original
target date for completion of the LWR project was 2003. Pending its completion,
the United States was obligated each year to provide North Korea with five hun-
dred thousand metric tons of heavy fuel oil to compensate for the energy pro-
duction the North claimed it would forgo by shutting down its indigenous
five-megawatt reactor and ceasing construction of the larger reactors.26
From the U.S. perspective, the essence of the Agreed Framework concerned
the constraints imposed on North Korea’s nuclear activities, in return for U.S.
leadership of the LWR project and the provision of heavy fuel oil. In a separate
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“letter of assurance” provided to Kim Jong Il the day prior to the signing of the
Agreed Framework, President Clinton pledged to
use the full powers of my office to facilitate . . . the light-water nuclear power project
. . . and the funding and implementation of interim energy alternatives . . . pending
completion of the first reactor unit. . . . [I]n the event that this reactor project [or the
interim energy alternatives are] not completed for reasons beyond the control of the
DPRK, I will use the full powers of my office to provide, to the extent necessary, such
a project [and interim energy alternatives] from the U.S., subject to the approval of
the U.S. Congress. . . . I will follow this course of action so long as the DPRK contin-
ues to uphold the policies described in the Agreed Framework.27
In return for these commitments, Pyongyang was obligated to freeze opera-
tion of its existing graphite-moderated reactor and of the reprocessing facility,
and to cease construction of the larger reactors. The DPRK was also required to
remain a party to the NPT.
However, specific milestones under the Agreed Framework were repeatedly
subject to divergent interpretation by the two sides; in particular, there were re-
peated complaints by Pyongyang about slippage in various delivery schedules.28
First, the reactor construction projects at Yongbyon and Taechon were to be dis-
mantled prior to completion of the second LWR, but no date was specified for
when the dismantlement would begin. Second, the DPRK was obligated to be in
“full compliance” with IAEA safeguards when a “significant portion of [the
LWR] project is completed, but before the delivery of key nuclear components.”
Compliance was expected to include a full rendering of North Korea’s reprocess-
ing activities during the late 1980s, when (as noted previously) the intelligence
community believed that the North may have separated sufficient plutonium to
fabricate one or two nuclear weapons. Third, North Korea was required to dis-
close the location and allow inspection of all undeclared nuclear sites, but not
until a “significant portion” of the first LWR had been completed. Fourth, North
Korea was obligated to can the eight thousand spent fuel rods and place them in
a cooling pond, with all spent fuel to be removed from the DPRK once the nu-
clear components for the first LWR began to arrive in the DPRK and after the
North was judged in full compliance with IAEA safeguards.
For better or for worse, the Agreed Framework and the KEDO accords de-
fined the overall context of U.S.–North Korean relations for the remainder of
the Clinton administration. The agreement immediately provoked major criti-
cisms from the Republican opposition, as well as from then ROK president Kim
Young-sam, who argued that the agreement had been consummated without
sufficient regard for the ROK’s sovereign interests.29 The combination of domes-
tic objections in the United States (greatly strengthened when the Republicans
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captured control of the Congress in the 1994 midterm elections) and a disgrun-
tled South Korean ally severely impeded fulfillment of the Agreed Framework’s
milestones. KEDO (though led by the United States) relied almost entirely on fi-
nancial support from the ROK, Japan, and piecemeal contributions from other
governments solicited on an annual basis; long-term funding seemed virtually
out of the question. With the project proceeding much more slowly than stipu-
lated under the accord, there were growing North Korean complaints of energy
and economic losses it was supposedly sustaining as a consequence of the
Agreed Framework, as well as parallel demands that the United States compen-
sate Pyongyang for these losses.30
North Korea also proved very selective in pursuing ancillary portions of the
accord. Although Pyongyang expeditiously froze the nuclear activities specified
in the agreement, it was not ready to accelerate fuller political relations with the
United States. The Clinton administration was far more intent than its North
Korean counterparts on establishing liaison offices in both capitals. The DPRK
preferred to work with U.S. officials through its UN mission or in negotiations
in various foreign capitals, and it repeatedly blocked proposals that would have
enabled a regular U.S. diplomatic presence in Pyongyang. North Korean officials
may well have believed that the
delay in the opening of liaison
offices might induce the United
States to implement the Agreed
Framework more rapidly, but this
proved a miscalculation. However, North Korea was now on the American radar
screen, and leaders in Pyongyang clearly understood how to prompt attention to
the North’s expressed needs. The administration’s foreign policy critics saw this
factor as one of the major weaknesses of Clinton administration strategy toward
the North—in the judgment of the critics, Pyongyang led and Washington
followed.
North Korea also understood that the Clinton administration was increas-
ingly concerned about possible breakthroughs in North Korean ballistic missile
development, both through its own deployments and by accelerated exports.
In May 1993, the DPRK successfully flight-tested its Nodong 1 missile in the Sea
of Japan. Though the missile test generated little reaction at the time (perhaps
given the North’s then-extant threat to withdraw from the NPT), it ultimately
resulted in missile negotiations that paralleled the nuclear agreements. These
talks were first held in April 1996; six additional rounds were undertaken over
the next four years.
From the outset of the missile negotiations, Pyongyang demanded financial
compensation from the United States in exchange for the DPRK’s forgoing
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additional sales. The Clinton administration repeatedly turned aside these en-
treaties. But North Korean statements suggested that Pyongyang might be will-
ing to accept political and security compensation as well as heightened
economic assistance as an alternative to cash payments. This possibility—in es-
sence, an Agreed Framework for missiles—preoccupied senior U.S. officials for
the remainder of President Clinton’s tenure in office. This included a May 1999
visit to Pyongyang by former secretary of defense William J. Perry (by then a des-
ignated presidential envoy and policy coordinator for North Korea); a visit by a
senior North Korean military official (Vice Marshal Jo Myung Rok) to the White
House in October 2000; and the visit of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to
Pyongyang later the same month. It was only in late December 2000 that Presi-
dent Clinton ruled out a visit to the North Korean capital, thereby dashing any
expectations of a last-minute “missile deal.”
At the same time as the bilateral negotiations proceeded, three major factors
had altered the larger context of U.S.–North Korean relations: the North’s accel-
erated internal decline coincident with Kim Jong Il’s steady consolidation of
power, with Pyongyang depending ever more on an “aid based” survival strat-
egy; continued evidence of North Korean missile development and lingering
suspicions of covert nuclear weapons activity; and the election of a new Korean
president (Kim Dae-jung) who advocated a much more accommodative stance
toward the North than his predecessor. Foreign interlocutors were seeking to
unlock Pyongyang’s doors at every turn, providing the North with unparalleled
leverage in its dealings with the outside world. North Korea sought to push its
advantage. This included the August 1998 launch of a three-stage Taepodong 1
missile that flew over northern Honshu; mounting U.S. concerns about a sus-
pect underground nuclear facility at Kumch’ang-ri (where U.S. intelligence
feared North Korea might be building a covert plutonium production facility);
and the ROK’s ever-increasing cultivation of the DPRK, leading to the June 2000
visit of Kim Dae-jung to Pyongyang for the first-ever South-North summit.
Though North Korea’s calculations toward relations with the United States
and other powers operated at multiple levels, expectations of financial compen-
sation were near the top of its list.31 In a December 1998 meeting with U.S. offi-
cials intended to address the underground facility at Kumch’ang-ri, North
Korean negotiators insisted that the United States would have to provide appro-
priate payment for an anticipated site visit. American negotiators continued to
reject blatant North Korean appeals for direct compensation. When a U.S. in-
spection team visited the site five months later, it found no evidence of nuclear
activity, but the United States did provide major increases in food aid following
the visit. A second site visit the next May followed a comparable pattern. But U.S.
officials sought to define any prospective bilateral agreement in political and
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security terms. During his visit to Pyongyang in May 1999, William Perry
broached a range of proposals designed to address North Korean nuclear activi-
ties outside the scope of the Agreed Framework and to forestall further ballistic
missile development by the North. The following September, Pyongyang
pledged a moratorium on further long-range missile tests as long as U.S.–North
Korean missile negotiations continued. For its part, the United States an-
nounced a partial lifting of economic sanctions long imposed on the North.
In mid-October 1999, former secretary Perry submitted his long-awaited re-
port to President Clinton, which argued for a
comprehensive and integrated approach . . . [designed to ensure] that the DPRK does
not have a nuclear weapons program. We would also seek the complete and verifi-
able cessation of testing, production, and deployment of missiles exceeding the pa-
rameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the complete cessation of
export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology associated with
them. [In return, . . .] the United States and its allies would, in a step by step and re-
ciprocal fashion, move to reduce pressures on the DPRK that it perceives as threaten-
ing. . . . If the DPRK moved to eliminate its nuclear and long-range missile threats,
the United States would normalize relations with the DPRK, relax sanctions that
have long constrained trade with the DPRK, and take other positive steps that would
provide opportunities for the DPRK.
Should North Korea be unprepared to accept the U.S. proposal, the report
concluded, “it will not be possible for the United States to pursue a new relation-
ship with the DPRK. In that case, the United States and its allies would have to
take other steps to ensure their security and contain the threat.”32
The Perry report marked the beginning of a sustained effort at the highest
levels of the Clinton administration to achieve a larger breakthrough in relations
with North Korea. The circumstances were never more propitious for such a
breakthrough, including the unequivocal endorsement of a U.S.–North Korea
bilateral accord by ROK president Kim Dae-jung. Even as Pyongyang intermit-
tently signaled interest in at least some of the policy objectives outlined in the
Perry report, its negotiating tactics were inconsistent and frequently unrespon-
sive to expressed U.S. concerns. In June 2000, the United States announced addi-
tional relaxations of long-standing trade sanctions against the North, with the
DPRK reaffirming its moratorium on additional missile tests. But in a fifth
round of missile talks weeks later in Kuala Lumpur, Pyongyang renewed its ear-
lier demands for a billion dollars in annual compensation in return for halts in
missile exports. The United States continued to spurn such demands, while con-
veying its willingness to expedite “economic normalization” with the DPRK in
return for the North addressing U.S. security concerns.
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Weeks later, in his first meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin, Kim
Jong Il again sought to advance a possible agreement with Washington. Kim
promised the Russian leader that Pyongyang would cease its missile tests in ex-
change for countries (i.e., the United States) opposed to North Korean missile
development facilitating North Korean satellite launches, presumably on U.S.
rockets. A month later, however, Kim told a group of visiting South Korean pub-
lishers and journalists that his proposal had been made “in humor,” thereby call-
ing into question the seriousness of his previous offer. But senior U.S. officials
continued to pursue these possibilities, culminating in the October visits of Vice
Marshal Jo to Washington and Secretary of State Albright to Pyongyang, where
she met at length with Kim Jong Il, the first American official to do so.
At the conclusion of Vice Marshal Jo’s visit, both governments pledged that
they would “fundamentally improve their bilateral relations.” Toward this end,
“the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward
the other and continued the commitment of both governments . . . to build a
new relationship free from past enmity. . . . The two sides [also] agreed that
resolution of the missile issue would make an essential contribution to a funda-
mentally improved relationship between them and to peace and security in the
Asia-Pacific region.”33
Several former Clinton administration officials (notably Secretary Albright
and Perry’s successor as Special Coordinator for North Korean Affairs, Ambas-
sador Wendy Sherman) believed that a missile agreement was within reach in
the waning weeks of the Clinton presidency but that a presidential visit to
Pyongyang would be required to achieve it.34 Vice Marshal Jo delivered a letter
from Kim Jong Il inviting President Clinton to Pyongyang; First Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju (also a delegation member) reportedly outlined the
prospective content of an agreement, including restraints on future missile de-
velopment and export. During Albright’s visit to Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il in-
formed her that North Korea would refrain from further tests of the Taepodong
1 missile. According to Selig Harrison, Kim Jong Il also informed Albright that
“North Korea would be prepared to negotiate an immediate freeze on
long-range missile testing and development and to stop all exports of missiles
and missile components, provided that the United States offered sufficient eco-
nomic aid and other inducements in return, including arrangements to launch
North Korean scientific research and communications satellites.”35 Kim Jong Il
clearly hoped that the allure of a major breakthrough in U.S.–North Korean re-
lations would convince Bill Clinton to undertake a visit to Pyongyang in the
waning weeks of his presidency. However, the prospective agreement seemed far
too contingent and uncertain to warrant a high-risk trip, and on 28 December
the president demurred.
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During 1999 and 2000 the Clinton administration had also begun to receive
scattered reports that North Korea was exploring a covert nuclear enrichment
option in evident violation of its commitments under the Agreed Framework.
But the evidence was far from definitive. Pyongyang was also voicing mounting
impatience with what it deemed laggard progress on the reactor project. As the
2003 target date for installation of the first reactor approached, North Korean
statements assumed a sharper edge. On 22 February 2001, a DPRK Foreign Min-
istry spokesman stated: “If [the United States] does not honestly implement the
Agreed Framework[,] . . . there is no need for us to be bound to it any longer. We
cannot but consider the existence of KEDO as meaningless under the present
situation when no one can tell when the LWR project will be completed.” On 18
June 2001, the same source warned that “the Agreed Framework is in danger of
collapse due to the delay of the LWR provision.”36 The DPRK was trying to build
a case for compensation for the project delays, even as these delays deferred
Pyongyang’s obligations to fully disclose its past nuclear history and identify all
its nuclear sites. But Pyongyang was also warning that it might decide to walk
away from its obligations under the Agreed Framework if there were further de-
lays in completion of the first phase of the reactor project. As the Bush adminis-
tration took power, U.S.–North Korean relations remained uncertain,
incomplete, and far from satisfactory for either country.
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND NORTH KOREA
The Bush administration assumed office convinced that President Clinton and
his top advisers had been far too solicitous of North Korea and that Pyongyang
had not undertaken the requisite steps for verifiable threat reduction, which the
new administration believed essential to genuine accommodation. The new
leadership team also needed to review the negotiating record of the preceding
eight years. At the same time, the Bush administration’s determination to accel-
erate pursuit of national missile defense to protect the United States against po-
tential “rogue state” missile threats had North Korea more in mind than any
other state, given that its missile program was far more advanced than that of
Iran or Iraq. The new administration also expressed its determination to rebuild
America’s major Asian alliances, which it believed had been undermined during
President Clinton’s tenure in office. However, this pledge was far more relevant
to Japan than to the ROK. President Bush’s senior Asian advisers were fully
aware that President Clinton had achieved a close working relationship with
South Korean president Kim Dae-jung, who in the aftermath of his June 2000
visit to Pyongyang had been increasingly committed to pursuit of the “Sunshine
Policy” toward the DPRK. Kim saw the outcome of the Perry review process and
the Clinton administration’s pursuit of a larger political breakthrough with the
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North as vindicating his efforts to dismantle a decades-long threat-driven policy
on the peninsula. But he also understood the risks to his larger policy initiatives
if he and the Bush administration were working at cross-purposes.
Less than three weeks after the Bush administration assumed office, Kim
Dae-jung dispatched Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Lee Joung-binn to
Washington. Lee briefed Secretary of State Powell on ROK policy toward the
North, sought a renewed U.S. endorsement of the Sunshine Policy, and lobbied
for “a meeting between President Bush and President Kim at the earliest possible
time.”37 Although Secretary Powell offered a broad endorsement of ROK policy,
he also made reference to specific
U.S. policy concerns with the
North that were under review by
the new administration. A month
later, Kim Dae-jung traveled to Washington for a working meeting with Presi-
dent Bush. On 6 March (the day prior to the scheduled meeting between the two
leaders), Secretary of State Powell declared that the Bush administration
“plan[s] to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton left off.
Some promising elements were left on the table and we will be examining those
elements.”
President Bush offered no comparable assurance to Kim Dae-jung. The pres-
ident declared that he “look[s] forward to, at some point in the future, having a
dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiation would require com-
plete verification of the terms of a potential agreement.” (The stated U.S. prefer-
ence for “dialogue” rather than “negotiation” would recur during the renewed
nuclear crisis.) The president voiced open skepticism about the trustworthiness
of Kim Jong Il and whether the North was “keeping all terms of all agreements.”
The president’s public remarks prefigured a deeply held animus toward Kim
Jong Il that he conveyed with evident emotion in an August 2002 interview with
Bob Woodward.38 In addition, he emphasized that the administration was still in
the midst of a larger review of its policy options toward Pyongyang. Secretary
Powell distanced himself from his comments of the previous day, making clear
that early resumption of negotiations with the North was not in the offing. Pres-
ident Bush’s remarks were a sharp and humiliating rebuke to Kim Dae-jung, and
the ROK president reportedly took ample offense. North Korea wasted little
time in reacting to the president’s statement, canceling ministerial-level talks
scheduled for Seoul the following week and harshly criticizing what it character-
ized as “hostile” U.S. policy. Pyongyang reiterated that it was “fully prepared for
both dialogue and war.”
Following extensive internal deliberations over U.S. policy options, on 6 June
President Bush announced completion of the administration’s North Korea
P O L L A C K 2 5
[North Korea’s] ultimate goal appears to be re-
gime survival.
29
War College: Summer 2003 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
policy review, reportedly following a private intervention by former president
George H. W. Bush at the behest of his former national security aide Donald
Gregg, president of the Korea Society and a leading advocate of the Sunshine
Policy.39 The administration called for a “comprehensive approach,” encompass-
ing “a broad agenda that includes missile, nuclear, and conventional force issues
and humanitarian concerns. . . . [I]f the DPRK takes serious steps to improve re-
lations with the United States, we are prepared to expand our efforts to help the
North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.”40 The ad-
ministration’s approach assumed “improved implementation of the Agreed
Framework,” “verifiable constraints” on North Korean missile development,
and “a less threatening conventional military posture.”
During a late July visit to Seoul, Secretary of State Powell indicated that the
United States had “no preconditions” to a resumption of talks with Pyongyang,
but a much more arms-length quality increasingly defined U.S. policy. Though
the administration was prepared to continue support for the Agreed Framework
and provision of food aid, it would not resume where its predecessor had left
off.41 In the absence of substantial changes in North Korean policy, the United
States would not undertake major new initiatives with the North, let alone be
drawn into open-ended negotiations akin to those of the Clinton administra-
tion, which many senior officials judged demeaning and simply not worth the
effort. Improved relations with the North would not be a high priority for the
new administration; the DPRK had first to address major U.S. policy concerns
before the United States would pursue improved relations. Pending future de-
velopments, U.S. policy toward North Korea was on hold.
North Korean officials took undoubted offense at the sharp turn away from
Clinton administration policy and at the president’s clear distaste for Kim Jong
Il. Kim nonetheless sought to keep the door ajar to the United States, informing
a visiting European Union delegation in May 2001 that North Korea would
maintain its promised moratorium on missile testing until 2003. He reiterated
this pledge in a second meeting with Russian president Putin in August. U.S. of-
ficials took note of these pledges but judged them an insufficient basis for
high-level exchanges. A far more circumscribed policy toward Pyongyang re-
flected the administration’s emergent attention to the growing risks of nuclear
and missile proliferation, in which North Korea figured prominently. The new
policy also reflected the importance that the administration attached to defend-
ing against future ballistic missile threats, beginning with a hypothesized North
Korean intercontinental-ballistic-missile threat to the United States. The Bush
administration, seeing no particular need or incentive to invest major time and
effort in conciliating the North, had opted for a waiting game with Pyongyang.
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The terrorist attacks of 11 September further reaffirmed the diminished U.S.
policy priority attached to engaging North Korea and strengthened the adminis-
tration’s predisposition to view Pyongyang as a looming danger, not a negotiat-
ing partner. Although the DPRK signed several antiterrorist international
protocols in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the administration’s larger
view of North Korea had turned even harsher. A succession of policy pro-
nouncements by the administration, beginning with the president’s 29 January
2002 State of the Union address characterizing North Korea as part of the “axis
of evil,” diminished further the prospects for renewed high-level exchanges with
the North. Other disclosures and policy statements, including the prospective
use of nuclear weapons in a major Korean contingency outlined in the 2001 Nu-
clear Posture Review and reported in mid-March 2002; the president’s June 2002
speech at the U.S. Military Academy; and the September 2002 release of The Na-
tional Security Strategy of the United States of America—all elevated North Korea
to one of America’s defining national security threats.42
The characterization of North Korea and Iraq as the primary “rogue state”
threats was designed to warn Baghdad and Pyongyang, not propitiate them. Ac-
cording to the policy document, “rogue states” pursued repression of their citi-
zens, threatened neighboring states, violated international treaties, sought
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to intimidate others, served as sponsors
of terrorism, and rejected American values. The administration’s additional re-
quirement for “new methods of deterrence” against any potential use of WMD
meant that it did not feel bound by previous policy commitments, including the
Agreed Framework pledge that the United States would “provide formal assur-
ances” that it would neither threaten nor use nuclear weapons against the DPRK.
In the words of a December 2002 addendum to the national security strategy,
“The United States . . . reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—
including resort to all our options—to the use of WMD against the United
States, our forces abroad, and our allies.”43
The only exception to this bill of particulars for Pyongyang was the absence of
any U.S. allegations of active North Korean links to terrorist groups. Subsequent
events (to be explored below) would further differentiate U.S. policies toward
Iraq and North Korea, but the immediate message and political effects were be-
yond dispute. “Rogue states” had been deemed a defining security concern in the
administration’s national security strategy. This placed primary attention on de-
terring and defending against WMD use and, if necessary, undertaking preemp-
tive actions to forestall imminent threats to the security of the United States.
Unlike the Clinton administration, which had viewed Pyongyang as an interloc-
utor with whom threat reduction could be negotiated, the Bush administration
(especially in a post–11 September context) saw North Korea as an emergent
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and potentially much larger danger. Despite these characterizations, Secretary
of State Powell acknowledged Pyongyang’s continued adherence to its promised
missile test moratorium, as well as to the North’s upholding of its commitments
under the Agreed Framework.44 But the secretary’s insistence that the United
States was ready to resume a dialogue with Pyongyang “without any precondi-
tions” had already assumed a somewhat ritualized quality; there was little, if any,
prospect of serious negotiations.
DPRK officials had long and assiduously followed U.S. security policy debate,
with North Korean media paying exacting attention to various U.S. policy docu-
ments. Having been cultivated and validated under the Clinton administration’s
engagement policies, the North’s leadership was especially attentive to perceived
slights to its international status, in particular any diminished U.S. willingness
to deem the DPRK a credible or legitimate interlocutor. Once the renewed nu-
clear crisis unfolded fully in October, North Korean statements regularly cited
President Bush’s inclusion of the North in the “axis of evil” and the administra-
tion’s preemption doctrine as virtual declarations of war that justified the
DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT. Given that North Korean media frequently
resorted to hyperbolic language to characterize U.S. intentions, it is possible and
even likely that U.S. officials paid little heed to the North’s statements. North Ko-
rea may have drawn worst-case conclusions from changes in U.S. declaratory pol-
icy, but the DPRK probably felt slighted as much as threatened.
However, North Korea did not close all doors to discussions with Washington.
On 31 July 2002, Secretary of State Powell met briefly in Brunei with the DPRK
minister of foreign affairs, Paik Nam Sun. On 7 August, Charles Pritchard, the U.S.
special envoy to North Korea and U.S. representative to KEDO, traveled to
Kumho, the site of the light-water reactor project, where concrete was being
poured for the first of the LWRs. Pritchard was the highest U.S. official visitor to
the DPRK since Secretary of State Albright in October 2000. Though the KEDO
process seemed to be making halting progress, the DPRK Foreign Ministry
spokesman warned on 13 August that “the Agreed Framework stands at the cross-
roads of abrogation or preservation due to the substantial delay in the provision of
the LWRs.”45 But other developments soon swamped these warnings, leading in-
exorably to the end of the Agreed Framework only four months later and the host
of unresolved challenges that at this writing confront the Bush administration.
The Enrichment Program
The summer of 2002 intelligence findings on North Korea’s enrichment activi-
ties triggered a succession of events that sharply redefined U.S. policy options on
the peninsula. U.S. policy by the end of 2002 seemed reactive if not passive, even
as North Korea appeared determined to change facts on the ground as rapidly as
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its technical capabilities would allow. Given the limited intelligence data on nu-
clear developments in the North and the paucity of detailed knowledge about
the deliberations of U.S. and North Korean policy makers, any rendering of
events during the latter half of 2002 is necessarily incomplete. Many of the con-
tentions by U.S. and North Korean officials remain under dispute, and there are
equally divided judgments about the extent and purposes of North Korea’s en-
richment activities. However, enough information is available to scrutinize crit-
ically the available data as well as evaluate various official claims.
Although the administration initially avoided highlighting the mounting evi-
dence of an enrichment program, by the early fall of 2002 this restraint had
ended. Indeed, officials from both countries opted to exploit the intelligence for
political purposes. To senior American officials who entertained serious reser-
vations about, or were overtly opposed to, U.S.–North Korean nuclear and mis-
sile diplomacy, the evidence of North Korean malfeasance furnished powerful
ammunition to render the Agreed Framework a dead letter. Other U.S. officials
may have hoped that the renewed nuclear crisis might enable a more satisfactory
and durable recalibration of earlier agreements. In either event, the changes in
U.S. policy toward the North triggered larger policy consequences that have rede-
fined the East Asian political and security landscape.
The existence of a parallel debate in Pyongyang is necessarily more conjec-
tural, though there are some suggestive hints of this possibility. Various North
Korean officials had grown increasingly frustrated by what they deemed inatten-
tion, unreasonable slights, or outright threats by the Bush administration. As a
consequence, leaders in Pyongyang quickly sought to exploit the opening pre-
sented by the U.S. decision to cease its commitments under the Agreed Frame-
work. DPRK officials made good on their past veiled threats to resume the
North’s long-frozen indigenous nuclear program. It is possible that some North
Korean officials believed that the breaking of these constraints would enable
them to “trade” these resumed activities in subsequent negotiations with the
United States. Others may have concluded that they had passed the point of no
return with the United States, with the longer-term survival of the DPRK now
inextricably tied to the declared possession of nuclear weapons, or at least the far
more credible threat of such an option. However, the available information does
not allow definitive judgment on this issue. Our intent in the remainder of this
article is to: describe what U.S. officials may have believed about the renewed
nuclear activities detected in the North; assess how the Bush administration re-
defined its policy goals toward the North in light of this information; and review
how officials in Pyongyang decided to respond to the United States, resulting in
the final breakdown of the Agreed Framework in late 2002 and early 2003.
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There are two types of fissile material used for nuclear weapons fabrication:
weapons-grade plutonium (a by-product of nuclear fission containing suffi-
cient proportions of the plutonium-239 isotope) or uranium enriched to 93 per-
cent with the uranium-235 isotope.46 Although there are a range of methods to
enrich uranium from its natural 0.7 percent content of U-235, gas-centrifuge
technology presently constitutes the most practicable, cost-effective method for
states intent on pursuing a covert enrichment capability. This still leaves the
question of plutonium versus enriched uranium as the preferred path to weap-
ons development. There are advantages and liabilities to both options in terms
of reliability and efficiency of design; volatility and availability of materials;
complexity, cost, and ability to avoid detection; and the fissile material require-
ments for different types of nuclear weapon designs. The history of nuclear pro-
liferation suggests that there is no optimal path, though the much larger
quantity of fissile material required for weapons using highly enriched uranium
would appear to argue for reliance on plutonium. But the properties of a pluto-
nium weapon entail a more complex and less readily predictable bomb design.
Each country’s nuclear history, moreover, has proven different, depending on
the scale of its nuclear ambitions and the specific technologies to which it has
gained access.
North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactor provided a ready means for pluto-
nium generation once the North had built a reprocessing facility for chemically
separating the plutonium in the spent fuel rods removed from the reactor.
Though the reactor could generate heat for industrial use, the lack of a power
grid at Yongbyon invalidated claims that it was designed for feeding electricity to
a grid. However, the nuclear activities covered under the Agreed Framework
were limited to declared sites associated with the North’s extant reactor program
and “related facilities.” North Korea was not obligated to allow inspection of any
undeclared sites until a “significant portion” of the first LWR was completed.
North Korea had pledged under
the Agreed Framework to pursue
the go a l s out l ined in the
South-North nuclear agreement
(including a commitment “not
[to] possess nuclear reprocessing
and uranium enrichment facilities”), but DPRK spokesmen now assert that the
denuclearization accord is a dead letter, thereby presumably invalidating any
pledge not to pursue an enrichment capability.47
Equally important, enrichment facilities serve an entirely legitimate civilian
purpose—they provide the means for fabricating the low-enriched uranium
(i.e., fuel enriched to approximately 4.4 percent uranium-235) to power
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light-water reactors. Numerous signatories to the NPT possess such reprocess-
ing capabilities, though under IAEA regulations such sites must be declared and
remain open for inspection. Here again, the North may well have believed that it
retained wiggle room, pending completion of a significant portion of the first
LWR. Absent a more extensive fulfillment of KEDO’s milestones, North Korea
probably felt little compunction about nondisclosure of its enrichment activi-
ties and may have believed that it had little to lose by doing so. The very small cir-
cle of DPRK officials who were likely informed about the enrichment efforts
probably recognized that early disclosure of these activities would almost cer-
tainly trigger a major reaction from an American administration already disin-
clined to collaborate with the North. It seems entirely plausible that Pyongyang
envisioned the need for an indigenous enrichment capability once the LWRs
were installed; the fuel requirements for a pair of thousand-megawatt reactors
are substantial and open ended. The KEDO-DPRK Reactor Supply Agreement
of 15 December 1995 committed KEDO to provide “LWR fuel for the initial
loading for each LWR plant . . . in accordance with standard nuclear industry
practice.” Though KEDO was further obligated “to assist the DPRK to obtain
LWR fuel” for the useful life of the reactor, the contracts were to be signed “with
a DPRK-preferred supplier,” leaving the ultimate choice of a supplier to the
North.48 Given the DPRK’s clear determination to avoid long-term dependence
on external sources of nuclear fuel, the North may well have been seeking such a
capability for itself, or at least wanted to explore the feasibility of such an under-
taking.49 But the acquisition of gas centrifuge technology would also provide the
North an alternative if far more protracted path to a nuclear weapons option.
A final but especially significant factor remains overlooked in the larger story
of the U.S. intelligence findings—North Korea had no operational enrichment
facility to declare. As noted by the CIA in an unclassified November 2002 esti-
mate provided to the Congress, construction of a centrifuge facility was not ini-
tiated “until recently. . . . Last year the North began seeking centrifuge-related
materials in large quantities. . . . We recently learned that the North is construct-
ing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more
nuclear weapons per year when fully operational—which could be as early as
mid-decade.”50 The intelligence community believed that North Korea still con-
fronted daunting obstacles had it decided to build an enriched-uranium
weapon, or even to acquire the production capabilities that might ultimately
permit such an option.
Some of these obstacles become clearer by reviewing the technologies in-
volved in these processes.51 According to Richard Garwin, a leading authority
on nuclear power and nuclear weapons design, a U-235 gun-type weapon de-
sign requires approximately sixty kilograms of enriched uranium to fabricate
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a single weapon, a process that would entail full-time operation of 1,300 high-
performance centrifuges for approximately three years to accumulate sufficient
fissile material. An implosion-type weapon design akin to that employed by Paki-
stan in its 1998 tests might require somewhat less than half this amount. By com-
parison, a nuclear weapon using plutonium requires approximately six kilograms
of fissile material, though the needed materials are much more volatile and prone
to failure. Garwin defines a high-performance centrifuge as one capable of achiev-
ing three separative work units (SWUs) per year, a throughput measure for iso-
tope separation in a single centrifuge. When assembled in a cascade, gas
centrifuges yield specific quantities of enriched uranium; depending on the level
of enrichment, the resulting product can be applied for civilian or military pur-
poses.52 Although more advanced centrifuge technologies now available on the
enrichment market enable much higher production rates, there is no possibility
that North Korea had access to such state-of-the-art equipment. One report sug-
gests that the centrifuges available to North Korea would have been able to per-
form at the capacity of as little as one SWU per year, though Matthew Bunn, a
leading authority on nuclear proliferation, believes that a capacity two or three
times this level is plausible.53
The imprecision in the CIA analysis underscored the difficulties of estimat-
ing the extant capabilities and ultimate purposes of the North’s enrichment pro-
gram—a point that begs the question of how complete and compelling the
intelligence data may have been on which the United States decided to confront
North Korea. (We will return to this issue below.) At the same time, enrichment
facilities are inherently dual capable, though the industrial materials required
for successful enrichment at much higher levels (i.e., use of maraging steel
rather than high-strength aluminum in centrifuge manufacture) is both more
expensive and more difficult to acquire. In theory, a facility designed for low en-
richment can be converted to high enrichment by the installation of additional
centrifuges and tubing, enabling the repeated recycling of uranium hexafluoride
gas to achieve higher enrichment levels, though the likelihood of equipment
failure would be far higher when relying on more basic enrichment technology.
Despite these constraints and the absence of an identified enrichment facility,
senior U.S. officials had concluded that North Korea was pursuing an HEU ca-
pability, not one designed for civilian use.
As noted by Assistant Secretary of State Kelly, the initial reports of North Ko-
rean interest in enrichment technologies antedated the Bush administration.
During the late 1990s, there were scattered reports that North Korea was show-
ing an interest in centrifuge technologies as an alternative method for acquiring
fissile material. One authority on North Korean weapons development, Joseph
S. Bermudez, Jr., dates this interest from as early as the late 1980s. Bermudez cites
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without further identification a 1999 Department of Energy document stating
that the DPRK “is in the early stages of a uranium enrichment capability” being
pursued in conjunction with Pakistan, though the DOE evidently deemed this a
pilot activity rather than a precursor to a full-scale program.54 Some scattered
Japanese and South Korean reports during 1999 and 2000 indicated heightened
North Korean interest in uranium-enrichment technologies, as well. According
to one unidentified South Korean
Defense Ministry official, “in 1999,
our military authorities obtained
information that the North was
trying to import enriched uranium
production facilities from abroad, and provided the intelligence to the United
States.”55 The bulk of this reporting focused on the increasingly intertwined rela-
tionship between Pakistan and North Korea, which emerged far more fully in press
accounts once the United States decided in October 2002 to disclose information
about North Korean enrichment activities.56
Despite the mounting evidence of North Korean efforts to acquire centrifuge
technology, and intelligence findings that confirmed these judgments, the Bush
administration initially avoided public disclosure of these findings and opted
not to raise these concerns in discussions with Pyongyang. In a later interview
Secretary of State Powell acknowledged that he had been apprised of the intelli-
gence assessments before he met with his North Korean counterpart in Brunei at
the end of July, conceding that “this enriched uranium program was going on. . . .
Nevertheless, we wanted to move forward with the North Koreans.”57 It seems
quite probable that the administration, wholly absorbed by the looming possi-
bilities of war with Iraq, did not want to be distracted by developments in other
regions, no matter how worrisome some may have judged the possibilities. But
the fact that North Korea had no operational enrichment capability and was
years away from achieving one may have convinced officials that there was no
urgency to the issue. It is thus possible that the administration had not yet de-
cided on a preferred course of action. In either case, the new findings did not ap-
pear immediately to affect U.S. policy toward the North.
Four weeks later, the stunning disclosure of Japanese prime minister
Junichiro Koizumi’s impending visit to Pyongyang triggered movement in U.S.
policy.58 The negotiations over a possible Koizumi visit had been conducted with
the utmost secrecy within Japanese bureaucratic channels, evidently gaining
momentum following renewed overtures from Pyongyang in October 2001.59
Following a 25–26 August 2002 visit to Pyongyang, Hitoshi Tanaka, director
general of the Asian-Oceanian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
informed the prime minister that the DPRK leadership was prepared for highly
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substantive talks, including the history of North Korea’s past abductions of Japa-
nese citizens, an issue with deep emotional resonance in Japan. Following
Tanaka’s return to Tokyo, Koizumi on 28 August immediately ordered acceler-
ated planning for a one-day visit to Pyongyang in mid-September. The prime
minister had met the previous day with visiting Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage and had informed him of the impending public disclosure of
his visit to the North, which was scheduled to be announced on 30 August. Given
that messages had been passed between Pyongyang and Tokyo as early as the
previous fall, the absence of prior communication between Japan and the
United States on the prime minister’s impending visit was remarkable enough in
its own right. In the context of recent intelligence findings about North Korea’s
enrichment activities, the prime minister’s last-minute disclosure to the United
States was even more stunning to American officials.
In the aftermath of the prime minister’s meeting with Deputy Secretary
Armitage, the Bush administration moved quickly to close the information gap
with Tokyo, very possibly beginning with the deputy secretary’s immediate reac-
tions to learning about Koizumi’s impending plans. In addition, President Bush
personally briefed the prime minister on North Korea’s nuclear activities during
the latter’s visit to the United Nations on 12 September. According to one Japa-
nese analyst, the prime minister was “shocked at the harshness” of the presi-
dent’s comments.60 The U.S. ambassador to Japan, Howard Baker, briefed the
prime minister on the new U.S. intelligence findings immediately prior to
Koizumi’s departure for Pyongyang. It is not known whether the United States
urged a postponement or reconsideration of the prime minister’s trip, but the
Bush administration conveyed that it expected Koizumi to raise vigorously the
nuclear issue during his visit.61
The prime minister’s exchanges with Kim Jong Il suggest that Koizumi
broached the nuclear issue primarily in terms of North Korea’s fulfilling its prior
commitments, although he also noted that “the United States has serious con-
cerns about the issue of [North Korea’s] nuclear weapons [program]. . . . [North
Korea] should accept inspections . . . to allay the U.S. concerns.”62 On the issues
of utmost concern to the United States (i.e., North Korean enrichment activities
and its ballistic missile development and exports), Koizumi conveyed little ur-
gency. The prime minister may not have fully grasped the import of the new nu-
clear developments to U.S. policy makers, but he also may have wanted to ensure
a successful conclusion to the summit, during which Kim offered unprecedented
apologies for the North’s past abductions of Japanese citizens.63 At the same
time, Kim Jong Il faulted U.S. policies toward the North and made clear that the
nuclear issue was not a relevant agenda item for the Japan-DPRK summit. As
Kim argued, “The [nuclear] inspection is a problem between the United States
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and the DPRK, and is not a topic for this summit.”64 It is not at all certain that
Kim had any more reason to anticipate the impending accusations by the United
States after the Koizumi visit than before it.
The Kelly Visit
In the aftermath of the Japan–North Korea summit, the Bush administration con-
fronted the prospect of abrupt and unanticipated changes in the Northeast Asian
political and security environment. The United States believed that Pyongyang
had defaulted on fundamental policy commitments to Washington, at the precise
moment when the DPRK had opened the door to a new relationship with Amer-
ica’s most important Asian ally and, prospectively, a major aid donor to the North.
There was a real possibility that U.S. options on the peninsula would be driven in-
creasingly by the policy agendas of others, perhaps enabling Pyongyang to achieve
substantial breakthroughs at the expense of U.S. interests and without paying any
price for its covert enrichment activities.
A week following Koizumi’s meeting with Kim Jong Il, the United States an-
nounced plans for the long-deferred visit of Assistant Secretary of State Kelly to
North Korea on 3–5 October. State Department spokesmen claimed that Pyong-
yang had agreed to the comprehensive policy discussions that the administra-
tion had sought since the summer of 2001. This characterization suggested the
prospect of breakthrough, not breakdown.65 Nothing in the public depiction of
the purposes of the Kelly visit even remotely hinted at an impending confronta-
tion in Pyongyang. There is no reason to believe that U.S. officials had conveyed
advance hints to the DPRK that the assistant secretary was coming to Pyongyang
to deliver a stern message and little else. There is also no evidence to suggest that
the United States sought any explanation or clarification from Pyongyang of the
U.S. intelligence findings, or that Washington broached these issues with the
IAEA prior to the Kelly visit.
Although the United States and North Korea agree on some of the broad de-
tails of the four meetings held over two days in Pyongyang, there are some sig-
nificant differences in their respective renderings. By most accounts, Assistant
Secretary Kelly wasted little time on diplomatic niceties, making clear that the
U.S. intelligence findings precluded any possible forward movement in U.S.–
North Korean relations. Other than informing DPRK officials and rebuking
them for the North’s evident attempt to circumvent the Agreed Framework, the
assistant secretary had no room for maneuver, given the instructions of his supe-
riors. As Kelly himself subsequently observed,
I stated that the United States now had a pre-condition to further engagement—that
the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program [had to] be dismantled immediately. . . . I
did not confront the Vice Foreign Minister [Kim Gye Gwan] with specific evidence of
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their uranium enrichment program, but I was emphatic that the U.S. knew the pro-
gram was being aggressively implemented and it was a serious violation of international
agreements. I asked the North Korean government to weigh its response carefully.
Kelly further asserts that Vice Foreign Minister Kim “angrily denied that the
DPRK had an HEU [highly enriched uranium] program. He dismissed my state-
ment, claiming it was a fabrication.”66 In a final U.S.–North Korean meeting
chaired on the DPRK side by First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, Assistant
Secretary Kelly observed: “Kang . . . surprised me by making it quite clear, even
before I was able to make my presentation, that North Korea was proceeding
with an HEU program and that it considered the Agreed Framework to be ‘nulli-
fied.’ . . . [H]e tried to blame this situation on U.S. policy under the current Ad-
ministration, but made no response when I pointed out that the HEU program
began well before the current Administration.”67
The State Department demurred from any immediate disclosures concerning
the results of the Kelly visit, not providing relevant details until a teleconference
with reporters on 15 October. The congressional resolution endorsing Bush ad-
ministration policy toward Iraq had been the primary focus of administration
policy during the interim period; President Bush signed the resolution only a
few hours before the State Department disclosed the outcome of the Kelly visit
to reporters.68 Administration spokesmen contended that North Korea admitted
to the existence of a clandestine weapons program, as well as asserting that
Pyongyang had declared its intention to terminate the Agreed Framework.
North Korean sources dispute several of the principal U.S. claims, though not
the basic outline. In an extended discussion with diplomatic reporter Don
Oberdorfer in early November, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan acknowl-
edged that he had been “stunned” by Assistant Secretary Kelly’s opening state-
ment. As Oberdorfer relates,
He [Kim] reported Kelly’s statements to his superiors at the first coffee break, setting
off furious internal consultations. After an all-night meeting of its top officials, North
Korea detonated its own verbal explosion the next day. First Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter Kang Sok Ju . . . told Kelly that the reclusive nation is “entitled to have nuclear
weapons” to safeguard its security in the face of a growing U.S. threat. After a debate
of their own, the Americans interpreted the statement to be an admission that Kelly’s
charge was true.
Other statements cited by Oberdorfer suggest that the North sought to hold
the United States accountable for the nullification of the Agreed Framework. In
addition, North Korean officials interviewed by Oberdorfer “never denied seek-
ing to enrich uranium in secret facilities, but portrayed their actions as a re-
sponse to the Bush administration’s hostility. . . . [O]ur interlocutors [also] said
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North Korea has adopted a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy about whether the
program existed before Bush took office. They would also ‘neither confirm nor
deny’ whether North Korea already possesses a nuclear weapon.” Kang Sok Ju
also insisted that the Agreed Framework, though hanging by “a thread,” was not
yet deemed inoperative by Pyongyang.69
North Korean officials characterize the 25 October statement from the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs as the authoritative DPRK policy document on the Kelly
visit.70 It seems reasonable to assume that the statement drew extensively from
Kang Sok Ju’s rebuttal to Assistant Secretary Kelly. The statement accused the
Bush administration of a “hostile attempt . . . to stifle the DPRK by force and
backpedal [on] the positive development of the situation in the Korean Penin-
sula and the rest of Northeast Asia.” As the document further alleged, “Pro-
ducing no evidence, [Assistant Secretary Kelly] asserted that the DPRK has been
actively engaged in the enriched uranium program in pursuit of possessing nu-
clear weapons in violation of the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework. He even in-
timidated the DPRK side by saying there would be no dialogue with the U.S.
unless the DPRK halts [its enrichment activities], and the DPRK-Japan and
North-South relations would be jeopardized.”
Though not expressly contesting U.S. claims, the report accused the United
States of continuing to threaten the DPRK with nuclear weapons and of failing
to carry out nearly all of its obligations under the Agreed Framework, “calculat-
ing that the DPRK would collapse sooner or later.” According to the MFA state-
ment, American characterizations of North Korea as part of the “axis of evil”
and as a prospective target for “preemptive nuclear strike” were “a gross viola-
tion of the basic spirit of the Nonproliferation Treaty, [and] reduced the
inter-Korean joint declaration on denuclearization to a dead document.” The
statement concluded, “Nobody would be so naïve as to think that the DPRK
would sit idle under such a situation. That was why the DPRK made itself very
clear to the special envoy of the U.S. president that the DPRK was entitled to pos-
sess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that
so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing nu-
clear threat by the U.S.”71
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs document then presented the basis for a “grand
bargain,” one that had reportedly been aired in the Kelly-Kang exchanges:
The DPRK, with greatest magnanimity, clarified that it was ready to seek a negotiated
settlement of this issue on the following three conditions: firstly, if the U.S. recog-
nizes the DPRK’s sovereignty; secondly, if it assures the DPRK of nonaggression; and
thirdly, if the U.S. does not hinder the economic development of the DPRK. . . .
[T]he DPRK considers that it is a reasonable and realistic solution to the nuclear is-
sue to conclude a nonaggression treaty between the DPRK and the U.S. . . . If the U.S.
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legally assures the DPRK of nonaggression, including the nonuse of nuclear weapons
against it by concluding such a treaty, the DPRK will be ready to clear the former of
its security concerns.
There were no explicit calls for financial compensation from the United
States. All subsequent North Korean statements, to this writing, essentially ad-
hered to the proposals outlined in the 25 October document.
However, the administration seemed determined to deny Pyongyang the sat-
isfaction of a direct response to this or to succeeding statements, which senior
officials contended would reward North Korea for its violations of the Agreed
Framework and related nonproliferation commitments. Administration
spokesmen repeatedly insisted that the renewed confrontation did not consti-
tute a crisis but a “serious situation,” to which they sought a “peaceful resolution
. . . through diplomatic channels.”72 Subsequent declarations (including several
by President Bush) emphasized that the administration had “no hostile intent”
toward Pyongyang, “no intention to invade” the North, or (less frequently) “no
intention to invade or attack” the DPRK.73 But the administration insisted that
pursuit of a diplomatic option did not extend to direct negotiations with North
Korea, only to consultations with Pyongyang’s neighbors. Senior administration
officials repeatedly asserted that regional actors had more influence over the
DPRK and would therefore be better able than the United States to induce the
North to reverse its renewed nuclear activities. This claim justified the U.S. deci-
sion not to pursue a direct channel to Pyongyang. To varying degrees, the ROK,
Japan, Russia, and China all disagreed with the administration’s declaration that
it would “talk” but not “negotiate” with the DPRK. But the United States re-
mained unmoved by the calls of North Korea’s immediate neighbors for Wash-
ington to seek a bilateral understanding with Pyongyang.
The administration also faced a profound disparity in its strategies and poli-
cies toward Iraq and North Korea, the only two countries identified as “rogue
states” in the September 2002 national security strategy document. Despite
North Korea’s far greater military power, its vastly more developed nuclear and
missile capabilities, the immediate threat that North Korea posed to U.S. mili-
tary personnel deployed on the Korean peninsula, and its widespread sales of
ballistic missiles in highly volatile regions, President Bush continued to insist
that Iraq represented a “unique” case that had to assume precedence in U.S. mili-
tary plans.74 American officials asserted that there were four essential differences
between the two cases: North Korea had not used WMD capabilities against its
own people or against neighboring states; the DPRK was not in defiance of Secu-
rity Council resolutions; North Korea was not accused of any current links to
terrorist groups; and the United States believed that regional actors (especially
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China) had a greater capacity to pressure or induce Pyongyang to forgo its nu-
clear weapons capabilities and to dismantle its extant programs.
The administration devoted far less public attention to other factors that
dominated its strategies toward the North. First, the United States had neither
the desire nor the wherewithal to activate a second major military front simulta-
neous with the mounting possibilities of war with Iraq. Decisions on Korea pol-
icy would be deferred, pending the outcome of the Iraq crisis. Second, U.S.
defense planners were keenly aware of the lack of realistic military options for
definitively eliminating the North’s nuclear weapons potential. Even if U.S.
planners contemplated a disabling strike on the reprocessing plant, it seemed
highly likely that such an action would trigger a major North Korean attack on
the South as well as a profound crisis in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Third, the United
States believed that North Korea’s own military options were also highly circum-
scribed, and possession of a few nuclear weapons would not appreciably alter
this assessment.75
Fourth, despite the administration’s dire warnings about the North’s enrich-
ment activities, most officials recognized that the path to a meaningful enrich-
ment capability remained a distant and very uncertain possibility. This more
patient view presumably did not apply as fully to the prospective reactivation of
Pyongyang’s plutonium program, which received less attention in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the enrichment disclosures.76 At least initially, the administra-
tion did not appear overly exercised by either potential path to weapons
development. This may have reflected a predominant U.S. view that Pyongyang
was seeking to induce the United States to resume direct negotiations, rather
than proceeding directly to finished weapons. Fifth, the administration did not
want to repeat what it deemed its predecessor’s grievous errors in its negotia-
tions with Pyongyang. The United States could therefore afford to wait and let
Pyongyang incur the international opprobrium that would inevitably follow its
nuclear defiance. This included the halting of any prospective forward movement
in Japanese–North Korean relations. Sixth, some may have believed that time was
simply not on Pyongyang’s side. A policy of international ostracism, containment,
and reinforced defense (including missile defense) would deny Pyongyang any
presumed political gains from its nuclear and missile programs and might even
lead to the ultimate collapse of the North Korean system, even if such an outcome
might trigger severe instability and potential military dangers.
With the United States unwilling to engage in direct substantive exchanges
with North Korea and with Pyongyang seeking to turn the tables on Washing-
ton, the impasse that materialized at the time of Assistant Secretary Kelly’s visit
had grown wider.
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THE AGREED FRAMEWORK UNRAVELS
The deadlock in U.S.–North Korean relations evident in early October quickly
went from bad to worse. The Bush administration was unprepared to resume di-
rect negotiations with Pyongyang, and the DPRK proved equally unwilling to
reverse course. The fate of the Agreed Framework hung in the balance, as both
states deliberated their next steps. As early as 19 October, senior administration
officials informed David Sanger of the New York Times that the Agreed Frame-
work “as we know it is dead,” while still leaving undetermined whether Washing-
ton would abandon the agreement in its entirety.77 The immediate issue was the
continuation of the U.S. monthly heavy-fuel-oil allotment to Pyongyang, as
stipulated under the Agreed Framework. The oil delivery for October had pro-
ceeded as planned, but the administration had not decided whether to proceed
with future deliveries.
The policy debate was fought openly in the press. On 24 October, a senior State
Department official participating in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) meeting in Mexico informed Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post that
he was not yet prepared to characterize the Agreed Framework as dead: “I have not
yet used the four-letter word—[and] have no plans to do so, at least at this time.
No decision has been made. . . . I’m
not ruling out direct contact or
communications with the North
Koreans. If they call us, we’ll listen,
and I hope vice versa. But that’s not
negotiating.”7 8 The next day,
speaking to the same newspaper, a senior administration official in Washington
excoriated the State Department source in exceedingly blunt terms, characterizing
the previous day’s statement as a “serious breach” in U.S. policy that suggested “a
State Department in revolt.” The senior official stated, “There is a discipline prob-
lem here, whether it’s the person who did the [Mexico] briefing, or someone else
in the State Department. . . . [W]hat that person said . . . may represent his view,
the State Department view, but it does not represent the administration view.”79
In the aftermath of this open contention, the administration soon made its
decision: the United States, with the concurrence of the ROK and Japan, opted to
suspend further heavy-fuel-oil deliveries to the DPRK.80 This decision proved
fateful. A week later Pyongyang declared that the Agreed Framework had col-
lapsed, arguing that the deliveries were the only portion of the agreement that
the United States had ever carried out.81 An IAEA resolution of 29 November
urging the North’s immediate compliance with its nonproliferation obliga-
tions was brusquely rejected in a 2 December letter from Foreign Minister Paik
Nam Soon to Mohamed ElBaradei, general director of the IAEA Board of
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Governors.82 On 12 December, the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman, claim-
ing acute energy shortages following suspension of the fuel oil shipments, de-
clared that the North would end its commitment to the Agreed Framework,
restart operations at its mothballed nuclear facilities, and resume construction
of the larger reactors suspended in 1994.83
The 12 December announcement initiated a succession of audacious, unilat-
eral actions that in a matter of weeks began to roll back much of North Korea’s
eight years of nuclear restraint. In rapid succession, North Korea requested on
13 December that the IAEA withdraw its seals and cameras from the DPRK’s de-
clared facilities; stated on 19 December that the Agreed Framework now existed
“in name only”; removed or otherwise disabled the locks and monitoring equip-
ment at the reactor, cooling pond, fuel fabrication plant, and reprocessing facil-
ity—all between 21 and 24 December; announced the intended expulsion of the
IAEA inspectors on 27 December, even as the inspectors reported that two thou-
sand fresh fuel rods had already been loaded into the reactor; and notified the
IAEA of its intention to reactivate its fuel reprocessing facility within several
months, purportedly to ensure the safety of spent fuel rods that would be re-
moved and stored following their use in the reactivated reactor and (once com-
pleted) in the larger reactors, where construction was expected to resume.
On 29 December, the Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that there was no
way “to internationalize the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. . . . [I]t is uni-
versally known that [this] issue . . . should be solved between the DPRK and the
U.S., as it is the product of the latter’s hostile policy in every respect.” Accord-
ingly, the spokesman declared that American actions were “compelling us to
withdraw from the NPT”; only a legally binding security guarantee from the
United States (including a nonaggression treaty with the DPRK) would satisfy
Pyongyang.84 On 10 January 2003, the DPRK announced its “automatic and im-
mediate” effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT and its “complete
free[dom] from the restrictions of the safeguard agreement with the IAEA.” De-
spite the national security justifications that pervaded the document, the DPRK
statement presented its actions as necessitated by energy exigencies: “Although
we withdraw from the NPT, we have no intention to make nuclear weapons; and
in the current stage, our nuclear activities will be limited to only peaceful pur-
poses, including electricity production. If the United States suspends its hostile
crushing policy on us and clears away the nuclear threat, we could prove,
through a separate verification between the DPRK and the United States, that we
do not make nuclear weapons.”85 Pyongyang therefore sought to maintain its
claims to special status that had pervaded its nuclear diplomacy since 1993. But
the North couched its withdrawal from the treaty in terms that did not preclude
an overt declaration of nuclear-weapons status at a future date.
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Despite North Korea’s abrupt reactivation of its plutonium program and its
announced withdrawal from the NPT, the Bush administration maintained the
studied equanimity evident since the nuclear confrontation became public
knowledge in mid-October. There was a late-December initiative for a policy of
“tailored containment” and periodic hints of flexibility should North Korea re-
lent from its course of action, but the essence of the administration’s approach
remained unchanged—there would be no resumption of direct negotiations
with the North.86 The hints of flexibility were likely intended to reassure the in-
coming ROK presidential administration of Roh Moo-hyun, who had already
voiced major reservations about U.S. policy toward the North. The Bush admin-
istration’s continued insistence that North Korea’s actions did not constitute a
crisis reflected its determination to deny Pyongyang what it sought above all—a
bilateral agreement with the United States, with both countries “sitting knee to
knee.”87 It also seems likely that the administration was caught flat-footed by the
speed and decisiveness with which Pyongyang had reactivated its long-dormant
plutonium program.
Pyongyang’s reaction to the cutoff of U.S. oil supplies suggested careful plan-
ning and execution, and a determination to change realities on the ground while
the opportunity presented itself. Justifying its behavior by the inattention and
misdeeds of its principal adversary was a time-honored North Korean strategy.
It is possible that the DPRK might have ultimately decided to reactivate its plu-
tonium program on its own initiative, but the oil cutoff made it far easier for
Pyongyang to justify its actions. Putting aside the North’s alarmist renderings of
U.S. policy, President Bush and various senior administration officials regarded
North Korea as an illegitimate government and a direct threat to vital U.S. secu-
rity interests. Yet a profound contradiction persisted between the administra-
tion’s ominous portrayal of North Korea in the new national security strategy
document and the seeming composure with which the United States reacted to
Pyongyang’s flouting of its nonproliferation obligations, especially in compari-
son to the administration’s single-minded focus on Iraq.
However, as North Korea steadily reactivated its plutonium program, senior
administration officials began to warn that President Bush was keeping “all mili-
tary options open.”88As further stated by Assistant Secretary of State Kelly in
mid-March 2003, the administration was “determined that North Korea not be-
come a nuclear power, acknowledged or unacknowledged,” without any admin-
istration official indicating what measures Washington might contemplate to
prevent such an outcome.89
By discarding the Agreed Framework, the United States and North Korea de-
cided that they preferred living with future uncertainties and dangers to sustain-
ing or modifying an imperfect formula that had capped Pyongyang’s nascent
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nuclear-weapons program for nearly a decade. Over the longer run, it is possible
that a successor to the 1994 accord addressing the declared concerns of both
countries and of neighboring states might reconstitute previous constraints. At
this writing, however, neither state exhibits much interest in such an outcome.
Should Washington and Pyongyang adhere to the equivalent of default options
as their long-term policies, a declared North Korean nuclear-weapons capability
and the severest of future crises could yet loom. One or both states might ulti-
mately be sobered by these possibilities, but this realization is not at hand.
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CHINA’S MANNED SPACE PROGRAM
Sun Tzu or Apollo Redux?
Joan Johnson-Freese
Nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuver. What is difficult
about maneuver is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn
misfortune to advantage.
SUN TZU
China is on a fast track into space. Chinese officials have stated that a mannedspace launch is imminent—likely in the second half of 2003. The four
launches since 1999 of the Shenzhou (Divine or Sacred Vessel) spacecraft in-
tended to launch the taikonauts into orbit evidence substantial Chinese techni-
cal achievement and the seriousness of the program.1 Those achievements, plus
pronouncements about timetables, space laborato-
ries, shuttles, space stations, lunar bases, and now
Mars missions, naturally make one wonder just what
the Chinese are up to. Is there a new, twenty-first-
century space race brewing? If there is, who is racing,
and toward what goal? Analysis and commentary have
spawned several, often one-dimensional, scenarios.
Policy and academic analyses of Chinese space ac-
tivities have been limited and “stovepiped” within dis-
ciplines. With few exceptions, analyses have either
focused on technical parameters or have been highly
politicized as part of threat assessments, usually in the
context of U.S. plans for missile defense.2 In the case of
the former, though much of the Chinese program re-
mains cloaked in secrecy due to both the nature of the
Chinese system and the military aspects of the topic,
considerable agreement exists among technical ana-
lysts concerning Chinese capabilities, now and
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potentially in the future.3 Securing consensus regarding political “intent” re-
mains more difficult. There are analysts who feel that the pursuit of space tech-
nology can be benign and development oriented; others perceive it as inherently
nefarious. That China is so large and complex that one can look there for proof
of any thesis, and find it, complicates the situation.
Some observers see China’s race to space as a battle with its own demons.
Prestige, in this scenario, becomes the Chinese brass ring. Conquering space
represents an opportunity in what China refers to as mankind’s “fourth fron-
tier” to recapture its lost legacy of technological mastery and innovation.4 Cer-
tainly, a Chinese quest for prestige is undeniable. Chinese scientists and policy
makers eagerly point out that when (not if) China launches taikonauts into
space, it will be only the third country in the world to have done so. No European
countries can do that, or Japan either; manned space flight will belong to an ex-
clusive club of the United States, Russia, and China. The world was dramatically
and tragically reminded of the technical difficulty of piloted spaceflight, and
subsequently the high level of technical achievement requisite to accomplish
such, with the recent loss of the space shuttle Columbia. So, the prospective do-
mestic, regional, and international benefits of that exclusivity are considerable.
But are they enough for a country that daily faces Herculean challenges in keep-
ing its population fed, employed, and stable and pursuing essential domestic
modernization, while it spends an estimated two billion dollars annually on a
space program?5
If not, the reason the Chinese are pursuing a manned space program may be
to draw attention from its military space activities, which will clearly benefit
from the dual-use nature of the technology being developed. The July 2002 An-
nual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, published by
the U.S. Department of Defense, stated, “While one of the strongest immediate
motivations for this [China’s manned space program] appears to be political
prestige, China’s manned space efforts almost certainly will contribute to im-
proved military space systems in the 2010–2020 time frame.”6 Global recogni-
tion of the increasingly important role of space in military operations began
with the unofficial proclamation of the Gulf War as “the first space war,” and it
has grown steadily since.7 Under a worst-case scenario, the Chinese manned ef-
forts are merely a Trojan horse. It has already been suggested, for example, that
Chinese leaders may see potential military value in Shenzhou as a reconnais-
sance platform.8 Chinese government officials have, after all, included national
defense in the stated aims of their space program.9
Both history and a logical policy analysis, however, reject the notion that Chi-
nese reasoning must be viewed as an either-or situation. Far more likely, Chinese
motivations for eagerly, even aggressively, pursuing a space program, including
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manned space, are multifaceted. Unless the Chinese suffer a technical disaster—
which they have been working to avoid, and will post-Columbia even more
ardently—space yields high returns on investment in multiple policy areas. In-
deed, in the United States space has always been a subfield of other areas—for-
eign, national security, economic, and science policy being the most prominent.
Examining the Chinese space program under the same premises allows for a
better understanding of what the Chinese are doing and why. Extrapolating the
current environment into the future makes apparent the context for a potential
coming space race, as well as why it is likely the United States and China will be
the primary—though not the only—competitors.
KNOW THE ENEMY AND KNOW YOURSELF . . .
Popular history tells us that the Apollo program exemplified the “can do” atti-
tude and visionary approach of the John F. Kennedy administration.10 If only,
some space-exploration advocates still wistfully muse, another American presi-
dent possessed such imagination and vision, the glory days of vigorous NASA
space activity would return. Those reflections are both about half-right. Popular
history’s view of Apollo rightly glorifies the can-do spirit but greatly embellishes
the vision aspect. Having observed the dramatic and unanticipated U.S. public
sense in reaction to the Soviet launch of Sputnik during the Eisenhower admin-
istration that the United States was technically inferior to, and hence potentially
weaker than, the Soviet Union—and how that impression spread worldwide—
the Kennedy administration recognized the symbolic power and allure of space
accomplishments.11 Additionally, the United States already had an active mili-
tary space program under way; it was patent that the technology requisite for ci-
vilian space activities would benefit the military side, and the American
economy as well. If the technical risks could be managed, the benefits were po-
tentially enormous. Space became, on one level, a Cold War battlefield, where
scientists and engineers were the frontline soldiers, fighting for the prestige and
global influence that would flow from technical prowess, prowess also beneficial
to the military. On another level, the knowledge and hardware created would
bring domestic benefits beyond the symbolic and military arenas.
Several parallels can be drawn between U.S. decision making in support of
Apollo in the 1960s and that going on in China today with respect to the manned
space program. Domestic, regional, and international prestige are clearly factors
in Chinese decision making. Domestically, a positive “public-rallying” factor
complements national pride. Images of the Shenzhou basically make people feel
good about themselves and their country; they are found on consumer goods
from phone cards to water heaters. Also, domestic pride and international pres-
tige also yield increased governmental legitimacy, a strong consideration in
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Beijing. Internationally, especially to the extent that prestige implies influence,
in the sense that it once did for the United States, regional politics, vying for the
“top spot,” comes into play. Few areas of exclusive technical achievement re-
main; many countries (most pertinently for Chinese regional considerations,
Japan and India) have satellites, launch facilities, etc. (though with a wide range
of quality, size, and capabilities); however, there are still only two countries in
the world with manned space programs. Hence, for purposes of prestige, accept-
ing the exponentially higher costs associated with manned versus unmanned
launches becomes obligatory.
Economically, the benefits for the United States of the space race generally
and the Apollo program specifically were far reaching, both direct and indirect.
Education and on-the-job experience for the Apollo scientists and engineers
created a generation of highly trained technical personnel. Engineering pro-
grams were specifically set up in
colleges and universities to meet
the need for new and specialized
aerospace skills. In China, the
University of Science and Tech-
nology of China, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and
Beijing Institute of Technology are all among the top universities, and all eagerly
discuss and promote their involvement in the space program. Student interest in
space is said to have exploded in China. If the Chinese experience parallels any-
thing close to what has happened in Japan already, universities and industries
must be using even remote possibilities of being involved in space ventures to
lure the best and the brightest into their programs.
Another economic payoff is to be seen in the movie Apollo 13. Tom Hanks’s
character shows a congressional delegation through the Vehicle Assembly Build-
ing at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). These tours were once a regular NASA
function. Escorts pointed out what parts of the program were produced in each
state of the union and how the approximately twenty-five billion dollars spent
on Apollo was being spread across the country—information politically neces-
sary to keep the funds flowing. Government money spent was expected not only
to get a man to the moon but to employ a great many people in the process.12 In
China today, programs that bolster technical education and create technical jobs
are of considerable interest; the lessons of Apollo have not been lost on the Chi-
nese leadership.
Conversely, China is also aware that space programs can be viewed, as was the
case during Apollo, as desirable but expendable in favor of more pragmatic,
near-term needs. Many U.S. scientists objected to Apollo as draining funds from
too many other programs, and politicians had other priorities. Some groups in
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China have quietly but deliberately let it be known that they see space programs
as a waste of money. This new phenomenon—Chinese public opinion actually
mattering to the government—demands returns on investment heretofore
unnecessary.
While the United States blazed through the heavens up the steepest of learn-
ing curves, other countries recognized that a technology gap was developing,
one potentially detrimental to their future.13 In the late 1960s and into the 1970s,
European nations aggressively pursued space activity, separately and then col-
lectively, for economic reasons. It was deemed that space engendered technol-
ogy, technology led to industrialization, and industrialization fostered
economic growth. In Canada, public and political pressure for space activity that
would prevent being on the wrong side of the technology gap produced a pro-
gram designed to focus on one technology at a time, carefully selected to benefit
the Canadian people directly. Communications satellites, linking Canada’s vast
geographic expanse, were the first focus. Robotics (notably the Canadarm), with
potential industrial and hence economic benefits on Earth, were the second.
China is keenly aware of these established relationships between space, technol-
ogy, economics, and domestic politics.
Finally, there is the military consideration. According to the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute, “No country can currently rival or contest
U.S. space dominance or the advantages that this provides to its terrestrial mili-
tary operations.”14 Wired magazine put it differently in April 2002: “The Penta-
gon’s role in world affairs has gone through an epochal transformation: from the
Fulda Gap to the Highway of Death, from Agent Orange to GPS [the Global Po-
sitioning System], from arsenal of democracy to global cop. When you are a cop,
sometimes you kick doors in. Most of the time you stay on patrol. Outer space is
where a global cop patrols. America’s eyes, ears and nerves are up there, all day,
every day, circling the blue yonder. Space vehicles are the ultimate asymmetrical
asset. They cannot be reached with a hijacked jet. They laugh at anthrax.”15 The
Chinese are well aware of U.S. space dominance. They have read the 2001 report
of the Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Opera-
tion (commonly known as the Space Commission Report), chaired by secretary
of defense and space supporter Donald Rumsfeld.16 That report surmised that
since air, land, and sea all have become battlegrounds, it is inevitable that space
will too; the United States, it went on, would be remiss not to prepare for that in-
evitability. The Chinese are fully able to read between the lines and see the impli-
cations for development of space weapons.
Identifying potential military gains from technology specifically developed
for manned space activities is not, however, as straightforward as some have
speculated. Using the Shenzhou as a reconnaissance platform, for example,
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hardly seems to maximize capability while minimizing expenditures. In 1969,
the U.S. military abandoned the Manned Orbital Laboratory program, intended
to perform reconnaissance, in large part because unmanned satellites could pro-
vide the same—or better—capabilities.17 If the Chinese are solely or even pri-
marily seeking what amounts to a high-resolution, real-time reconnaissance
satellite, a direct approach to building one makes more sense technically and
fiscally.
Nonetheless, development of space hardware and know-how for the manned
programs will certainly push the Chinese rapidly up the learning curve in every-
thing from materials to computing power to systems engineering, as the Apollo
program did for the United States. Their desire and perceived need to scale that
curve is unambiguous. In January 2003, the Chinese launched their second Zi
Yuan (ZY-2) photoreconnaissance satellite, capable of resolution in the range of
ten to twenty centimeters. It is a military version of a satellite jointly developed
by China and Brazil for remote sensing (the ZY-1, or China Brazil Earth Re-
source Satellite, CBERS)—evidence of how development of a civil program can
have clear military benefit.
The robustness and activism of U.S. military space efforts under the George
W. Bush administration—especially in contrast to the generally disapproving
attitude of its predecessor—must also be considered in the context of
U.S.-China relations more generally. Until “9/11,” when many international re-
lationships got turned on their heads and several strange bedfellows emerged,
some analysts felt that justly or unjustly, China had been deemed the next enemy
of the United States. China-U.S. relations have been strained in this realm, com-
mencing with the 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States (again led by Rumsfeld); they were exacerbated by the 1998 Cox
Commission Report accusing U.S. aerospace companies of giving China techni-
cal assistance in its military space program through commercial satellite
launches, and aggravated by the EP-3 incident in 2001; and they must always be
considered in the context of both American military support to Taiwan and U.S.
missile defense plans, which the Chinese perceive as severely impacting their
own nuclear deterrence.18
Indeed, during this time a loose alliance of members of Congress, congressio-
nal staff, think-tank fellows, conservative journalists, lobbyists for Taiwan, for-
mer intelligence officers, and a handful of academics proudly proclaimed
themselves the “Blue Team,” united in their view that a rising China posed great
risks to America’s vital interests. They were determined and effective in encour-
aging a hard-line U.S. government stance on anything Chinese.19 Their success
was interpreted in China as signaling mainline acceptance of those views; that
has provided in turn an opportunity for backlash from Chinese hard-liners
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(potentially triggering a dangerous action-reaction cycle). Therefore, any activ-
ity that might increase Chinese capabilities in an area of clear and expanding
U.S. dominance—like space—would easily garner support in Beijing.
Taken together, the political, economic, and military benefits to the Chinese
in pursuing space activity, including manned space, validate their course of ac-
tion as a rational policy decision. Although certainly there is no full-blown cold
war, there are considerable parallels to the Apollo-era U.S. rationales in terms of
domestic benefits, surrogate struggles for regional influence, and global political
and military posturing. Indeed China itself is clear that it is pursuing space ac-
tivity not just as an end in itself but as part of a larger strategy.
INVINCIBILITY DEPENDS ON ONE’S SELF . . .
In November 2000, the Information Office of the State Council issued the first
Chinese white paper on space, China’s Space Activities.20 The technical mile-
stones laid down were impressive, and the language was insightful. It reminded
readers that China had invented gunpowder, the “embryo of modern space rock-
ets.” Space, then, is a field China sees itself as having initiated and once domi-
nated, but was then overtaken in. It now wants to regain a place of distinction.
Included in the development targets provided in the white paper were
earth-observation systems, independently operated satellite broadcasting and
telecommunications systems, an independent satellite navigation and position-
ing system, upgraded launch vehicles as necessary for manned space flight, a co-
ordinated national satellite remote-sensing application system, space science,
space exploration, and industrialization and marketing of space technology and
applications. Equally important, the paper also declared that these goals would
be achieved through adherence to
the principle of long-term, stable and sustainable development and making the de-
velopment of space activities . . . serve the state’s comprehensive development strat-
egy. The Chinese government attaches great importance to the significant role of
space activities in implementing the strategy of revitalizing the country with science
and education and that of sustainable development, as well as in economic construc-
tion, national security, science and technology development and social progress. The
development of space activities is encouraged and supported by the government as
an integral part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy.
In that context, the white paper promoted international space cooperation,
placing priority on cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region and supporting
Chinese participation in international launch services.
China recognizes that its current “catch-up” position is at least partly of its
own making. Space scientists and engineers did not escape the wrath of the Cul-
tural Revolution.21 Facilities were destroyed, and individuals were starved and
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sometimes beaten while being forced to continue work in austere, even unimag-
inable conditions. One early launch account, for example, describes rocket fuel
being loaded by bicycle pump. China did have, however, well trained individuals
in its space program. Many, including the program’s leader, Qian Xuesen, were
Western trained; Dr. Qian had a Ph.D. from Toronto University and had worked
at the California Institute of Technology for more than twenty years.22 Qian,
along with approximately a hundred other Chinese scientists, was expelled from
the United States in 1955 during the McCarthy era and now bears long-standing,
and many say understandable, ill feelings toward the United States.
From those roots, China proceeded tumultuously but determinedly. The Chi-
nese must be commended for development of what was, until very recently, a
virtually indigenous space program. Between the updated German V-2 rocket
(renamed R-2 and left behind by the Soviets when they broke relations with the
Chinese in 1960), the initiation of commercial satellite launches in the
mid-1980s, and collaboration with the Russians on aspects of the manned space
program beginning in the late 1990s, the Chinese have worked primarily alone,
though not entirely by choice. Mao Tse-tung scared off even Nikita Khrushchev
with his casual attitude toward nuclear war; there followed the self-imposed iso-
lation of the Cultural Revolution, and a relationship with the United States that
was tenuous at best, especially after Tiananmen Square. The Chinese quickly
made significant autonomous technical achievements, however, when left on their
own. Within a decade of their first satellite launch in 1970, the Chinese could suc-
cessfully recover large satellites from orbit. This is important today as a critical
step in any manned program, since it requires the development of such technolo-
gies as heat shields, sophisticated tracking systems, and automated controls.
Nevertheless, the Chinese always maximized their ability to learn from oth-
ers. That their Xichang launch site is at approximately twenty-eight degrees
north latitude and KSC is at 28.5 degrees north is not coincidence. The Chinese
picked a similar latitude to allow emulation of American post-launch trajecto-
ries, which were described in some detail in open-source U.S. literature. Even to-
day, although the Shenzhou spacecraft bears similarities to the Russian Soyuz
design, the Chinese avidly defend it as their own product, which technical com-
parisons seem to bear out.23 They view having begun with the Soyuz design
rather than reinventing the wheel as simply smart business practice.
In May 2002 China held a National Science Week. In one exhibition, a model
showed China’s vision of a permanent settlement on Mars. “From a long-term
perspective, it is a historical necessity for man to travel into space,” a poster pro-
claimed. A six-wheeled robotic detector was unveiled as potentially China’s first
lunar visitor. The exhibition’s tone reflected China’s acknowledgment that con-
siderable self-interest was involved in its bid to become the third nation to put a
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human in space. “The development and use of technologies for manned space
flight have far-reaching significance for our nation in the political, military, eco-
nomic and technological fields,” a poster said.24
The current manned space effort, known as Project 921, is China’s second.
(Actually it is the third, if one counts Wan Hu, a sixteenth-century inventor who
built a rocket-propelled chair. Upon testing, both the inventor and the chair met
with unfortunate outcomes.) In the present program, fourteen taikonauts have
been selected, and much like the first U.S. astronauts, they were drawn from the
elite ranks of military fighter pilots. Two taikonauts trained in Russia, but most
training is now conducted in a secret facility north of Beijing.25 The Chinese are
deliberately creating an aura of mystique and drama around the taikonauts. Af-
ter the latest preliminary flight, the Chinese released rare footage of the men in
training. The Shenzhou capsule is reportedly able to carry three or four
taikonauts, though it is likely that the initial flight will carry only one. There has
been speculation that Chen Long, a thirty-year-old fighter pilot, is to have the
honor of being the first Chinese into space.26
The earlier manned program started in the 1970s and then stopped in 1980,
due to lack of funds, technological barriers, and a pragmatic decision to put
more emphasis on applications satellites. That project was run purely on a
planned, central-economy basis, with a one-way money flow. This second
round, which commenced in 1992, is being managed very differently.
The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC, or
CASTC) was created in 1999 for the pursuit of national defense and aerospace
endeavors; it spun off from the China Aerospace Corporation (CAC).27 The
change was part of an effort to become more competitive, in which the Chinese
government reformed the top defense and technology corporations, like CAC,
which was a large state-owned enterprise under direct supervision of the State
Council. CAC, which had some 270,000 employees, was divided into the CASC
and the China Aerospace Machinery and Electronics Corporation (recently re-
named China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation), presumably with
about 150,000 employees. CASC, itself a large state-owned enterprise, has a reg-
istered capital of RMB* nine billion yuan.28
Over 130 organizations are subordinate to CASC, including five large re-
search academies—the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, the
Chinese Academy of Space Technology, the Shanghai Academy of Space Flight
Technology, the Chinese Academy of Space Electronic Technology, and the
Academy of Space Chemical Propulsion Technology; two large research and
manufacture bases, the Sichuan Space Industry Corporation and Xian Space
Science and Technology Industry Corporation; as well as a number of factories,
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research institutes under the direct supervision of the headquarters, and compa-
nies in which CASC has major or minor shares. CASC employs around 110,000
employees, of whom technical staff accounts for more than forty thousand,
including over 1,300 researchers and twenty-one academicians from the Chi-
nese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering.29 CASC’s
general manager, Zhang Qingwei, urges the corporation’s workers to strive to
make it globally competitive in the next three years by transforming it into a
modern enterprise system. CASC projects that total income and profit will
double between 2001 and 2005, as it becomes a large enterprise group boasting
renowned brands, its own intellectual property rights, and powerful core com-
petitiveness.30
The tricky part of reorganization and management reform in China is that
cutting jobs is usually necessary. Chinese launch site workers, for example, have
remarked to the author that often three or four people are assigned to a task one
person could handle, and likely could handle better alone. Yet, as previously
stated, creating jobs remains an important Beijing priority. So China has had to
be creative, balance interests, and move slowly in its reform efforts. The aero-
space industry has become something of a test case.
CASC has general authority over manned spaceflight and the Long March–
series rockets. Ultimately, however, the military (specifically the Second Artil-
lery Corps) controls the Chinese space program. Although specific efforts have
been made toward separating the military aspects from the civil/commercial as-
pects, China, like Russia, did not initially bifurcate its program as did the United
States.31 Having said that, however, it cannot be forgotten that the U.S. civilian
program too grew from military roots. The Long March (Chang Zheng)
launcher series, today marketed by the Great Wall Industry Corporation, bears a
legacy not unlike those of the U.S. Delta, Atlas, and Titan commercial launchers.
That is, it was originally designed
in the early 1970s as an interconti-
nental ballistic missile (Dong
Feng 4 and 5) rather than simply
as a rocket, like the French Ariane, for example.32 This ultimately unified effort
in sensitive areas like propulsion research but gave rise to concern in the United
States about technology transfer.
Among CASC’s most important current achievements are the more than
twenty consecutive successful test launches achieved since 1996. Although each
of those successful launches is important independently, together they build a
record of reliability important for restoring confidence among commercial
launch-insurance companies. After a series of accidents in the 1990s and the
subsequent Cox Commission report issued in the United States, the lucrative
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Chinese launch market quickly dried up.33 Other than thirteen satellites for the
Iridium communication venture, commercial launches, which had generated
hard currency for China, with considerably more likely expected, have been at a
virtual standstill, and little likelihood of a dramatic turnaround is foreseen.34
The Chinese probably hope that positive spillover from a successful manned
launch, in terms of perceived technical capability, will benefit their commercial
launch program. Nevertheless, problems will remain: Chinese launch costs are
higher (between sixty and seventy million dollars per launch) than those of in-
ternational competitors, and U.S. export laws for launching U.S.-built satellites
in China are highly restrictive.
Besides launch vehicles, China has numerous satellite programs. Dong Fang
Hong (DFH) communications satellites have gone through multiple iterations.
DFH-1, also known as Mao 1, was launched in 1970. It is most famous for broad-
casting from space the song “The East is Red.” The latest DFH iteration is being
cooperatively developed with Germany. The Fanhui Shi Weixing recoverable
satellites were originally developed for photoreconnaissance but now are also
used for remote sensing. The third application satellite is the Feng Yun (FY) se-
ries, used for meteorology and remote sensing. The Chinese have also launched
a series of Shi Jian satellites, carrying science payloads. Two Bei Dou navigation
satellites have also been launched. Between 2001 and 2006 the Chinese have said
they intend to launch thirty satellites as part of an expanding program culminat-
ing with human spaceflight.
Announcements as early as 1996 gave 1999 as the year for the first manned
launch, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the commu-
nist state. Depressed finances (perhaps in part due to the loss of anticipated in-
come from commercial satellite launches) and technical issues, however, made it
impossible to keep to the original timetable. There simply was not enough time
for unmanned proving missions to ensure that the first manned attempt would
not meet with disaster. The first Shenzhou flight occurred in November 1999.
Shenzhou I completed fourteen orbits and returned to earth after just
twenty-one hours, but even so it achieved a big step forward for the Chinese.
The second flight was in January 2001; it was both more complex and more
mysterious. Numerous maneuvers were conducted before the descent module
returned to earth seven days and 108 orbits later.35 The Chinese ability to ma-
neuver the Shenzhou II independent orbital module surprised Western observ-
ers. International press reports varied, with some stating that the flight carried
cell and tissue samples of eighty-seven animals, plants, and microorganisms,
while others stated that animals (rats) were on board. Clearly, life support sys-
tems were being tested at some level. The Chinese were ambiguous as to exactly
how, and China’s state-run Xinhua Agency made no reference to animals in its
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reports. Dr. Liu Yongding, life sciences payload manager for the mission, refused
to comment when specifically asked if a monkey, dog, rabbit, or snails were
among the live specimens on board.36 Guidance and reentry technology was also
tested. No pictures of the returned capsule were released; indeed, there was a vir-
tual press blackout, leading to Western speculation that there had been landing
problems, likely either with the parachutes or the retro-rockets. The Chinese de-
nied such allegations.
Shenzhou III was launched on 24 March 2002 and returned to the remote
grasslands of Inner Mongolia on 1 April 2002.37 In each of the three seats
dummy humans were wired to medical monitors to test life-support systems,
most of which had been purchased from the Russians.
The forward part of the Shenzhou spacecraft is an orbital module, used for
experiments and as a crew transfer module for future space missions (which
could include docking with another Shenzhou vehicle to form an interim “space
laboratory,” a project Beijing has
talked about). The spacecraft has
an aft propulsion system; between
the two is a manned capsule.
Shenzhou III left the forward
module in orbit, likely for future docking tests. It also appears to be carrying a
relatively sophisticated remote-sensing payload (a medium-resolution imaging
spectroradiometer known as MRIS), transmitting high-quality data to Chinese
ground stations. The infrared technologies being validated by the instrument
potentially have both civil and military applications (that is, for military satel-
lites), again illustrating the inherently “gray” nature of most space technologies
and hence the difficulty of discerning the “intent” behind any space program.
On several occasions after the third flight and during preparation for the
fourth, Chinese officials categorically stated that “no animal has ever been on
board one of China’s unmanned space flights.”38 Indeed one official declared, “If
we sent a monkey up, it would surely make trouble, skipping and fumbling
about if it got loose.”39 This kind of ambiguity, followed by contradiction and
confusion on specifics, is not atypical for the Chinese program.
Shenzhou IV was launched on 30 December 2002 and landed just over a week
later, on 6 January 2003, again after 108 orbits. State newspapers and media her-
alded stories of the spacecraft after its successful landing. Testing maneuverabil-
ity and life-support systems had been the mission’s priority.
China’s plans are for a phased, incremental, cautious—though ambitious—
program. Future launch vehicle designs provide for increasing lift capabilities,
using a concept similar to the U.S. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. A
“family” of vehicles is to be created, based on one design but with a range of
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capabilities. Further, China continues development of liquid oxygen/kerosene
engines to replace the nitrogen/UDMH engines currently used on the Long
March.40 The lift capabilities planned and being developed for the next century
are of such a magnitude that they are obviously intended to support such mis-
sions as a manned lunar program, potentially a Mars program as well. It should
be noted, though, that these powerful launchers also expand Chinese capabili-
ties to launch heavier military satellites.
There is really no need for the Chinese to rush (perhaps to failure), especially
since small incremental steps create considerable (and positive) journalistic at-
tention in the West. Per the Beijing Morning Post, they have a three-step plan: a
taikonaut in space, establishment of a space laboratory, and eventually setting up
a space station. Wang Zhuangyin, a leading space program engineer, says
manned spaceflight will occur by 2005. The official China Daily stated that
China would put a man into orbit by 2005 and on the moon by 2010.41 Ouyang
Ziyuan, chief scientist of China’s moon exploration program, has stated, “China
is expected to complete its first exploration of the moon in 2010 and will estab-
lish a base on the moon as we did in the South Pole and the North Pole.”42
The Chinese, however, are adamant that they will build a sustained program,
not just plant a flag or return with a moon rock, alluding to the U.S. abandon-
ment of its manned lunar program and failure to step farther into space. In a
truly rational, well laid out, and well funded plan, many analysts feel, establish-
ment of a moon base (by any country) should ultimately lead to exploitation of
lunar mineral resources. Establishment of a Chinese base on Mars by 2040 has
been proclaimed as a goal. In any event, the statements now being made go far
beyond the 2000 white paper; the often-reticent Chinese are going out on a limb,
actually assigning dates to ambitions. Experience has shown them, however, that
they need not actually meet the dates to keep the rest of the world interested;
they need only keep working toward them. Nonetheless, it is likely that they will
not wait for 2005 for the first manned launch. With a successful Shenzhou IV
precursor launch now completed, the Chinese will likely go for a first manned
launch this year, in 2003. A launch date in October would coincide with the an-
niversary of the founding of the communist state—and potentially while the
U.S. shuttle fleet is still grounded, further reminding the world of the magnitude
of their technical achievement.
That the Chinese have not been included in space projects undertaken as
much for their political and cooperative aspects as for their technical utility—
such as the International Space Station (ISS)—has been a source of frustration
for them. People’s Daily on 27 December 2000 stated that the Chinese govern-
ment would seek acceptance into the ISS program. In all fairness, ISS partners
have been expected to contribute either technology or money, or both, and until
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recently China has had neither. More recently, however, Brazil, a country with
far less space experience than China, has become an ISS partner, making it more
difficult to deny that China’s exclusion includes a strong political component.
The United States has historically viewed international space cooperation as
both a political “carrot” and a technical way to “guide” other countries’ space ac-
tivities.43 Europe and Canada, and later Japan (even in the previously forbidden
area of launch technology), enjoyed the benefits of working with the United
States in space program development. That the United States has taken a differ-
ent path with China has likely, though inadvertently, contributed to China’s de-
termination now to become a space power. It is also interesting to note that since
“9/11,” after which many international relationships were redefined, NASA has
suddenly become much more open to closer ties to Beijing. Space science tradi-
tionally serves as a safe first area of space cooperation, being relatively
nonthreatening from a military perspective. Progress, even incremental, toward
ISS participation would be a domestic and regional triumph for Beijing.
Chances of that occurring post-Colombia, however, are significantly lower now
than they might have been.
China has signed cooperative space agreements with a number of countries,
including Canada, Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Russia, Pakistan, India, and
Brazil. The scope of cooperation ranges from development of the Dong Fang
Hong 3 communications satellite with Germany to a broad Russia-China coop-
erative agreement, to narrow scientific co-ventures. One future area of interna-
tional cooperation that will be especially interesting to watch is launch services;
participation in international launch services is a white-paper goal. The Chinese
understand that launch consortia like International Launch Services, a joint
venture between Lockheed Martin and Russian companies Khrunichev State
Research and RSC Energia, marketing the Proton and Atlas launchers, have be-
come increasingly prevalent and competitive since the Cold War. The Chinese
may well be looking to find partners for the Long March series.
Another interesting cooperative arrangement the Chinese have built is with
the United Kingdom’s University of Surrey Space Centre. Having built and
launched over twenty-five “microsats” performing a wide range of scientific
missions, including earth surveillance, Surrey has specialized in marketing this
new capability to developing nations. Its customers include Chile, Malaysia, Tai-
wan, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria—and China. A concern about microsatellite tech-
nology has been its potential as a means to interfere with other nations’ use of
space. China has warned that it might consider using microsats to deny U.S. use
of space in a crisis or conflict.
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ONE DEFENDS WHEN HIS STRENGTH IS INADEQUATE;
HE ATTACKS WHEN IT IS ABUNDANT
Space weaponry (beyond the handguns that have been carried into space by as-
tronauts and cosmonauts), including both weapons placed in space and those
on the ground for use against space-based assets, has until recently been care-
fully avoided by all space-faring nations. For many years it was argued that space
weapons were banned by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. What article 4 of that
treaty actually says, however, is:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any ob-
jects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in
any other manner. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States
Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military
bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the con-
duct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.
The argument against weapons was hung on the “peaceful purposes” phrase.
The “peaceful purposes” rationale against weapons has been eroding, however,
because the parties making that argument often define “peaceful” as meaning
nonmilitary, whereas the United States has long contended that “peaceful” pur-
poses include defensive ones. Increasingly, those who argue on the ground that
the 1967 treaty bans space weapons find themselves in a conundrum in the age
of communications, navigation, and reconnaissance satellites—all of them dual
use. Defining “peaceful purposes” as nonmilitary has become problematic for
any military wanting to use space hardware.
The first efforts of both the United States and Soviet Union toward space
weaponry were in the area of antisatellite (ASAT) systems; the Americans ini-
tially favored guided missiles (an early form of missile defense), while the Sovi-
ets preferred “killer satellites,” basically orbiting satellites armed with shrapnel
charges that would disable enemy spacecraft. Although no formal treaty was
ever signed, both countries recognized the inevitable arms race that would fol-
low if either aggressively and consistently pursued an ASAT program. (As it hap-
pened, neither state did, though more through serendipity than rational
decision making, as both programs waxed and waned in domestic support and
technical achievement.)44 Further, space weaponry was recognized as not with-
out risk to all parties. Blowing things up in space creates debris. That debris in it-
self becomes a threat to other spacecraft, including one’s own. Soviet ASAT tests
in the 1960s left debris that is still a hazard today.
The Chinese, for their part, clearly see 1998 as a turning point with respect to
space weapons—a time when the Blue Team and its supporters began moving
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from militarizing space—which has a long and accepted history—to
weaponizing it. The U.S. Space Commission Report stated it as inevitable that
space will become a battleground and that the United States would be remiss not
to prepare. The United States held its first space war game in January 2001, much
to the consternation of the Chinese.45
Chinese space efforts will, indeed already do, include militarization. Chinese
use of satellites for troop communication or for reconnaissance equates to
militarization. But the bigger question is whether China also intends to develop
space weapons.
In November 2001 the Associated Press reported Huang Huikang, an official
from the Chinese foreign ministry, as saying, “Some powers in the world are on
the way to militarizing outer space, not peacefully exploring. Another arms race
in outer space has begun since 1998 and we should be watchful.”46 Obviously,
Chinese reasoning for seeking to minimize a space-technology gap with the
United States falls much into the same lines as that of the United States subse-
quent to the Space Commission Report—each feeling that they would be im-
prudent not to prepare and respond. China sees the United States as having
“abundant power,” especially in space; with missile defense, it will have what
many countries refer to as “the sword and the shield.”47 Subsequently, a com-
ment in a Chinese newspaper in July 2000 suggesting that for countries clearly
unable to defeat the United States by tanks and aircraft, attacking its space sys-
tem may be an irresistible choice, is not really surprising.48
Many analysts feel that the first “space assault” will likely be a ground-based
electronic attack on a satellite. Evidence suggests, in fact, that such assaults
have already occurred, tempo-
rar i ly “blinding” satel l i tes . 4 9
China is purportedly aggressively
working on ground-based laser
technology for that purpose. The easiest way to attack and destroy a satellite,
however, is with a weapon launched from the ground. A small missile could de-
posit a cloud of sand, ball bearings, or other hard objects in a satellite’s path;
the target’s own velocity would provide the impact needed for destruction. A
dozen or so countries have the capability to build such a system, though there
is no evidence any have done so. China claims, however, to have developed
“parasite satellites,” orbiting bombs that attach themselves to enemy spacecraft
for detonation when deemed necessary. Verification of the claim is difficult,
since none has ever been launched. Arguments can be made both that it be-
hooves China to let the United States think it has these capabilities so that it
will not think China’s strength “inadequate,” and that claims like these prod
the United States to be even more aggressive in its own military space
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development. In either case, there is clearly an action-reaction cycle building,
from which there is no obvious escape.
China and Russia have repeatedly called for a treaty banning weapons in
outer space, most recently in May 2002. How those calls correspond to Chinese
claims to have developed a parasite satellite is unclear. Likely they would deem
that technology “defensive,” perhaps even in a preemptive sense. In any case,
their calls for a ban on space weapons have gone unheeded; indeed, they are
viewed as somewhat hypocritical. Perhaps the United States believes that forcing
China to spend money on space technology to keep up will “break the bank,” as
apparently happened in the Soviet Union because of its self-destructive efforts
to respond to the American Strategic Defense Initiative. The question then be-
comes, however, whether it is in the best interest of the United States to deal with
a strong and robust China or an imploding one, likely with problems of even
greater magnitude than the former Soviet Union’s.
KEEP HIM UNDER STRAIN AND WEAR HIM DOWN
Early in 2002, NASA discovered on Mars potentially vast resources of under-
ground water, close to the surface. Subsequently, there was considerable specula-
tion that NASA was “on the verge” of announcing plans to send a man to Mars,
at an estimated cost of fifty billion dollars. Other countries (Japan, Europe,
China) were making advances in space, and the question was raised: would there
be a new race to space? Likely there will be, but not because of water on Mars.
Lining up competitors in any potential space race today is relatively easy,
though there is a wild card. Although Russia starts from a presumed position of
strength, the country is a cash-strapped, emaciated shadow of its former self.
President Vladimir Putin has said that Russia now has nothing to be proud of in
space.50 European efforts, traditionally through the European Space Agency,
have long been dictated—that is, restricted—by having to get fifteen member
states to agree on goals, then on funding, and then on follow-through. This will
be further complicated by the new and as yet undefined role of the European
Commission in space activity; the Galileo program (an alternative to GPS) will
be one to watch as an indicator of the extent to which Europe will be able to
match actions to rhetoric. Japan, once touted as the country most consistently
progressing toward a fully matured program, is now plagued with problems in
its space activities, particularly the centerpiece H-II launcher. India has an ag-
gressive and impressive space program, but Indian decision makers are acutely
aware of what politicians in the United States have long known, that in a democ-
racy, space is positively viewed by the public but considered expendable relative
to other public spending concerns. While India develops specific space technol-
ogy for civil and military purposes and has generated a considerable regional
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technological reputation, there is little chance that the expenditure that would
be required for a manned program would be domestically tolerated.
China does not have voters to worry about (though that does not mean that it
can ignore public opinion). Accordingly, although China has yet to produce a
Nobel Prize laureate and remains constrained by economics, it has the scientific
and engineering potential and could have the political will (arising from domes-
tic factors and action-reaction with the United States) to stay the course in space
development. That, the Chinese believe, will have a significant impact on its
global image, as a country’s relative position on the spaceflight learning curve
can be a barometer of a nation’s fortunes, while the unforgiving nature of space
flight can dramatically illustrate a country’s failings just as graphically.
The wild card may well be South Korea. It has plans for indigenous satellite
launches, including military satellites, by 2005. The prestige and military impli-
cations of that could spur Japan to reinvigorate its own efforts, in turn challeng-
ing China, with implications for India. A successful Chinese manned launch
could also push Japan toward an autonomous manned program—a decision
that risk-averse Japan has been avoiding for many years. On the other hand Japa-
nese risk-aversion will be strengthened by orders of magnitude post-Columbia.
Certainly, however, regional action-reaction considerations will come into play,
the pertinent question becoming how quickly they would expand beyond the
United States and China.
Sun Tzu’s adage of bearing down on the enemy seems to encapsulate the current
approaches of both the United States and China. China does not have to be an
enemy of the United States, but it is certainly destined to be a competitor, if the
U.S. benchmark for competition in Asia is anything beyond the status quo. If the
United States continues to exploit the obvious military advantages of space and
China feels compelled to respond, a space race of some sort seems inevitable. It
is inevitable because both countries recognize that space can provide advan-
tages, or at least avoid disadvantages, vis-à-vis the other. It may inevitably make
China the third man in the fourth battlefield.
Whether China intends to be the tortoise or the hare in the space race is a rela-
tive matter. China invented the game of Wei Qi, the Asian equivalent of chess
(commonly called “Go” in the West); it has 256 pieces with which to strategize,
versus sixteen in chess. That complex a planning perspective, in the context of a
country with a continuous five-thousand-year history, exemplifies the dramatic
difference between China’s idea of long-term planning as opposed to that typi-
cal of the United States. Nevertheless, the Chinese clearly have committed them-
selves to the goal of space development, at whatever rate funding permits; it will
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be factored into the precarious balancing act the Chinese regularly practice.
China’s manned space program is about its determination to regain what it con-
siders its deserved place in global, and by default regional, politics.
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CHINA’S CLOSING WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Justin Bernier and Stuart Gold
Conventional wisdom says that the People’s Republic of China is, for better orworse, recovering its place as a major power on the world stage. To its
citizens and leaders, many of whom regard the Middle Kingdom’s decline in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a historical anomaly and its modern
resurgence as a national priority, this renewed stature means a larger economic,
political, and military role for China in East Asia and beyond. It also means
Taiwan’s return to the PRC fold, without which China’s destiny will remain un-
realized in the hearts and minds of most mainlanders.
Many analysts and cogent observers have already concluded that history is on
China’s side in the struggle over Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province.
As China’s size and strength continue to grow in the
Asia-Pacific region, they say, Taiwan will have little choice
but to yield—on its own terms if the fledgling democracy
is lucky and wise. The same China watchers quickly point
to the PRC’s steady military buildup and substantial,
albeit uneven,economic growth as proof that today’s rela-
tively weak Beijing will in due course develop the muscle
it needs either to take the twenty-three-million-strong
Republic of China forcibly or pressure Taipei into accept-
ing a Hong Kong–like arrangement. Most estimates put
the inevitable day of reckoning somewhere between ten
and twenty years from now, when China’s military and
economic engines are expected to overshadow those of
most of its regional neighbors, if not Japan.
Mr. Bernier, a staffer in the U.S. House of Representa-
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International Corporation (SAIC) as a war-gamer.
A Ph.D. candidate (international relations) at
Georgetown University, he earned a master’s degree in
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A more realistic, comprehensive examination of the pertinent trends reveals a
different future. An attempted blockade and limited missile campaign—the
most plausible attack scenario—would be more likely to produce China’s de-
sired results in this decade than in the next. By 2010, the guardian United States
will have strengthened its military position in the western Pacific relative to
China, and a defensively stronger Taipei will have fully embraced, if not institu-
tionalized, Taiwan’s increasingly popular “status quo” approach to cross-strait
affairs, further marginalizing the idea of reunification. Added to other unmis-
takable trends, such an environment will make a PRC move on Taiwan exponen-
tially riskier. The conservative defense planners in Beijing almost certainly
realize this. If Chinese aggression in East Asia is to be deterred, Taiwan and the
United States must also recognize and prepare for this alternate reality.
TAIWAN’S STATUS QUO CONSENSUS
Happy on average with its national identity and way of life today, Taiwan is un-
likely to join voluntarily an authoritarian, economically unpredictable PRC, ab-
sent some use of force by the mainland. Never cordial neighbors, the two parties’
differences have hardened in recent years, while the Republic of China’s success-
ful democratic experiment has tipped the domestic political scale in favor of the
status quo, perhaps forever.
At the heart of this political shift is the breakdown of the pro-reunification
Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, Beijing’s best hope for a peaceful merger.
Plagued by infighting and mass defections to splinter factions after half a cen-
tury of uninterrupted rule, the party of the ROC’s “founding father,” Chiang
Kai-shek, lost its majority in the parliament for the first time in history in De-
cember 2001, surrendering almost half its seats. Following a disappointing
third-place finish in the presidential race one year earlier, the shocking loss was
widely blamed on the Kuomintang leadership’s decision to remain faithful to the
party’s historical, but increasingly unpopular, commitment to reunification.
The new government is led by native-born Chen Shui-ben. His Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) had made periodic assertions of defiance—such as
Chen’s now-famous pronouncement to an American interviewer that “Taiwan
is an independent country,” or his coy support for a national referendum on in-
dependence—each of which prompted warnings from Beijing. However, the
DPP, which downplayed its independence proclivities near the end of its journey
from the minority to the majority, has demonstrated no measurable interest in a
serious showdown since taking power two years ago.1 Like a plurality of Taiwan’s
citizens, Taipei’s new leadership appears satisfied with the status quo, a position
tantamount to independence but without the pitfalls of a formal declaration.
“Status quo” is congenial to most Taiwanese voters, who no longer see
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reunification as desirable, or even practical, given their growing prosperity and
expanding political rights, and it has been reinforced by events in Hong Kong
that have called Beijing’s trustworthiness into question—including the reap-
pointment of an unpopular chief executive and his fourteen “ministers” for a
second five-year term without even the pretense of an election. With most voters
in favor of maintaining the present state of affairs, the Kuomintang must ac-
cordingly water down its reunification stance in future elections if it hopes to re-
main competitive on the national stage. Even China’s new president, Hu Jintao,
has conceded (as vice president) that a majority of islanders favor maintaining
the status quo, though he said that Taiwanese polls show the number of reunifi-
cation advocates rising—a claim refuted by Taipei and most surveys, which put
support for Chinese rule under a “one country, two system” model safely below
10 percent.2
Taiwanese public opinion on reunification is in fact surprisingly steady,
though pro–status quo figures are misleadingly small. In 2001, reunification op-
ponents—those who ultimately want independence or the status quo forever—
collectively polled around 40 percent. Merger advocates, Taiwanese who favor
reunification either now or later, showed only half as well, with those backing
“reunification now” perennially under 5 percent.3 About one in three Taiwanese
are for “maintaining the status quo to decide unification or independence in the
future”;4 but this group is probably more “status quo now” than “decision later”
at heart.5 Polling by the official Mainland Affairs Council indicates that many
Taiwanese citizens who say they want to decide the matter later actually reject
the most—maybe only—plausible peaceful reunification scenario. The council
demonstrated that “when Beijing’s formula of ‘one country, two systems’ for re-
solving cross-strait issues is clearly spelled out (that Taiwan is a local govern-
ment, subject to the rule of the Beijing government, and the ROC [Republic of
China] government no longer exists”—something akin to the Hong Kong
deal—70 to 74 percent of respondents rejected the measure.6 A separate
think-tank survey shows the Taiwanese people equally united against forced re-
unification, with more than three-quarters of respondents willing to defend the
nation if China launched an attack to take it over and only 10 percent unwilling
to bear arms.7 At least a sizable majority of Taiwan, it reasons, opposes Beijing’s
demands for political merger by peaceful and violent means alike, even if most
do not clamor for traditional independence.
Predictably, the voters have rewarded Taiwan’s like-minded political parties.
To be sure, the DPP’s political fortunes might dissipate were the charismatic
presidential hopeful James Soong and his People First Party to revitalize the
“pan-blue” alliance—those parties that support eventual reunification—by
merging with the cash-rich Kuomintang, but a DPP loss would probably be
7 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
78
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/21
immaterial. Besides Soong’s support for “one roof ” with “two seats” (an implied
call for delaying reunification), public opinion is no longer a secondary consid-
eration of Taiwanese politicians.8 Whoever wins the ruling seat, Taiwan’s new,
truly multiparty democracy promises to represent better the pro–status quo ma-
jority, a consensus that developed under the previous authoritarian regime, be-
fore the island’s first lawful change of power. As one observer put it, “When the
Kuomintang was in power, the authorities refused to adopt a new separate iden-
tity because it could cost them their legal basis”—that Taipei was in fact China’s
legitimate government—“however false it was, for ruling.”9 Today, Taiwanese
voters can freely realize a cross-strait policy that better reflects their own opin-
ions and desires, if not necessarily those of Beijing. So far, they have done so
in both of Taiwan’s open presidential contests, electing closet independence-
advocate Lee Teng-hui in 1996, four years before Chen’s victory forced mainland
leaders to consider the possibility that the runaway province might never will-
ingly return.
BEIJING’S SOLITARY OPTION
Implicit threats of violence have failed to steer Taipei and its constituents toward
serious reunification talks. In March 1996, Taiwan’s first-ever presidential elec-
tions went forward despite missile tests aimed at draining support for Lee, the
eventual winner with 54 percent in a field of four candidates. A year earlier, simi-
lar intimidation tactics had failed to influence the island’s parliamentary elec-
tions in the PRC’s imagined favor. Both times the Beijing-preferred Kuomintang
party suffered losses, while public support for independence or the status quo
stayed safely above 66 percent (defiantly rising one year). In each instance, Tai-
wanese support for reunification briefly peaked as high as 27 percent—unusu-
ally inflated numbers, but hardly the groundswell for which Beijing had
apparently gambled.10 Frustrated and humiliated by such political backfires,
Beijing refuses to renounce violence against Taiwan, one of its official defense
white papers declaring a readiness to “adopt all drastic measures, including the
use of force, to . . . achieve the great cause of reunification” if the Republic of
China declares independence or drags its feet in negotiations.11 Fortunately for
defense planners in Washington and Taipei, Beijing’s plausible military options
are as narrow as its threats are vague.
The most dramatic but least feasible PRC threat is an amphibious attack with
hundreds of thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops supported by
ballistic missile barrages, aircraft, naval forces, and all manner of modified mer-
chant ships. A host of analysts and government reports have poured cold water
on this frequently discussed scenario, revealing China’s sea and airlift short-
comings, the numerous force-concentration problems associated with Formosa
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beach landings, and, not the least, Taiwan’s super-hardened land defenses. Piers
Wood and Charles Ferguson, for example, persuasively argue that China lacks
not only the amphibious assault ships to bridge the strait with enough firepower
and men but also the port capacity to employ hundreds of potentially useful ci-
vilian craft.12 Their conclusion was shared by Admiral Dennis Blair, former com-
mander of the U.S. Pacific forces, who not long ago reported that “the PLA is still
years away from the capability to take and hold Taiwan.”13
By comparison, a naval blockade could bring Taiwan to its knees with relative
ease and minimal international protest. A sustained interruption of key sea lines
of communications would be economically disastrous for the Taiwanese econ-
omy, which relies heavily on shipping for its lifeblood trade and energy needs,
some two-thirds of which are fulfilled by fossil fuel imports.14 Even a temporary
closure would likely prove debilitating for the import/export-dependent econ-
omy. Shortly prior to Taiwan’s 1996 election, for example, all merchant marine
traffic to Taiwan was halted for days after China fired several unarmed DF-15
short-range missiles toward the island’s two largest ports, the closest of them
falling approximately twelve miles from land. Traffic into Taiwan’s northern
port was similarly blocked the previous year after China lobbed six DF-15s into
the strait some eighty-five miles north of the island.15
China’s green-water navy could isolate Taiwan using mines, surface ships, and
even state-sponsored piracy—an unconventional yet effective tool in the dan-
gerous South China Sea. As sunken or stolen cargo raised sensitive shipping and
insurance costs to prohibitive levels, a blockade strategy would almost certainly
trigger price spikes overnight, causing shortages and rushes on stores soon
thereafter. Chinese mines, ranging from older contact types to more modern
command-activated models that lie in wait for specific acoustic signatures,
could block harbor and port entrances as well as shipping lanes (though Beijing
might be reluctant to permanently close those shipping lanes on which it too
depends). The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) possesses submarines,
aircraft, and over forty major surface ships capable of laying mines, in addition
to some two hundred smaller vessels available for lesser mining roles.16 In the
words of the Communist Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, “Surface warship,
submarine, airplane, merchant ship and even sampan can all be used to deploy
mines,” which then become the “dragon in water.”17
There is currently little Taiwan could do in response to an aggressive undersea
campaign. With at most a dozen outdated counter–mine warfare ships at hand
(though it may buy some American minesweeping helicopters), Taiwan would
be hard pressed to clear any sizable minefields, known or suspected.18 The ROC
navy’s submarine force is similarly outmatched. Its four diesel models—two
dating from the 1940s—and nominal antisubmarine capabilities could not
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seriously challenge China’s force of seventy submarines, the best of which in-
clude four Russian-built Kilo-class boats (though two may be seriously dam-
aged) and five nuclear-powered units of the Han class.19 Taiwan’s fleet will be
even less effective against the Hans’ eventual replacement, the Type 093 nuclear-
powered attack submarine, which will be operational sometime after 2005.
Reflecting Russian influence and technology, the Type 093 will carry potent
wire-guided and wake-homing “fire and forget” torpedoes as well as cruise mis-
siles.20 Beyond procurement, China’s submarine training program concentrates
“on concealment and ambush procedures, formation attacks, long-range de-
ployments, minelaying and torpedo strikes against surface shipping.”21
Taiwan is equally unprepared today for a traditional blockade by the Chinese
surface fleet, which is numerically and qualitatively superior. Its newest ad-
ditions, two Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers fitted with the super-
sonic Sunburn ship-killing cruise missiles, present an edge over anything
Taiwan has sent to sea this decade. News that Russia will deliver to China by 2005
or 2006 another two Sovremennys, probably fitted with the even deadlier
186-mile-range Yakhont antiship cruise missile, makes a bad situation worse (if
they can be put on target).22 In contrast, Taiwan’s surface fleet is still based on
older Harpoon-armed American ships and a handful of readiness-plagued
French La Fayette frigates with missile defenses outclassed by both the Sunburn
and the Yakhont. Though useful and capable in many other respects, Taiwan’s
four Kidd-class destroyers will not appreciably alter the surface warfare balance
in the narrow strait. These ships are outranged by China’s Russian-made cruise
missiles and lack the means to detect them early enough to engage them with
their Standard missiles. (The proposed tactic—dubbed “open-seas mobility”—
for dealing with the new threat is reportedly to deploy the Kidds far from the strait,
in the vicinity of Guam.)23 The Sovremenny, with only modest 1970s-era defenses,
is vulnerable to U.S. air and submarine attack, but if the ROC navy challenged a
PLAN blockade alone, hostilities could not be expected to last long.24
NEGOTIATIONS AT MISSILE-POINT
An effective blockade alone could lead to economic collapse and panic, but a
bigger push might be required to convince a stubborn Taiwan to accept reunifi-
cation. Beijing may believe that a limited but sustained ballistic missile cam-
paign could provide the final inducement. According to a famous news story,
just before the March 1996 missile tests a Pentagon official returned from China
and reported to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake that he had learned
that the Politburo had plans prepared for a rocket attack against Taiwan consist-
ing of one conventional strike a day for thirty days.25 The idea was presumably
to make a panicked public force Taipei into an agreement favorable to the
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mainland. Though the threat may have been planted, coming as it did shortly
before Taiwan’s presidential election, it nonetheless demonstrated China’s ap-
parent willingness to pursue reunification in such a way.
Accurate missiles would be an integral part of this strategy. Much has been
said about China’s missile buildup in Fujian Province opposite Taiwan, where
the Second Artillery Corps is adding some fifty missiles a year to its estimated
arsenal of 350 (as of July 2002) mobile short-range ballistic missiles.26 Once
fully integrated with satellite-aided guidance systems, as expected, these weap-
ons will transform China’s growing short-range missile stockpile from a clumsy
political tool into a paralyzing military threat also capable of reliably hitting
prime economic and population centers. To name targets beforehand, such as
office complexes, airports, and key industrial hubs—concentrated civilian fuel
reserves could be wiped out with a few ballistic missiles, according to Taiwan’s
defense minister—would have an immeasurable effect on morale, possibly even
dissolving the island population’s will and ability to resist.27 China boasts plans
to use the Global Positioning System (GPS) on its M-type missiles, which likely
include the Dong Feng 15 (or DF-15, also known as the M-9) and another
short-range rocket, the DF-11 (or M-11).28 In fact, the accuracy of the DF-15—
deployed in Fujian, and the missile used in the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait mis-
sile tests—has already been improved with navigation data from the U.S. GPS
constellation.29
A large and accurate missile barrage could do incalculable damage to Tai-
wan’s defenses and infrastructure, but saturating the island with rockets and
land-attack cruise missiles—another type of weapon China is busily amass-
ing—would probably be counterproductive. Instead of complementing a block-
ade strategy to bring Taipei to the bargaining table once and for all, a full-scale
missile strike would likely inflame Taiwanese defiance and make the island a
martyr in the eyes of potential saviors. The United States, Australia, the United
Kingdom, and even the United Nations would be hard pressed to look away as
China pummeled Taiwan with high-explosive warheads or worse. Taiwan is now
essentially defenseless against a Chinese ballistic missile attack, but its plan to
buttress a very limited Patriot II theater missile defense system with the
third-generation Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) probably worries
Beijing, which would be embarrassed were Taiwan to shoot down a missile strike
during a blockade attempt.30 Although hardening defense facilities would prob-
ably be the most effective countermeasure to a missile attack, successful inter-
cepts could postpone a Taiwan collapse, affording Washington time to take
action. Partly in response, Beijing has deployed longer-range missiles, like the
GPS-guided DF-21, farther inland, where they can target Taiwan from a distance
that makes the forthcoming PAC-3 and other “lower tier” defenses ineffective.31
7 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
82
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/21
This partial solution, or hedge, further explains Beijing’s emotionally charged
opposition to any deal that would bring more capable “upper tier” defenses, like
the Aegis-based Navy Theater Wide System, to Taiwan.
China may see alternatives to challenging the international community. A
limited missile strike—possibly coupled with debilitating special-operations at-
tacks—could plausibly remain below the threshold of “intervention,” especially
if U.S. forces were preoccupied. This last point is important because China un-
doubtedly understands that if American help does come, it would probably not
end at assistance in missile defense. Beijing appears to think that its current
long-range nuclear deterrent, momentarily based on some two dozen vulnera-
ble silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), is insufficient to deter
the United States from exercising force in a serious cross-strait crisis. The real-
ization probably drives not only Beijing’s opposition to a U.S. national missile
defense but also its own well-documented strategic modernization program,
which began in earnest sometime in the early 1990s, shortly after the Soviet
Union’s collapse allowed China to turn its attention to Taiwan.
China likely believes its future deterrent forces, based on mobile ICBMs like
the already serviceable, five-thousand-mile-range DF-31 and its longer-range
DF-41 version, can discourage a preemptive nuclear attack by the United States,
the secret nuclear doctrine of which reportedly lists China as “a country that
could be involved in an immediate or potential [nuclear] contingency.”32 Even
so, these improved weapons will only level the strategic playing field between the
two nuclear powers, protecting the Chinese homeland from strategic preemp-
tion and direct attack but little else. China has conveyed an implicit threat to
level America’s second-largest city should Washington interfere in a cross-strait
war—“Americans care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan,”
warned one Chinese general—but the United States has not shrunk in the past
from its security commitments, formal or otherwise, when nuclear exchanges
were possible and is unlikely to alter its engagement policies any time soon, bar-
ring a major turnabout in America’s global defense strategy.33
WIDENING THE MOAT
Political trends in the United States make it harder for Beijing to bully Taipei
into resuming reunification talks, which ended abruptly in 1999 after President
Lee Teng-hui, by outlining his groundbreaking “two states doctrine,” challenged
the “one China”understanding that Washington and Beijing had worked hard to
preserve since 1978. In the spring of 2002, President George W. Bush effectively
dumped “strategic ambiguity,” the decades-old policy of deterring Beijing from
attacking Taiwan while discouraging Taipei from recklessly moving toward in-
dependence. Administration officials have made it abundantly clear that U.S.
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policy still does not support a declaration of independence, but Bush’s sweeping
promise to do “whatever it takes” to help defend the island—the first time an
American president has made such a declaration on Chinese soil—ties U.S. and
Taiwanese security closer than perhaps at any time since the early 1970s, when
the island was Washington’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier.”34
The Bush administration has drawn dramatic distinctions between its Tai-
wan Strait policy and that of its predecessor, referring to its own posture as one
of “strategic clarity.” More tangibly, after Bush’s first Asian diplomatic swing
U.S. officials revealed that the White House had decided to put aside the previ-
ous administration’s “three noes”—no support for Taiwan’s independence; no
support for “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”; and no support for Tai-
wan’s membership in international organizations that required statehood. Re-
placing the old framework is the “six assurances,” the Ronald Reagan–era
security policy that emphasized unabated arms sales to Taiwan and a hands-off
approach to cross-strait negotiations. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly
brought this point home during a Florida conference speech in the presence of
Taiwan’s defense minister: “U.S. security policy continues to be embodied in the
‘six assurances’ offered to Taiwan by President Reagan. Today, as previously, we
will neither seek to mediate between the PRC and Taiwan, nor will we exert pres-
sure on Taiwan to come to the bargaining table. You can count on this.”
The State Department’s top East Asia official went on to underline Washing-
ton’s commitment to help Taipei meet its self-defense needs: “A secure and
self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more capable of engaging in political
interaction and dialogue with the PRC.”35 Coupled with Bush’s pledge to defend
the island from mainland aggression, this new policy structure leaves little to the
imagination, arguably reducing Taiwan’s incentive to deal with an impatient,
even angry, Beijing.
A change in the White House could alter this course, but parallel domestic
political developments ensure extension of the current policy far beyond 2004.
For instance, in 2002 a large, bipartisan group of members of the U.S. House of
Representatives founded the Congressional Taiwan Caucus to bolster the key-
stone 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the Pentagon to sell the island
enough arms to defend itself. The 113-member caucus (at last count) includes
dozens of representatives from key committees, including senior lawmakers ac-
tively engaged in Washington’s Taiwan and China policies. Congressional sup-
port for the Republic of China is not a passing fad; in 1999 the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act—cosponsored by an impressive seventy-seven members—
passed in the House 341 to seventy, reaffirming broad support in that body for
the Taiwan Relations Act. (The Senate never voted on the measure; its version of
the bill stalled in the Foreign Relations Committee amid strenuous Clinton
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administration appeals and warnings from Admiral Blair that it would cause
grave transpacific tensions. The legislation’s failure was not interpreted, how-
ever, as Senate disapproval.)
Support from the Taiwan Caucus and other key members of Congress will help
sustain the arms flow that gives teeth to this new arrangement. Bush’s approval
of the largest defense package to Taiwan since 1992, valued at nearly six billion
dollars, fell short of Taipei’s request for advanced seaborne missile defenses but
opened the door for the island to buy several big-ticket items, including eight
diesel-electric submarines, twelve antisubmarine P-3 Orion aircraft, Sea Dragon
minesweeping helicopters, and Kidd-class guided-missile destroyers, which are
expected to prepare its Navy to operate the theater-missile-defense-capable Aegis
destroyers.36 These “legacy” systems, plus the subsequently approved sale of thirty
Apache Longbow attack helicopters, prove that the Bush administration is making
good on its promise to normalize arms sales to the island and could very well help
Taiwan resist a naval blockade; their greatest benefit, however, will be more fre-
quent and substantive military exchanges with the United States. Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said as much at the Florida conference mentioned
above, when he counseled that military improvements, not multibillion-dollar
procurement deals, should be Taipei’s top defense priority and that the United
States is “eager to help” Taiwan improve its armed services’ procurement process,
training, and jointness—a shortcoming highlighted by recent war games there.37
The Bush administration also wants to help civilian Taipei master its control over
the military, long considered an extension of the Kuomintang.
On the world stage, U.S. diplomatic support for Taiwan has frustrated PRC
efforts to check an aggressive DPP campaign to gain admittance to prominent
international organizations. Though Chinese diplomats blocked Taiwan’s bid
for observer status in the World Health Organization—a possible precursor to
full UN membership, in Beijing’s eyes—the Bush administration successfully
lobbied for the island’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), al-
beit as a “separate customs territory,” and actively advocates its entry into other
international assemblies of sovereign states.
Building on this success and anxious to expand market-access measures al-
ready in place under the WTO, as well as rechannel tens of billions of dollars in
“China fever” investment outflows, Chen’s government enthusiastically wel-
comed news that a U.S. commission is carefully considering a free-trade agree-
ment with Taiwan, the tenth-largest American export market, immediately
behind China.38 Movement toward a bilateral trade deal—or trilateral zone were
Japan included, as Chen recommends—sends an unmistakable political mes-
sage to Beijing, that in a world where trade pacts may be more important than
state-to-state military treaties, an attack on Taiwan could amount to an attack
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on the American economy. Still, such an arrangement could be years away, de-
spite “fast track” trade negotiating authority and solid congressional support
from heartland senators like Iowa’s Charles Grassley, chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, and Max Baucus of Montana, ranking Democrat on the Fi-
nance Committee. A free trade agreement would likely boost by hundreds of
millions of dollars food exports to Taiwan, the fifth-largest market for U.S. agri-
culture products (ahead of China), but the failure of Taiwan so far to meet its ba-
sic WTO responsibilities, such as those related to intellectual-property issues,
rules out a deal any time soon.39 Nevertheless, movement in this direction tells
Beijing that the United States is deepening its investment in Taiwan’s well-being
at more than one level.
MASTERING A MATURING PLA
Closer political and formal economic ties, added to the reopening of Washing-
ton’s arms spigot after almost ten years of drought, are steadily reducing Tai-
wan’s susceptibility to mainland coercion and attack. However, a growing U.S.
defense presence in East Asia and improvements in the capability of Pacific
forces relative to the PLA will continue to present China with its greatest imped-
iment to a coercive reunification strategy.
Calling attention to “the possibility . . . that a military competitor with a for-
midable resource base will emerge in the region,” the report of the 2001 Qua-
drennial Defense Review (QDR), the Pentagon’s primary strategic roadmap,
calls for a “paradigm shift in force planning” that adds new and better military
capabilities to the Pacific theater, where long distances and access challenges
could prove costly in a major theater war.40 Citing an unnamed threat, the QDR
recommended that the United States add in the Pacific a second aircraft carrier
battle group, up to four new surface ships, submarines with cruise missiles, and
additional air bases. Indeed, the Navy has already “stood up” Submarine Squad-
ron 15 on Guam, more than three thousand miles west of Hawaii, allowing its
two Los Angeles–class attack submarines, the USS San Francisco (SSN 711) and
USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN 705)—USS Houston (SSN 713) will join them in
January 2004—to provide eighty-eight to 123 mission-days per year, compared
to thirty-six for Pearl Harbor–based boats.41 At the same time, innovative solu-
tions to surface-ship readiness problems, such as a tested “crew-swapping” idea
intended to eliminate transit time and extend deployments without punishing
sailors and their families, will provide regional combatant commanders with
270 additional days of surface combat power over a year-and-a-half period.42
This Asia-centric, “forward deterrence” defense policy, if fully adopted, as Bush
administration officials assure the public that it will be, would improve U.S. pro-
jection options and guarantee uninterrupted carrier-battle-group presence in
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the western Pacific. The latter has been dangerously absent in past regional cri-
ses, most recently when the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) left Japan for the Indian
Ocean to support operations in Afghanistan. The overall result should be a fur-
ther check upon Chinese ambitions.
New regional operating concepts will buttress these seaborne platforms and
reduce U.S. Pacific Command’s reliance on politically shaky basing agreements.
Central to these plans is the Air Force’s strategy of using Guam as a main operat-
ing base for tactical missions into the region from its periphery. Andersen Air
Force Base is ideal for its hardened facilities and for its distance from Taiwan
(nearly 1,500 nautical miles)—close enough to provide combat support over the
strait using new, longer-range fighters in conjunction with air “tanker bridges,”
but far enough away to limit the effectiveness of PLA missiles.43 Future U.S. ca-
pability improvements will only enhance this smarter, beefed-up western Pacific
presence. Better and more precise long-range air assets, including new stealth
bombers and standoff munitions, will allow American pilots to challenge the
PLA’s maturing anti-access strategy from safer distances; planned carrier-based un-
manned combat air vehicles and improved cruise missiles may be even less susceptible
to Chinese defenses.44 Under the sea and on the surface, astonishing American naval
advancements, like those incorporated in the revolutionary Virginia-class attack
submarines, continue to outpace PLAN’s near-term ambitions, which China’s mor-
ibund domestic arms industry has forced it to pin to foreign acquisitions.45
Some analysts, citing exotic Israeli and Russian-made hardware, counter that
high-profile acquisitions will so improve China’s anti-access capabilities that
defending the island could prove costly. Chinese strategy, they correctly argue,
is not to defeat the American military but to put Washington out of the fight
by disabling its major platforms or simply deterring intervention altogether.
Richard Fisher of the Jamestown Foundation, for example, argues that the PRC
is already gathering the appropriate forces to attack successfully a carrier battle
group in the vicinity of Taiwan (“Sink an aircraft carrier, win the war,” goes the
PLA mantra).46 Realistically, though, supersonic ship-killing cruise missiles and
other devices will only lengthen the time it takes U.S. forces to “kick down the
door.” Without trivializing the deadly threat such weapons pose to American
surface platforms and their crews, the U.S. ability to operate from ever-greater
distances and its unmatched battlespace awareness, to say nothing of forthcom-
ing ballistic and cruise-missile defenses, mean that Washington could spoil a
Chinese blockade even if it could not prevent one.
There is consensus even in Beijing that Washington can beat the PLA in its
own backyard. Dedicated students of U.S. warfighting capabilities and doctrine,
Chinese officers have carefully observed as American forces have repeatedly
proven their conventional superiority in diverse, hostile environments. If
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Operation DESERT STORM convinced the PLA that it lags decades behind, the
Serbia and Afghanistan air campaigns, with their historic rates of precision sor-
ties, real-time targeting, and casualty-free operations, convinced the leaders of
the PLA components that the capabilities and doctrine gap is growing (as must
have Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as well). Several Chinese officers have warily
noted how much U.S. capabilities grew in the brief seven years between the Per-
sian Gulf War and the air campaign over Kosovo. Tellingly, two of the PLA’s three
competing schools of thought—“Local War under High Tech Conditions” and
(especially) the “Revolution in Military Affairs”—argue that the United States is
decades ahead of the PLA in military technology.47
The gap is nowhere more evident than in China’s lagging intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance capabilities, which cannot yet help China “see over
the horizon,” a skill the PLA must master if it hopes to employ its new antiship
cruise missiles at their intended ranges. China is trying to close the divide by fo-
cusing on several other niche capabilities to exploit U.S. weaknesses, but forward-
looking war games consistently prove that the narrow tactical advantages it may
achieve with, say, advanced “double digit” surface-to-air missiles will be increas-
ingly insufficient to keep American forces at bay.
NO TIME LIKE THE PRESENT
Current trends make it increasingly difficult for China to intimidate Taiwan, let
alone make good on vociferous invasion threats. The United States is steadily
strengthening its projection capabilities, and Washington (both the White
House and Congress) is rekindling its “tropical island love affair.” At the same
time, Taiwan’s voters have all but divorced themselves from the idea of a peaceful
merger; years of mainland strong-arming and Hong Kong’s record-high unem-
ployment and political woes—including conspicuous human rights violations
and a reversal of democratic gains—have largely eroded what little public sup-
port remained for sincere one-China negotiations.48 Average Taiwanese citizens,
indications are, want the status quo—probably because of the political and eco-
nomic risks associated with joining the authoritarian regime, but also because
most were born and raised in a self-determined Republic of China. Little is ex-
pected to change on these fronts any time soon. Washington’s basic support for
Taiwan is as calculated as it is bipartisan, a strategic decision based on long-term
interests that cannot willingly be ceded to a would-be regional aggressor. Entre-
preneurial and independent minded, today’s Taiwan appears equally predis-
posed to de facto independence, unencumbered by some of its grandparents’
lingering romantic fantasies of a China united under a Nationalist banner. Chi-
nese foreign and defense policy is as likely to remain static, with Jiang’s contin-
ued control of the People’s Liberation Army through the Central Military
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Commission ensuring a continuation of China’s current strategy for reabsorb-
ing Taiwan.
Indeed, China’s apparent decision to forgo an amphibious invasion capability
in favor of a blockade force suggests that a direct attack is not even under consid-
eration. The Pentagon’s latest assessment of Beijing’s cross-strait military op-
tions says that China “likely would encounter great difficulty” conducting an
amphibious invasion throughout the remainder of the decade without a major
shift in national priorities.49 A buildup of amphibious capabilities would neces-
sarily be at the center of such a reallocation effort, but there is little discussion in
Chinese strategic literature of a need to develop such capabilities and even less
activity on the procurement side. In fact, despite its multiplying defense budget,
the Chinese navy has demonstrated only nominal interest in acquiring the troop
and cargo ships necessary for any large-scale amphibious assault.
By one academic study, China’s aging amphibious assault fleet includes a
mere fifty ships with full displacements of a thousand tons or more, with only
ten over two thousand and none over 4,800. Moreover, these modest numbers
appear to have already peaked; projections nearly halve the fleet’s amphibious
inventory by 2010.50 To be sure, hundreds of smaller military and civilian craft
could be launched on short notice from Chinese riversides and makeshift ports,
but such small craft, even if they managed to traverse the choppy 115-mile wa-
terway, could not transport armaments or men in sufficient numbers to breach
Taiwan’s vicious air and land defenses. By most informed estimates, China could
get one reinforced infantry division of fifteen to twenty thousand troops to the
shore, and another division of paratroopers over the island—far short of the
estimated three hundred thousand troops necessary to take and hold a beach-
head.51 A slightly more generous appraisal by a well-briefed congressional com-
mission says China can move two divisions by sea at best and that its capability
to insert airborne forces is limited to one of its three divisions at a time.52
Meanwhile, Beijing is pouring resources into blockading tools. In addition to
the fifty new short-range ballistic missiles a year opposite Taiwan, the PLA is re-
placing its aging liquid-fueled DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile with
the solid-propelled, mobile DF-21.53 It is also spending a large number of yuan
on a strategic modernization project that includes the development of land-
mobile ICBMs as well as a submarine-launched version, the Julang 2 “Great
Wave,” for the PLAN’s forthcoming ballistic-missile submarine—all key ele-
ments in a survivable and, thus, more credible nuclear deterrent.
China’s rapid succession of conventional purchases has been no less impres-
sive. Beijing’s $1.6 billion agreement to take prompt delivery of at least eight
more Project 636 Kilo diesel-electric submarines fitted with the Klub-S antiship
cruise missile system—its 186-mile-range comparable to a carrier battle group’s
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defense radius—moves the PLAN’s projection capabilities well beyond what its
troubled Song (Type 039) program promised alone.54 Taiwan has decided to ac-
quire as many diesel models from a yet-undetermined source, but all of China’s
eight submarines are scheduled to be delivered to the PLAN before 2010, the earli-
est that Taiwan’s first modern diesel-electric submarines are expected to reach ini-
tial operating capability.55 With an appreciably lower price tag (five to six billion
dollars) than comparable submarines the ROC navy might ultimately buy, the
Kilo purchase guarantees more defense planning and spending woes for Taipei.
The PLA budget has been climbing at a double-digit rate for twelve consecu-
tive years and will, the CIA judges, double by 2007.56 In contrast, Taiwan’s sus-
tained recession has produced draconian defense cuts. By Taipei’s own account,
defense spending as a share of the total budget has been halved over the last de-
cade, dropping from almost a third of all government spending in 1991 to an
anemic 16.5 percent in 2002.57 The spending debate in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan,
heated and frequently ill informed, reveals a parliament all but unwilling to
boost defense outlays. Predictably, the opposition Kuomintang and People First
Party appear committed to legislative obstructionism, but even President Chen’s
own party cannot be counted on to fund urgent modernization and readiness
projects. History suggests that Taiwan will ultimately find the wherewithal for
defense programs the United States deems critical to its security (as evidenced
by the tortured but ultimately successful Kidd-class destroyer purchase), but in
the short term the Republic of China has clearly fallen behind the mainland’s ag-
gressive acquisition timetable.
The poor state of U.S. readiness in this decade might similarly add to the at-
tractiveness of an early Chinese blockade gamble. Taiwan’s combat prepared-
ness has become notoriously bad, and U.S. readiness levels, though not yet dire,
have badly suffered from a war on terrorism that will undoubtedly last through
the decade.58 A heavier special-operations and intelligence-gathering mission
load since the 11 September 2001 attacks, for example, has strained the Navy’s
attack submarines, forcing the fleet to jeopardize their longevity and effective-
ness by skimping on critical maintenance and training.59 The global war on ter-
rorism has increased the demand for intelligence-gathering missions by attack
submarines by upward of 30 percent, and dwindling numbers will remain a
problem for years to come even with more Virginias (at $2.3 billion apiece).60
Notwithstanding slightly higher procurement rates, the Department of the Navy
estimates that the submarine fleet will stay flat at the 1997 QDR-recommended
level of forty-five to fifty-five compared with the target of sixty-eight set by a
1999 study for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, further impeding the Navy’s ability to ex-
ecute blockade-busting campaigns reliably and quickly.61
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The attention of the U.S. military and its civilian leadership is understandably
focused on the Middle East. Emergency and supplemental spending bills are the
norm today and for the foreseeable future, redirecting money to maintain high
operation tempos and fill empty precision munitions bins at the expense of ba-
sic naval operating funds.62 The U.S. government may not be so distracted from
East Asia that its vital interests there suffer, but a costly, long-term war on terror-
ism, like the one President Bush publicly predicts, and a drawn-out occupation
of Iraq could ultimately lead to even riskier readiness gaps. Before stepping
down from the Pacific Command, Admiral Blair testified that the Navy’s readi-
ness levels, while generally improved since 2001 thanks to supplemental funding,
continue to suffer, particularly among aviation units and aging surveillance air-
craft, which had delivered “dangerously low . . . collection rates of required intelli-
gence information” in his domain.63 The full toll may not be felt for several more
years, but U.S. forces will nevertheless remain more susceptible to readiness prob-
lems than they would have under a peacetime engagement strategy.
As U.S. readiness and force structure issues entice China to act early, so might
a perceived cruise missile imbalance. At present, American surface ships have no
effective defense against the Sunburn and Yakhont, both of which travel at su-
personic speeds and execute terminal maneuvers designed specifically by Rus-
sian companies to overcome U.S. naval defenses.64 Currently, American surface
ships rely on the Standard Missile 2 and the NATO Sea Sparrow for cruise missile
defense at long ranges, and thereafter on the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System
and the rolling-airframe RIM-166.65 All of these systems would have difficulty
detecting and engaging China’s sea-skimming Sunburns and Yakhonts, which at
Mach 2.5 are nearly three times as fast as the American Tomahawk.66 The Navy is
working to plug this vulnerability, but the prospective solution, the developing
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile—launched from the Aegis destroyers’ Mark 41 Ver-
tical Launch Systems—will take time. The Raytheon-led international effort
holds considerable promise (having already been successfully tested against a
supersonic target drone) but is scheduled to undergo operational testing with
the U.S. Navy only in 2003 and will not yield a deployable system until 2005 at
the earliest.67 Beijing could prove unwilling to squander the military advantage
it will enjoy in the meantime, at least if it can overcome its own intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance problems.
In a similar vein, Beijing might feel under pressure to act before the United
States deploys a national missile defense system that might be effective against as
many as a hundred incoming nuclear warheads. New strategic delivery systems
are expected to give China a reliable second-strike capability by the end of the de-
cade, but a more aggressive U.S. missile defense program, supported by
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consistently higher spending, could give Beijing pause in a crisis. Optimistic esti-
mates suggest a fully capable missile defense system might be available as early
as 2008.68
Also, the final system could be even more effective than originally envisioned,
because the potential benefits for testing that come with the U.S. withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty have yet to be realized. Further complicat-
ing China’s deterrence strategy is Washington’s leaked intention to consider us-
ing tactical nuclear weapons in a Taiwan Strait war.69
All of these factors conspire to improve China’s offensive chances in the next
decade. More specifically, as shown in the figure, China’s military power will
peak relative to that of Taiwan and the regional forces of the United States some-
time between 2005 and 2008. In this window, improved naval and air capabili-
ties—including ballistic and cruise missiles—will give China its best chance to
effect Taiwan’s acquiescence. After 2008, Taiwan’s expected defensive gains and
the seemingly exponential military advances of the United States will preclude a
successful attack on the island.
DISCOURAGING AN ANXIOUS ADVERSARY
With all these trends warily in mind, Beijing will likely take action before its
odds become too long, even without assurance of victory (see the table below).
To prevent Chinese aggression, the United States should institute closer military
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ties with Taiwan, more cautious dealings with the PLA, and a strengthened naval
and air presence in the western Pacific, all the while taking sensible, complemen-
tary nonmilitary measures. The argument that such a “pro-Taiwan” policy will
exacerbate cross-strait relations, self-fulfilling a war prophecy, is flawed; it con-
tradicts the lessons of history and recent experiences with the PRC.
First, as recommended by the bipartisan, congressionally mandated
U.S.-China Security Review Commission, the Bush administration should con-
tinue to expand its military dialogue with Taiwan.70 These important exchanges
should enhance the interoperability of Taiwan’s command and control systems
for air and surface engagements, antisubmarine warfare, and eventually, theater
missile defense—key elements in a Taiwan antiblockade strategy. Issues such as
doctrine and force planning should also be covered, with meaningful
mentorships at the highest levels. The 2003 Defense Authorization Act requires
the Pentagon to report on the feasibility and advisability of conducting com-
bined operational training with, and exchanges of general and flag officers be-
tween, the U.S. and Taiwanese forces.71 If ultimately accepted and properly
executed, such an initiative could make Taiwan less dependent on the United
States for its immediate security while establishing interoperability in case
Washington is forced to stop a Chinese attack on the island. Given the U.S. mili-
tary’s multiplying resource commitments and defense responsibilities, such a
plan is morally compelling as well as strategically sensible. If President Bush
means to do “whatever it takes” to help defend the island democracy, the people
who live there should be as capable as they are willing to do the same alongside
American forces.
Giving Taiwan the ability to defend itself also means reestablishing its slip-
ping qualitative military edge. Taiwan has traditionally maintained a conven-
tionally advanced, if outnumbered, defense force; however, a lopsided
PRC-driven arms race fueled by destabilizing Russian and Israeli sales is quickly
eroding this advantage. Added to the bargains that have brought hundreds of
advanced land-attack Sukhoi fighters to China since the late 1990s, a $1.6 billion
deal with Russia to buy several dozen Su-30MKK Flanker naval fighters
equipped with the X-31 supersonic antiship missile does little to allay Taiwanese
fears that its maritime lifeline and the protective U.S. Navy are being targeted.72
These long-range multirole fighters could be particularly effective against
regionally deployed aircraft carriers or eastern Taiwan’s less-defended air and
naval facilities.
The robust 2001 arms package and streamlined acquisitions process for Tai-
wan proves that the Bush administration is committed to buttressing the island-
ers against attack, but more can still be done. The State Department, for
example, would have done well to respond to the latest Su-30 sale by giving
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Taipei direct control over its AIM-120C beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles,
which could help blunt a Sukhoi-led attack; yet the ROC air force complains it is
no closer to receiving the 120 advanced missiles it bought from Raytheon over
two years ago.73 Apparently to avoid Chinese protests, the State Department in-
sists on holding onto these first-line weapons unless a conflict erupts; however,
test-firings of the AA-12 Adder, a Russian-made missile comparable to the
AIM-120C, strongly suggest that this weapon is now operational in the Chinese
air force (which has possessed the weapon since 1999).74
The implications of the air-to-air missile imbalance should not be under-
stated. A computer simulation–aided study by California’s RAND Corporation
found that an unanswered AA-12 capability would give China an overwhelming
advantage over the ROC air force. The U.S.-China Security Review Commission
confirms that an Adder-armed Sukhoi fighter has an advantage over Taiwan’s
Mirage 2000-5 equipped with inferior MICA missiles.75 The AIM-120Cs are do-
ing little to protect the ROC or deter China warehoused in the United States.
Washington is also reluctant to sell Taipei the Aegis destroyers it craves, in
part because of clamorous PRC objections but mainly because the White House
thinks it can thereby tease out of Beijing concessions on cross-strait security and
nonproliferation matters. Using the destroyers as bargaining chips sounds dip-
lomatically clever, but China’s frenetic missile buildup and unending missile
technology transfers to states like Iran all but confirm Beijing’s unwillingness to
reform its behavior.76 The Aegis ships, then, are yielding no appreciable diplo-
matic leverage and might as well go to Taiwan while they can still make a positive
difference.77
The United States also needs to overhaul its military relationship with China,
especially with respect to a parade of “confidence building measures” that have
disproportionately benefited Beijing over the past decade. Before the White
House halted military-to-military ties after the EP-3 was forced down and its
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crew detained in April 2001, PLA officials attended elite American military
schools and enjoyed access to sensitive facilities, platforms, and force structure
information. By contrast, perfunctory U.S. visits to Chinese bases, ships, and
schools yielded few real insights into PRC capabilities or thinking, largely be-
cause of Beijing’s apprehension about revealing weaknesses. Drawing on its own
negative experiences with what it calls “extensive” Chinese secrecy, the Pentagon
has cautioned policy makers about wide knowledge gaps, conceding that “since
the 1980s, U.S. military exchange delegations to China have been shown only
‘showcase’ units, never any advanced units or operational training or realistic
exercises.”78 Similarly frustrated, the U.S.-China Security Review Commission
complains that “whether in the area of threat reduction, budget discussions, or
military to military exchanges, the Chinese pattern has been to absorb as much
information as possible and share as little as possible.”79
The moratorium has since been lifted, but it is as yet unclear if Washington
will demand equal access in the future. Military exchanges should continue,
but at a slower pace, as the security commission recommends, and only if
confidence-building measures and other ties are “strictly based on the princi-
ples of reciprocity, transparency, consistency, and mutual benefit.”80 Further-
more, military-to-military ties are useful only so far as they serve U.S.
interests; annual Pentagon “cost-benefit analyses” would allow the White
House and the Congress to judge such programs on their true merits.
Most importantly, the United States should adopt a strengthened Pacific
presence and response doctrine that leaves little doubt in Beijing over Washing-
ton’s will and ability to interject itself during a cross-strait crisis. This could be
achieved most traditionally (and inexpensively) with better regional basing in
the Pacific theater, where long distances between current bases and operating
areas strain resources. Added to the Guam-based attack submarines, an addi-
tional carrier battle group homeported in Japan or Guam would ensure access to
the area and make manifest the U.S. ability to defend Taiwan despite myriad
global commitments. Aircraft carriers and guided-missile destroyers serve as
constant reminders of U.S. power-projection capabilities, while submarines—
which potential opponents must presume to be present, even if undetected—
make a similar point in a subtler way.
The United States can no longer afford to leave the Taiwan Strait without an
aircraft carrier nearby. As one RAND study shows, the adequacy of U.S. Air
Force access near that hotspot is uncertain at best because of the distance from
South Korea and Japan, and because of those states’ unwillingness to avow open
support for the United States should it come to the aid of Taiwan in a confronta-
tion with China.81 New operational concepts like the Global Strike Task Force,
which emphasizes expeditionary dispersed operations, would help mitigate the
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Far East’s “tyranny of distance.”82 However Washington ultimately decides to ex-
pand and deepen its footprint in the western Pacific, the Pentagon should use its
improved presence to affirm the readiness and willingness of the United States
to counter strong-arm tactics in the area. In the face of a threatening missile test,
naval exercise, or mock combined-arms invasion, forward demonstrations will
clarify American stated foreign policy interests and thereby minimize misun-
derstandings and the risk of strategic miscalculation on both sides of the strait.
This fundamental approach to enhancing Taiwanese security is not one of
military “containment,” which would necessitate many more regional air bases
and naval deployments as well as a dramatic expansion of relationships with na-
tions like Vietnam and the Philippines. Neither does it preclude such nonmili-
tary measures as tighter dual-use export controls and attempts to curb or negate
Russian, Israeli, German, and French military sales to Beijing. All such basic ini-
tiatives—military, diplomatic, and economic—pursued in tandem, would help
discourage Beijing from using force to achieve its perceived destiny. They would
also regularly remind Washington that peace in the Taiwan Strait is far from in-
evitable and deserves its uninterrupted attention. First of all, however, U.S. civil-
ian and military leaders must dismiss the fatally flawed theory that time is on
China’s side in the struggle over the strait and recognize that the real danger of a
PRC attack is in this decade, when Taiwan is most vulnerable, not in the next.
Only then will Washington and Taipei act and plan according to a shorter, realis-
tic time line.
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Admiral Turner attended Amherst College and then the
U.S. Naval Academy, from which he graduated in 1946;
thereafter he earned a master’s degree in philosophy, pol-
itics, and economics from Oxford University as a Rhodes
Scholar and studied at the Harvard Business School. Be-
fore promotion to flag rank in 1970, he served in destroy-
ers (including off Korea and Vietnam) and in shore
assignments including duty as executive assistant and
naval aide to two Secretaries of the Navy. As a rear ad-
miral he commanded a Sixth Fleet carrier task group;
from 1972 to 1974, as a vice admiral, he was President of
the Naval War College, where he instituted fundamental
and enduring curriculum changes. Thereafter he com-
manded the Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic
and, upon promotion to full admiral, was Commander
in Chief, NATO Forces in Southern Europe. In 1977
President Carter appointed Admiral Turner as the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, a post he held until 1981.
Since then he has taught at the U.S. Military Academy,
Yale University, and the University of Maryland. Ad-
miral Turner served as the Raymond A. Spruance Dis-
tinguished Fellow at the Naval War College in the fall
academic term of 2000. His books include: Secrecy and
Democracy: The CIA in Transition (1985), Terrorism
and Democracy (1991), Caging the Nuclear Genie: An
American Challenge for Global Security (1997, winner
of the 1998 Foreign Policy Association Medal), and
Caging the Genies: A Workable Solution for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Weapons (1999). His most
recent article in this journal was “The Dilemma of Nu-
clear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century,” in the
Spring 2001 issue.
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IS THE U.S. NAVY BEING MARGINALIZED?
Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy (Retired)
All who have gone down to the sea appreciate the various roles that seapowerplays in our nation’s defense. Going back to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s day, that
role was sea control—the ability to use the oceans to one’s advantage and to deny
the use of them to opponents. Shortly after Mahan, the first rudimentary projec-
tion of power ashore by amphibious assault was added. During World War II,
the projection of power ashore with aircraft and guns became another major
mission of navies; this has since expanded to include guided missiles. With the
advent of the nuclear age, navies also came to assure strategic nuclear retaliation
as the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. Today a new mission may be emerging,
that of defending the homeland or other land areas against attacks by missiles
through space.
Declining Missions
Setting aside homeland defense for the moment, the other four missions are to-
day of lessening importance to our country’s security.
Strategic Deterrence. At the peak we had forty-one strategic ballistic missile sub-
marines (SSBNs). We are now approaching eighteen and probably going to ten.
In part that is true because of the demise of the Soviet Union. It is also in part be-
cause we are beginning to recognize that the prime virtue of the SSBN, its invul-
nerability, has never been as important as many of us who have written on this
subject have contended. This change of mind results from a realization that the
threat of even only a few retaliatory nuclear detonations is sufficient to deter
anyone. That is because any would-be nuclear aggressor must assume the worst,
which is that we would retaliate by attacking his cities. Would the Russians or
even the Chinese, let alone ourselves, be willing to lose ten, or five, or even two
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major cities in the name of initiating and “winning” a nuclear war? Thus, even if
we had only the more vulnerable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
no SSBNs at all in our nuclear arsenal, we would still have an adequate strategic
deterrent. That would be the case even were some other nuclear power to acquire
many more nuclear weapons than we. No such power could assume that any pre-
emptive first strike it undertook would be 100 percent successful—that is, that
there would be no nuclear retaliation. There would always be errors of targeting,
missiles that failed entirely, missiles that were inaccurate, and human errors in
execution. It all adds up to what Clausewitz described as “friction” in war. So a
U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent with only ICBMs should suffice. Thus, the
Navy’s role in this area is going to be looked at more critically, and this mission
of the Navy will be seen as less critical to the country than it once was.
Sea Control. Sea control is the most fundamental mission of the Navy, because
the country cannot thrive in peacetime without it and cannot fight overseas in
wartime in any sustained way without it—and no other military service can per-
form it. Today, though, there is no challenge to our control of the seas. The once
formidable sea-denial capabilities of the Soviet Navy have dried up. Starting
from the low point they are at today, it is unlikely they could be rebuilt in less
than two decades. The Chinese may have aspirations to challenge our use of the
seas in their region of the world, but they also are several decades from being
able to mount such a challenge. Smaller navies with diesel submarines, fast pa-
trol craft, land-based aircraft, and land-based missiles may be able to make our
use of littoral waters more costly than we would like, but not to deny it to us. In
this atmosphere the Navy is going to have a difficult time obtaining funding for
sea control in the foreseeable future. It is also going to be difficult to motivate
personnel to train against a nonthreat.
Power Projection Ashore by Amphibious Assault. The last opposed amphibious
assault was made in 1950 at Inchon. We planned one at Wonsan in 1951 and an-
other at Kuwait in 1991; both came a cropper due to mines. Today it is difficult to
imagine where the United States might want to conduct a major opposed am-
phibious assault in the next twenty years or so. China seems a possibility, but one
has to wonder if the United States would ever risk placing a major force ashore in
a country as vast as China and one with over a billion people, some three million
of whom are under arms. After fifty-two years of nonuse, the mission of major
amphibious assault is not going to draw a great deal of support or money. What
can be justified is the capability to put troops ashore in remote areas reasonably
quickly, either by helicopter assault or assault across a beach, in modest numbers
and against modest opposition.
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Power Projection Ashore by Bombardment. This is a mission of expanding capa-
bilities. Guns already reach far inland and almost certainly can be made to go
very much farther; precision-guided missiles can be launched from submarines,
ships, aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. All except guns played a role in
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. All will almost certainly have
roles to play in any future conflict. The Navy would do well today, though, to
take note that the U.S. Air Force dropped a majority of the munitions in Afghan-
istan, though it had to go halfway around the world to do it because there were
no good bases. In short, land-based airpower has demonstrated a very long
reach and quite short response times under very taxing circumstances. In con-
trast, naval airpower may find its response time lengthened. Today the Navy has
a fleet of about three hundred ships but is procuring only enough new ones each
year to sustain a fleet of about 180 to two hundred. If the Navy does drop down
that far, there will be insufficient ships to ensure that it can be quickly within
range of unexpected trouble spots around the world. If the Navy cannot get
there first, it will not be the instrument of first choice in such situations. Today,
though, there are areas where only the Navy can bring shorter-range, tactical
airpower to bear quickly, but the melding of long-range bombers with tactical
missiles is creating competition even here. Recent reports indicate there are
plans to upgrade the fleets of B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers to reach targets almost
anywhere in the world. This is certainly not to say that naval air, missile, and gun
power will not be in demand for a long time to come. It is to say that the Navy’s
traditional advantages with these weapons are diminishing.
As noted earlier, the Navy may emerge into a mission of defense of land areas
through the interception of intercontinental ballistic missile attacks. It is far too
early to tell whether this mission will in fact mature or whether it will become
such a major one as to justify additional forces. With the fleet declining in size,
however, it would be difficult for the Navy to take on this additional mission.
An Altered Relevance
Why, though, with the exception of the possibility of missile defense, are the
Navy’s missions less relevant to national needs today than during the Cold War?
In part this is because advances in technology are making other systems more
competitive. In part it is because changes in the global environment have radi-
cally altered the need for military forces of all types. The relevance of the Army’s
heavy armored forces, for instance, has been questioned. In the 1991 Gulf War we
manhandled one of the largest tank forces in the world with hardly a scratch on
our own tanks. The Air Force, for its part, finds itself in a position with respect to
air superiority analogous to the Navy’s in regard to sea control—there just is not
much opposition today that can tangle with it in aerial combat. In short, all the
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military services are facing a need for “transformation,” to use the current jar-
gon. If the Navy is to play the best role it can for our country it needs to examine
what transformation means for it, mission area by mission area.
Strategic Deterrence. We will not, and should not, forsake the submarine-based
deterrent entirely. It is psychologically important for the country to feel assured
that its strategic nuclear forces will never be so vulnerable as to endanger the
country. It is also prudent to err in the direction of safety when the consequences
of making a mistake could be so high. Also, should deterrence fail, we would
want to have a reasonable retaliatory capability available. Still, we also must rec-
ognize that the SSBN has several disadvantages. One is that the cost per deliver-
able warhead is high, and it will be especially so if we eventually succeed in
reducing nuclear arsenals to the low hundreds of warheads.1 We would not place
all those warheads in one SSBN, but it would be very expensive to maintain
SSBNs with only a handful of warheads on each. Also, if we do work our way
down to a low number of total warheads, numbers of warheads and their condi-
tion of readiness may well be controlled by an arms control treaty—we would be
anxious to know for certain what other people have, and they would want to
know what we have. It is difficult to count numbers and observe readiness in a
submarine hiding deep in the sea. In any case, however, we do not require more
than one or two SSBNs at sea with two hundred to four hundred warheads to in-
timidate any potential nuclear aggressor. In time we could reduce the cost of this
element of deterrence by replacing some of the ICBMs in our SSBNs with con-
ventional cruise missiles and giving the submarines a dual mission. Alterna-
tively, if each attack submarine carried one or two cruise missiles with nuclear
warheads, we would have plenty of assured deterrent out at sea at all times with-
out having to dedicate SSBN platforms solely to that role.
Sea Control. As noted above, as far as the Navy’s sea control, the Army’s armored
warfare, and the Air Force’s air superiority are concerned, the traditional forms
of threat have all but disappeared and will not reemerge for the foreseeable fu-
ture. Still, it would be foolhardy to expect these conditions to continue indefi-
nitely. Since at least the battle of Salamis in 481 B.C., nations have attempted to
deprive other nations of the use of the seas. The issue for the Navy, then, is how
to sustain sufficient sea control capability to be able to deal with the possibility
of a revived threat of some sort to the use of the seas. One approach is simply to
resolve to retain some modest level of training and equipment against the tradi-
tional threats, despite the cost. That is easier said than done. For instance, in “Sea
Power 21,” the Chief of Naval Operations recently revised the wording of the
Navy’s missions, apparently to focus them more directly on impacting wars on
and over land.2 This new doctrine includes three new missions, “Sea Shield,”
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“Sea Strike,” and “Sea Basing.” Sea control may be subsumed within these three
new categories, but it is difficult to tell.
Perhaps the best way to deal with the sea control dilemma is a strong empha-
sis on discerning what the next threats may be and how to counter them. For in-
stance, one near certainty is that traditional antisubmarine and antiair warfare
will not suffice to keep our ships afloat. One new threat to be countered is that of
terrorists attempting to drive our ships away from overseas deployments by ha-
rassing them whenever in port, as with the USS Cole. The development of a mo-
bile defensive perimeter needs priority attention. Another potential threat is a
cruise missile, or even ICBM, launched from land and targeted at our larger
ships at sea by satellites. We will need far greater capabilities in antimissile de-
fenses than we have today; bringing them into being should be a high priority
for research and development. Also, as part of better defensive capabilities, we
will likely want to move more of our cruise missile punch under the surface of
the seas—that is, into submarines. Analysis of the trade-offs in costs, capabili-
ties, and vulnerabilities of surface ships and submarines for launching cruise
missiles in a future threat environment is a vital need. Still another concern must
be with our training and educational establishments, which must remind our
officers that the core mission of any navy will always be sea control, even if the
challenge is not great at a particular time.
Power Projection Ashore by Amphibious Assault. As the Navy shrinks, the am-
phibious force, with its rather limited mission, is bound to decrease in size,
probably substantially. The first units to go should be those having the primary
role of supporting major, division-scale assaults. For instance, large command
ships are not needed for smaller assaults, and the large staffs that go with them
could be trimmed down. The last amphibious units to go should be those capa-
ble of a second mission of projecting power ashore by bombardment. As we
come to rely increasingly on aircraft capable of vertical and short takeoffs and
landings, such as the Marine Corps’s V-22, and unmanned aerial vehicles to de-
liver ordnance ashore, amphibious ships with small flight decks could operate as
small aircraft carriers. The Chief of Naval Operations recently indicated that the
Navy and Marine Corps are moving in this direction, creating “expeditionary
strike groups” from what have been amphibious ready groups. These groups will
be capable of littoral power projection by either assault or bombardment.
Ideally, this move is a precursor to making the Navy the fixed-wing tactical air
force of the Marines, with substantial savings over the present practice of main-
taining two separate air establishments. Still another point to remember in the
transformation of projection forces is that mentioned earlier with respect to
amphibious assaults aborted because of mines. In those instances, mines were
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employed successfully by powers that—like our potential opponents today—
had negligible naval forces. Effective ways to detect and sweep mines have eluded
us for decades. It is time for a full-scale research effort to get on top of this
problem.
Power Projection Ashore by Bombardment. Sea Power 21 calls on the Navy to be
ready to strike at a moment’s notice anywhere. That is a tall order for a shrinking
fleet. There are four approaches to stretching the Navy’s resources for attacking
land targets: obtaining more funding, building less expensive ships and aircraft
but more of them, getting as much dual use as possible out of ships and aircraft
having other primary missions, and getting more punch out of existing forces
designed for the mission.
As for the first option, increased funding, it is difficult to forecast whether the
Navy’s budget will increase substantially. Many of us would have thought it im-
probable that military funding would stay as high as it has after the end of the
Cold War. Still, it would be not only problematic but even dangerous to bet on
sizable increases in the next decade.
The second option, less expensive but more numerous ships and aircraft, fits
well with the trends in both offensive and defensive military technologies. The
day of large aircraft carriers with large numbers of high-performance aircraft is
simply drawing to a close. Ninety percent of the munitions dropped on Afghani-
stan were precision guided, up from 10 percent in the Gulf War just a decade ear-
lier. Remote sensors will see targets better than pilots can, and remotely
controlled precisions weapons will hit targets more accurately. In time more and
more of the precision weapons will be launched at long ranges from their tar-
gets, or from unmanned aerial vehicles, in order to minimize the exposure of pi-
lots. With more accurate weapons, the ordnance-carrying capacity of the large
carrier will no longer be as important. On the defensive side of the technology
coin, we must recognize that technologies that make our forces more lethal will
be available in time to others. When opponents acquire remote sensing and pre-
cision, long-range targeting capabilities, as they are bound to do, the huge detec-
tion signature of the hundred thousand tons of steel in one of today’s aircraft
carriers will be a tremendous liability. It is argued that such liability is offset by
the defensive capabilities of larger ships. Those defensive systems (like directed-
energy weapons) are themselves shrinking in size, however.
The third option of more dual use of ships and aircraft also fits with the
trends in technology. Small, less-vulnerable ships can carry much greater offen-
sive punch than was possible just a few years ago. We need to distribute fire-
power: in expeditionary strike groups; in surface combatants and attack
submarines loaded heavily with land-attack missiles; in surface combatants with
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long-range, accurate guns; and in ballistic-missile submarines converted to con-
ventional missile shooters. We should also revisit the concept of an Arsenal Ship
as an inexpensive way to put firepower to sea.
Just as the means of projecting naval power ashore by bombardment are
changing dramatically, the need for projecting naval power ashore is also chang-
ing dramatically. The requirement today is, and will be into the future, for quick
response with limited force more than for response with massive firepower. The
days of all-out “alpha strikes,” as in Vietnam, are behind us. Instead, as seen in
Iraq, we are turning to precision-guided attacks with modest amounts of muni-
tions and modest numbers of aircraft. What we are likely to confront tomorrow
is the terrorist cell that is a target today but will be gone tomorrow; the rogue
state that is about to obtain weapons of mass destruction or already has and is
about to use them; the hostages who need to be rescued before they are taken
deep underground; the coup against, or invasion of, a friendly regime that must
be reversed before it becomes a fait accompli; or the need to respond to the use of
weapons of mass destruction by anyone against anyone.
The fourth option, doing more with what the Navy has, brings up the network-
centric concept of making information more universally available, thus opti-
mizing the usefulness of the forces that can be brought to bear. The Navy has
been netting ships together for combat effectiveness for decades. The issue today
is to take maximum advantage of the ever-growing capabilities of information
technology.
The demand for transformation of the Navy is urgent, because of the pace of
both technological and geopolitical change. Military professionals are often ac-
cused of resisting change, and there is considerable evidence to support that
charge. Today it is vital to prove that adage wrong. Battleships dominated naval
warfare for about sixty years, and carriers for about the same. Our existing carri-
ers will have plenty to do for the remainder of their operating lives, but a Navy
built around these ships will not carry us into the emerging era of warfare any
better than did the USS Arizona into World War II. To procure more large carri-
ers today and expect them to be useful into midcentury is to be blind to reality.
Finally, today, much more than ever before, it is incumbent upon military
professionals to promote transformation. The nature of the military-industrial
complex, plus the breadth of congressional constituent interest in military pro-
curement, bases, etc., will by themselves make forsaking the tried and true ex-
tremely difficult. Only if military professionals stand up and place the weight of
their expertise and prestige behind radical change will there be a change.
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NOTE S
1. See the author’s “The Dilemma of Nuclear
Weapons in the Twenty-first Century,” Naval
War College Review 54, no. 2 (Spring 2001),
pp. 13–23.
2. First publicly introduced by Adm. Vernon
Clark, USN, “Sea Power 21: Operational
Concepts for a New Era,” remarks delivered
at the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War
College, Newport, R.I., 12 June 2002.
1 0 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
108
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/21
109
War College: Summer 2003 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
Dr. Peter J. Dombrowski is an associate professor in the
Strategic Research Department of the Naval War Col-
lege’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He is the author
of more than twenty-five refereed journal articles and book
chapters on international relations, national security,
and foreign economic policy. His book Policy Responses
to the Globalization of American Banks was published
by the University of Pittsburgh Press in 1996. He serves
as coeditor of International Studies Quarterly, the flag-
ship journal of the International Studies Association
(ISA), and recently completed a term as chair of the
seven-hundred-member ISA international political
economy section. Professor Dombrowski is completing
two books, The Political Economy of the New Interna-
tional Security Environment and Buying Naval Trans-
formation: Technological Innovation and the Defense
Industry.
Dr. Andrew L. Ross is a professor and director of studies
in the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War
College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies. His work on
grand strategy, national security and defense planning,
regional security, arms control, weapons proliferation,
the international arms market, and defense industries
has appeared in numerous journals and books. He is the
editor of The Political Economy of Defense: Issues and
Perspectives (1991) and coeditor of three editions of
Strategy and Force Planning (1995, 1997, 2000). Pro-
fessor Ross is currently writing a book on military
transformation.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the
panel on “Military Innovation and U.S. Plans for Trans-
formation,” Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Boston, 29 August–1 September
2002. The authors would like to thank Emily Goldman,
Eugene Gholz, and other panel participants for their
comments and suggestions. They would also like to thank
James Giblin, Hank Kamradt, Catherine Kelleher,
Stephen McBrien, William Murray, and Timothy
Somes. The views expressed here are those of the authors
alone; they do not necessarily represent those of the Naval
War College, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense,
or any other government agency or department.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 3
110
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/21
TRANSFORMING THE NAVY
Punching a Feather Bed?
Peter J. Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross
To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You
punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are
finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before
you started punching.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Bush administration has made military transformation a central defenseand national security objective.1 It came into office declaring its commit-
ment to profound, potentially radical military change. Even while engaged in the
global war on terror, preparing to go to war against and then fighting one rogue
state, and deterring another, the U.S. military has been pressed to remake itself.
Indeed, the threat of terrorism is said to demonstrate the need for transforma-
tion, and a possible war in Southwest Asia has been viewed by some as an oppor-
tunity to showcase the military’s emerging transformational capabilities. While
deployed across multiple theaters, the armed forces are to develop a coherent
view of the future and to begin implementing the technological, doctrinal, and
organizational changes necessary to meet future warfighting requirements.
Moreover, this is to be done in a budget environment in which, despite dramati-
cally increased defense spending, flexibility is limited by current operating ex-
penses. By any standard, this is a tall order. Yet civilian officials in the
Department of Defense continue to push the military to think more creatively
and move more quickly. Individuals, programs, and services thought to stand in
the way of building the “military after next” have been taken to task.2
The Navy claims that its challenges are particularly difficult. The fleet has
shrunk. It is likely to shrink still further before it grows. Programmed recapital-
ization and modernization are thought to exceed the resources expected to be
available. Operational requirements have dictated more frequent, and longer,
deployments. Operating tempo has spiked. The fleet and resources are stretched
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thin. Is now the time to transform, to introduce new platforms and force the na-
val acquisition system and the naval industrial base to adopt new business prac-
tices and achieve greater economies? For transformation proponents, the
answer is a resounding “Yes.”
Of course, some within the Navy had begun to think about the next Navy and
even the Navy after next well before Governor George W. Bush was selected to be
president. Over the last decade, the concept of network-centric warfare, which
calls for a profound “shift from platform-centric operations to Network Centric
Operations,” gained gradual, if often grudging, acceptance.3 Network-centric
warfare, in the form of “ForceNet,” is at the heart of “Sea Power 21,” which was
introduced in 2002 as the Navy’s transformation vision. ForceNet is the integrat-
ing agent of SP-21’s “Sea Strike,” “Sea Shield,” and “Sea Basing,” which are to in-
crease the Navy’s capacity to strike deeply and sustain joint operations even in
the absence of land bases, as well as to help protect both the American homeland
and U.S. allies and friends against ballistic missiles and other threats. Intended
as a comprehensive guide to naval transformation, Sea Power 21 also reflects an
appreciation of the long-term demands of waging the war on terror and com-
bating weapons of mass destruction, as well as of how the Bush administration is
likely to employ military power.
We present here a four-part, interim assessment of the Navy’s ongoing trans-
formation project.4 First, we provide the context for our assessment with a re-
view of the administration’s approach to transformation. Second, we describe Sea
Power 21 and its network-centric-warfare underpinnings. In the third section we
examine whether the Navy’s vision of its future is indeed transformational and
the extent to which the Navy is progressing toward its vision’s promise. We con-
clude by evaluating the prospects for Navy transformation and by asking
whether the force envisioned by Sea Power 21 will meet the nation’s national
security requirements in the coming decades.
THE TRANSFORMATION IMPERATIVE
An array of joint and service transformation visions had been developed even
before the Bush administration took office. Joint Vision 2020, like Joint Vision
2010 before it, foresees a military able to dominate the full spectrum of military
operations, from low-intensity conflict to major theater wars. Information su-
periority is to be the underpinning of “dominant maneuver,” “precision engage-
ment,” “focused logistics,” and “full-dimensional protection.”5 U.S. forces are
expected to prevail over any and all military challengers by moving more
quickly, hitting harder and more precisely, and when necessary, sustaining oper-
ations longer than potential adversaries.
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Not only the Navy but the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have developed
transformation visions. The Army’s transformation project promises to deliver
an “Objective Force” with a Future Combat System that will be responsive, de-
ployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.6 The Air Force’s
Vision 2020 promises “Global Vigilance, Reach and Power” through a full-
spectrum aerospace force to control and exploit not only the air but also space.7
Air Force assets are to be able “to find, fix, assess, track, target, and engage any
object of military significance on or above the surface of the Earth in near real
time.”8 Marine Corps Strategy 21 and the Corps’s “Operational Maneuver from
the Sea” doctrine promise scalable, interoperable expeditionary forces at a high
level of readiness.9
Since each service is attempting to exploit the opportunities presented by
modern information technologies and is responding to the overarching guid-
ance provided in such documents as Joint Vision 2020 and the National Military
Strategy, there are many commonalities across the individual visions. Each ser-
vice claims, to one degree or another, to be expeditionary; even the Army is
lightening its forces, in order to increase mobility and sustainability. Each vision
also focuses on the ability to strike adversaries with a variety of weapons; no po-
tential target anywhere in any environment—land, sea, air, space, or cyber-
space—will not, in the end, be vulnerable to U.S. forces. Strike operations are to
be enabled by “information dominance”—which, reduced to its essentials,
means improving the intelligence available to all echelons, but especially shoot-
ers. A premium is placed on precision, speed, agility, flexibility, adaptability, and
connectivity. Operations are to be conducted in parallel rather than sequentially.
All of the services genuflect before the requirements for jointness and
interoperability.
In 2001, the stakes were raised. A new administration took office proclaiming
its commitment to transformation. Military transformation had emerged as an
article of faith for the Bush team during the presidential campaign. In his Sep-
tember 1999 Citadel speech, then-Governor Bush called for “creating the mili-
tary of the next century,” seizing the opportunity “created by a revolution in the
technology of war,” moving beyond “marginal improvements,” “skipping ‘a gen-
eration of technology,’ ” and encouraging “a new spirit of innovation.”10
In remarks at the Joint Forces Command in February 2001, the new president
returned to the themes of his Citadel address:
We are witnessing a revolution in the technology [of] war. Power is increasingly de-
fined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness. Advantage increasingly comes from
information. . . . Our goal is to move beyond marginal improvements to harness new
technologies that will support a new strategy. . . . On land, heavy forces will be
lighter. Our light forces will be more lethal. . . . In the air, we’ll be able to strike across
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the world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and unmanned systems. On the
oceans, we’ll connect information and weapons in new ways, maximizing our ability
to project power over land.11
Upon assuming office, the new secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld,
moved quickly to initiate the “comprehensive review” of military strategy, struc-
ture, and procurement priorities promised by President Bush. Andrew W.
Marshall, the director of net assessment and a longtime proponent of transfor-
mation, was tapped to lead a wide-ranging review of U.S. defense strategy.12 Ad-
ditional teams were formed to focus on transformation, conventional forces,
nuclear forces, missile defense, space, crisis response, acquisition reform, and
quality of life, among other issues.13 An Office of Force Transformation, led by
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), a leading advocate of network-
centric warfare, was established. The services were directed by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to develop transformation roadmaps. A Defense
Transformation Guidance document was developed to accompany OSD’s De-
fense Planning Guidance. These and other initiatives clearly signaled the impor-
tance of far-reaching military innovation to the Bush team.
The administration’s commitment to transformation was formalized in the
Defense Department’s September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report.
Even in the wake of the attacks of 11 September and the onset of the global war
on terror, the secretary of defense continued to emphasize the importance of
“the transformation of U.S. forces, capabilities, and institutions.”14 Transforma-
tion was once again proclaimed to be “at the heart” of the administration’s “new
strategic approach.”15 Indeed, a renewed sense of urgency was conveyed: “Trans-
formation is not a goal for tomorrow, but an endeavor that must be embraced in
earnest today.”16 Four transformation pillars—joint operations; experimenta-
tion; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and research and de-
velopment and selective recapitalization—and a set of “six critical operational
goals” were identified.17
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Pete
Aldridge has remarked that “transformation is a loose concept.”18 Yet adminis-
tration officials have attempted to pin down the meaning of “transformation.”
The most prominent dimensions of transformation—technology, doctrine, and
organization—were evident in the characterization of transformation provided
in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report:19
Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational con-
cepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of organiza-
tion that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic and operational
challenges and opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war
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obsolete or subordinate. Transformation can involve fundamental change in the form of
military operations, as well as potential change in their scale. It can encompass the
displacement of one form of war with another, such as fundamental change in the ways
war is waged in the air, on land and at sea. It can also involve the emergence of new
kinds of war, such as armed conflict in new dimensions of the battle space.20
The administration’s characterization of transformation suggests that re-
making the armed forces requires more than routine, sustaining innovation. As
the 2002 Annual Report explicitly recognized, transformation entails “discontin-
uous change,” not merely the incremental change typical of modernization.21
Risks are to be taken.22 Transformation is to result in fundamentally new, rather
than merely improved, technologies and weapons systems, doctrines, and oper-
ational concepts. Revolutionary rather than evolutionary change is the objec-
tive.23 Marginal improvements in capabilities are to be rejected in favor of leaps
ahead.24 As indicated by the QDR’s use of language evocative of a “revolution in
military affairs,” its discussion of transformation’s “social” dimensions, its rec-
ognition of the necessity for “fundamental changes . . . in organizational culture
and behavior,” and the military’s palpable concern about the administration’s
transformation agenda, the stage has been set for disruptive innovation.25
Even in the face of the military’s increased responsibilities for homeland se-
curity, the demands of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the complexities of the
broader global war on terror, and preparations for and then war against Iraq, the
transformation imperative has remained among the highest priorities of the
Bush administration.26 The September 2002 National Security Strategy, for ex-
ample, called for transforming the U.S. armed forces and other national security
institutions to maintain and enhance American primacy.27 The Bush adminis-
tration, seemingly, has repudiated the Clinton administration’s approach to
transformation and embraced the approach of the 1997 National Defense Panel,
which recommended “transforming the armed forces into a very different kind
of military from that which exists today,” for according “the highest priority to
executing a transformation strategy,” and for accelerating transformation.28
Against this backdrop, the U.S. Navy and the other armed services have strug-
gled to turn such nascent concepts as network-centric warfare from abstract ex-
ercises in strategic thinking into full-fledged transformation plans.
THE NAVY TRANSFORMATION VISION
Publicly unveiled by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, at
the Naval War College in June 2002, “Sea Power 21” is the most complete, and re-
cent, depiction of the Navy’s transformation vision.29 It is a successor to . . . From
the Sea and Forward . . . from the Sea, post–Cold War visions that profoundly
reoriented the Navy away from blue-water fleet-on-fleet engagements to
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projecting power ashore in the littorals.30 Sea Power 21, however, is focused as
much on how the Navy will fight in the future as on where it will fight. The offen-
sive Sea Strike, defensive Sea Shield, and facilitating Sea Basing capabilities it
calls for are to be integrated by ForceNet, which is to “network” the future Navy’s
formidable capabilities. The inspiration for Sea Power 21’s emphasis on the
force-multiplying, potentially transforming, effects of connectivity and net-
working is network-centric warfare, a concept of future warfare long advocated
by former Naval War College president Vice Admiral Cebrowski.31 In the form of
ForceNet, network-centric warfare is embedded in Sea Power 21’s vision of how
the Navy will “organize, integrate, and transform.”32
Network-centric Warfare
For its proponents, network-centric warfare is the emerging vision of the future
of war.33 It is a vision driven by a particular understanding of the transformation
of modern society from the industrial age to a postindustrial, or information,
age at the beginning of the twenty-first century.34 Advances in information tech-
nologies that have resulted in widespread socioeconomic changes are expected
to revolutionize the conduct, if not the nature, of war.35 In particular, the in-
creasing use of networks for organizing human activities is touted as a means for
reshaping the way American forces train, organize, equip, and fight.36
In brief, networks harness the power of geographically dispersed nodes
(whether personal computers, delivery trucks, or warships) by linking them to-
gether into networks (such as the World Wide Web) that allow for the extremely
rapid, high-volume transmission of digitized data (multimedia). Networking
has the potential to increase exponentially the capabilities of individual nodes or
groups of nodes and to render the use of resources more efficient. In theory, net-
worked nodes have access not only to their own resident capabilities but also,
more importantly, to capabilities distributed across the network. The loss of a
networked node need not be crippling; in a robust network, its functions can
and will be assumed by other nodes. Since networked nodes can share informa-
tion efficiently, they can be designed individually as relatively simple, low-cost
adjuncts to the network itself.37
The Navy and the other services have been developing, individually if not
jointly, the capabilities for network-centric operations (NCO).38 In a draft cap-
stone concept paper, the Navy Warfare Development Command identified four
NCO “pillars,” or supporting concepts: information and knowledge advan-
tage, effects-based operations, assured access, and “forward sea-based forces”
(see figure 1).39
The benefits of NCO to be provided by the pillars of information and knowl-
edge advantage and effects-based operations include speed of command,
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self-synchronization, advanced targeting, and greater tactical stability.40 Netted
sensors are to provide shooters and commanders with “unmatched awareness of
the battle space.”41 Within the battle space, war fighters are to be able to
“self-synchronize” their activities to fulfill a commander’s intent by drawing upon
a shared “rule set—or doctrine,” as
well as a common operational pic-
ture (COP).42 Self-synchronization
is accomplished by devolving deci-
sion making downward to the lowest
appropriate level, thus allowing war
fighters to respond directly and
quickly to tactical, operational, and
even strategic challenges. “Fires”
(munitions delivery) are to be em-
ployed in a framework of effects-
based operations rather than of
attrition-based warfare. Precision-
guided munitions in conjunction
with advanced ISR capabilities will
allow targets to be hit with greater economy—simultaneously rather than
sequentially—greatly increasing the possibility of imposing disproportionate
effects, particularly psychological ones, on the adversary. Tactical operations
may thus achieve strategic objectives.
By geographically dispersing sensors, shooters, and their supporting infra-
structure within an overarching network, U.S. forces will be able to achieve
greater tactical stability—a favorable balance between survivability and combat
power.43 Fires, rather than forces, will be massed, and they will be delivered from
beyond visual range. Ideally, effects-based operations, fueled by information
and knowledge superiority, will enable U.S. forces to “lock in success and lock
out enemy solutions.”44 Smaller, lighter, faster, less complex, and less expensive
nodes (i.e., platforms) linked by interoperable, highly redundant, self-healing
networks will present adversaries with fewer high-value targets and improve the
robustness of operations against a determined foe.
Implicitly at least, NCO is a joint vision that harnesses capabilities from all
services; it is applicable to warfare on land, air, or sea.45 That it is a Navy concept
with naval origins, however, is evident in the two pillars that are more distinctly
maritime: assured access and forward-deployed sea forces. “Assured access” re-
fers to the ability of the U.S. armed forces to gain entry to and use both overseas
infrastructure, such as ports and airfields, and the battle space itself, even when
confronted by a capable and active adversary.46 No sanctuary is to be ceded to the
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opponent. It is the job of the Navy and the Marine Corps to enable and ensure
access by follow-on elements of the Air Force and the Army—the heavier forces
necessary to fight and win major theater wars. The Navy accomplishes this
through the combat capabilities inherent in its forward-deployed presence as-
sets (i.e., the ability to operate in the littoral). Since sea-based forces “do not rely
on permissive access to foreign shore installations that may be withdrawn or
curtailed,” they “furnish an assured infrastructure for additional joint forces.”47
The most robust form of NCW also features a wide variety of nodes (or plat-
forms) that are to be smaller, lighter, faster, or less complex than current plat-
forms. Unmanned vehicles, for instance, are to deploy sensors or serve as
sensors, communications relays, and weapons platforms. In the view of its
strongest advocates, NCW requires innovative design concepts such as small lit-
toral combatants (a concept formerly known as “Streetfighter”), fast lift, and
small-deck aircraft carriers. According to their logic, fulfilling the ultimate
promise of network-centric operations requires less complex and less expensive
network-tailored nodes/platforms that will facilitate self-synchronization and
“swarming” tactics and increase tactical survivability.48 Complexity is to be lo-
cated on the web rather than on the node; the expensive platform nodes that
populate the legacy force will be displaced by simpler, less expensive ones. In to-
day’s Navy, platforms are networked via, for instance, the Cooperative Engage-
ment Capability (CEC) and IT-21. In the network-centric Navy of the future,
nodes will be tailored to network requirements from their earliest conception.
Sea Power 21
Network-centric warfare, in the form of ForceNet, is “the ‘glue’ that binds to-
gether” Sea Power 21’s “three fundamental concepts”: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and
Sea Basing.49 Integrated by ForceNet, the offensive and defensive capabilities of
Sea Strike and Sea Shield and the operational autonomy of Sea Basing are to pro-
vide “unprecedented maritime power”—nothing less than “decisive warfighting
capabilities from the sea.”50 The development of these capabilities will be sup-
ported by three additional elements of Sea Power 21: “Sea Trial’s” innovation
processes, “Sea Warrior’s” investment in people, and “Sea Enterprise’s” im-
proved business practices. SP-21 is driven not by the asymmetrical challenges
posed by regional or transnational threats but by a concerted effort to exploit (and
thereby help preserve) the asymmetry inherent in U.S. technological preemi-
nence;51 accordingly, it is to provide “powerful warfighting capabilities” that “will
ensure our joint force dominates the unified battle space of the 21st century.”52
The core operational concepts of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing, the
“operational construct and architectural framework” of ForceNet, and the three
supporting concepts had all appeared earlier in the Department of the Navy’s
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Naval Transformation Roadmap.53 Beginning in June 2002, these concepts took
the form of “Sea Power 21” in a series of speeches and articles by the Chief of Na-
val Operations and other flag and general officers.54 Sea Power 21 represents a
concerted effort to market as transformational the future capabilities sought by
the Navy’s leadership, civilian and military alike. The array of capabilities envi-
sioned by the NTR and SP-21,
which are to be developed in a
phased process from 2002–2020,
are depicted in table 1.55
With the promulgation of the
Naval Transformation Road-
map and Sea Power 21 in 2002,
network-centric concepts, in the
form of ForceNet, are for the first
time firmly embedded in the
official version of naval transfor-
mation. It remains to be seen,
however, whether naval transfor-
mation will fulfill the overarching
vision of transformation sug-
gested by Joint Vision 2020 and
the Bush administration’s defense
planning documents.
EVALUATING NAVAL TRANSFORMATION
There are two ways to assess the Navy’s transformation enterprise. First, it can be
evaluated against transformation objectives articulated by President Bush and
the members of his national security team. In effect, this approach uses a mea-
sure external to the Navy. Second, Navy transformation can be assessed in terms
of how well the Navy has implemented to date its own concepts. This approach
measures internal progress toward the Navy’s stated objectives.
We argue here that although the Navy has made progress toward developing a
coherent transformation vision over the past decade, there are gaps between the
administration’s stated objectives and the Navy’s transformation enterprise. As
for the overall prospects for transformation, a definitive judgment cannot yet be
rendered; much depends on how well the Navy supports the headline goals of
Sea Power 21 and NCW over time. It is difficult to evaluate the implementation
of the Navy’s vision, because the effort cannot be expected to bear fruit for an-
other ten years or more. However, there are already signs that as a result of
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Sea Strike
• Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
• Time-sensitive strike
• Offensive information operations
• Ship-to-objective maneuver
• Covert strike
Sea Shield
• Homeland defense
• Sea/littoral superiority
• Theater air and missile defense
• Force entry enabling
Sea Basing
• Enhanced afloat positioning of joint assets
• Accelerated deployment and employment time
ForceNet
• Expeditionary, multitiered sensor and weapons grid
• Distributed, collaborative command and control
• Dynamic, multipath, and survivable networks
• Adaptive/automated decision aids
• Human-centric integration
TABLE 1
THE NTR’S AND SP-21’S TRANSFORMATIONAL
WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES
Source: Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access . . . from the Sea (Washington, D.C.:
Dept. of the Navy, 2002); and Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive
Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 2002), pp. 32–41.
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budgetary, bureaucratic, and political impediments to transformation, imple-
mentation is lagging and will continue to lag.
Does Naval Transformation Measure Up?
Judged against the expectations created by the president and his defense team,
the naval transformation enterprise will fall short, even if—and this is a big if—
it is fully implemented in the coming decades. Transformation advocates within
OSD, including the Office of Force Transformation, believe that transformation
is a matter of discontinuous, even “revolutionary,” change. Yet while neither the
next Navy (of 2010) nor the Navy after next (of 2020) will look exactly like to-
day’s Navy, they will be quite recognizable. With a few important exceptions, op-
erational capabilities are unlikely to have been transformed; instead, capabilities
resident in the current Navy will have been improved.
The Navy advertises Sea Power 21 as a “new operational construct.”56 Yet
much of Sea Power 21 is a repackaging of familiar ideas. The Navy has long pos-
sessed offensive, defensive, and presence capabilities. Although relabeled “Sea
Strike,” “Sea Shield,” and “Sea Basing,” those capabilities will continue to be en-
hanced, or modernized; they are unlikely to be revolutionized. The “new opera-
tional construct” essentially calls for routine, sustaining modernization.57
A similar judgment can be rendered against network-centric operations. At
the most basic level, the desirability of the kinds of information and knowledge
advantages touted by NCO is not new. Military commanders since time imme-
morial have sought more and better information.58 As for effects-based opera-
tions, the Navy, indeed all branches of the military, have often sought to destroy
targets with an eye to the reactions of enemy forces and political decision mak-
ers. Was not strategic bombing in World War II intended to break the will of the
English, German, and Japanese citizenries? Assured access is not a novel idea ei-
ther. The Navy has long provided battlespace access for other components of the
total force; did it not make it possible for the Marines and Army to island-hop
across the Pacific? The Navy has also long been the provider of “forward
sea-based forces.”59 Dominating the tempo of war and foreclosing adversary op-
tions is also a traditional warfighting objective. How all of this is achieved will
certainly be improved, but it is not clear that the Navy will be revolutionized.
Neither is the Navy new to the information age. ForceNet builds upon exist-
ing Navy information technology capabilities and programs.60 Few if any of the
envisioned capabilities entail skipping a generation of technology; if anything,
even with the advent of spiral development, Navy information technologies will
continue to lag behind those of the civilian IT sector. Indeed, existing plans from
the Navy–Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) to CEC, the Naval Fires Network
(NFN), and the Expeditionary Sensor Grid (ESG) will incorporate and build
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upon existing networks to enhance future connectivity. Sustaining innovation is
likely to continue to be the norm. Tellingly, the performance metrics of the
nodes, or platforms, and networks envisioned by NCW and NCO require less
discontinuous and disruptive innovation than sustaining innovation.61
The sense of urgency attached to transformation by the president is little evi-
dent in the NTR and other Navy planning documents. For the Navy, it seems that
thus far transformation means business as usual—incremental, evolutionary
changes in both capabilities and the doctrine necessary to employ those capabil-
ities. There is no evident generation-skipping. The NTR, in particular, features
rampant incrementalism. It calls for “more effectively” utilizing and exploiting
assets; for enhancing, increasing, improving (sometimes significantly), and lever-
aging existing capabilities while accelerating certain current programs. Risk tak-
ing is also difficult to detect; indeed, the Navy has remained steadfastly risk averse.
The evolution since the mid-1990s of the Navy’s plans for a future carrier is
instructive. Initially, with what was “CVX,” the Navy took an ambitious,
clean-sheet design approach that may well have resulted in the skipping of a gen-
eration, a leap ahead. Due to budgetary constraints and reluctance to assume
technological risks, that approach was scaled back with the shift to “CVNX,” a
distinctly evolutionary program intended to yield a next-generation carrier. By
most accounts, it was only pressure from OSD for a “CVN-21” incorporating a
range of emerging technologies that prevented the Navy’s next carrier from be-
ing merely a slightly improved Nimitz-class carrier. Just how transformational
the Navy’s next carrier will actually be is an open question. The point is that the
Navy reached ahead as far as it did only because it was pushed by OSD.
Some analysts have speculated that Navy programs might be vulnerable after
the cancellation of the Army’s Crusader artillery system. But few Navy programs
have been canceled to free up resources for transformation.62 Instead, such exist-
ing programs as the Joint Strike Fighter are billed as transformational. Further,
the alignment of programs and resources with the Navy transformation vision
and roadmap is far from seamless. Programs remain platform-centric rather
than network-centric.63 In the course of his remarks at Ship Tech 2003, Rear Ad-
miral Jay Cohen, Chief of Naval Research, characterized SP-21 and the NTR as
“ship-centric.” Science and technology, and research and development, pro-
grams remain focused more on near-term technology transition to the fleet than
on the long-term basic S&T/R&D that may be required for true transformation.
Routine modernization and the recapitalization of legacy systems appear to
overshadow programs that could yield disruptive innovation.64
Navy transformation to date is thus a rather modest enterprise. It is difficult
to distinguish from modernization. It emphasizes sustaining innovation and in-
cremental, evolutionary change. At best, it amounts to “modernization plus.”
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Barring unforeseen developments, the Navy will continue to do what it does
now, only better. The Navy’s transformation enterprise does not live up to the
expectations created by the Bush defense team; Sea Power 21 is unlikely to result
in transformation.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the Navy’s measured, incremental,
evolutionary approach to transformation is actually not entirely out of sync
with OSD’s approach. The urgency attached to transformation, the emphasis on
discontinuous—even disruptive—change, evident in the QDR, the 2002 Annual
Report, and elsewhere is not absolute. Administration officials recognize that
transformation is a long-term process, that its promise will be fully realized only
with the passage of time.65 “Today’s challenges” must be addressed even while
the military is transforming for the future; future readiness is not to be ensured
at the expense of current readiness.66 Prudence and balance are ever the watch-
words: “It would be imprudent to transform the entire force all at once. A bal-
ance must be struck between the need to meet current threats while
transforming the force over time.”67 This approach, which much resembles that
of the Clinton administration, is unlikely to result in a rush to transformation by
the Navy—or any of the other services.
Modernization Plus
Each of Sea Power 21’s major foci provide possible exceptions to the argument
that current plans for Navy transformation do not measure up. Several initia-
tives particularly deserve attention.
Sea Strike. A range of strike platforms have been portrayed as “undergoing a rev-
olution in capability.”68 For instance, SSGNs—Trident ballistic-missile subma-
rines converted to attack boats, carrying cruise missiles and unmanned vehicles
and deploying special-operations forces—will have Arsenal Ship–like capabili-
ties; indeed, they will be even more stealthy than the Arsenal Ship would have
been. SSGNs will also bolster the Navy’s existing cruise-missile launch capability
(if not the number of cruise missiles available for launch). Why four SSGNs
should be regarded as transformational, however, is not evident.
The DD(X) destroyer, CG(X) cruiser, and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) have
also been characterized as revolutionary.69 This “Surface Combatant Family of
Ships,” however, may be no more a radical departure than the aforementioned
CVN(X). That DD(X) is being designed as a multimission land-attack destroyer
is in line with the Navy’s post–Cold War reorientation from blue water to the
littoral. As for the LCS, given the vehement reaction to the concept of a
Streetfighter when it was introduced, it is no less noteworthy that the Navy
is not only proceeding with the program but is seriously considering alterna-
tive hull designs, some of which are of foreign origin.70 Yet the mix of surface
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combatant capabilities represented by this family of ships inspires a sense of déjà
vu. As two retired admirals have pointed out, “The Family of Ships is really a
21st-century version of the high-low mix of the 1970s.”71 This reincarnated
high-low mix may be undermined by two of the problems that doomed the ear-
lier attempt: at the low end, cost growth; at the high end, inability to procure the
number of platforms required to make the mix work. The Navy has not yet es-
caped the tyranny of resource constraints.
Many transformation proponents have highlighted the potentially revolu-
tionary impact of unmanned vehicles on military operations from reconnais-
sance to strike. Sea Strike envisions a future battle space populated by an array
of unmanned vehicles—aerial, surface, and subsurface. Yet the Navy’s
unmanned-vehicle programs appear to lag behind Air Force, Army, and Marine
counterparts. This is especially true for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
According to one recent report, there are fourteen separate Navy unmanned-
vehicle programs. Seven are UAVs; of those, five are being used, or will be used,
in very limited numbers for testing, training, or developmental training; the
other two (Northrop Grumman’s Pegasus and Boeing’s X-45) are largely
funded by the Defense Advanced Research Agency and are not projected to see
naval service until 2015. As for Global Hawk, a now well-known UAV that was
first rushed into operation for the Afghanistan campaign, the Navy plans to
purchase only two systems, one in 2005 and one in 2007.72 The Navy has also
sought a hundred million dollars to upgrade a Pioneer system that dates back to
the mid-1980s. By contrast the U.S. Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps have de-
ployed relatively new, relatively capable UAVs even as they continue to test and
evaluate next-generation systems.
Perhaps this is unfair. After all, there is something to the claim that operating
UAVs in a maritime environment poses challenges not faced by ground-based
systems. Launch and recovery of ship-based naval UAVs, for example, presents
serious technical challenges. Finding space to store, maintain, and operate UAVs
on vessels not originally designed to host them can be problematical. Moreover,
if the Navy is able to field reconnaissance variants of either the Pegasus or the
X-45 by 2015 as planned, the service will actually be on track to meet the needs
of the Navy after next.
Even though the utility of UAVs has become increasingly clear over the past
two decades, the Navy has been slow to recognize their value. It has pursued un-
manned aerial vehicles only in fits and starts. Representatives of one major UAV
manufacturer told one of the authors that they “hated” doing business with the
Navy, because it spent so much time researching operational requirements and
testing existing systems. They doubted that the Navy would ever actually field a
system.73 The Fire Scout vertical-takeoff-and-landing UAV program, whatever
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its specific merits, seems representative; after an initial investment the Navy
pulled back from production in early 2002, all but terminating the program, and
began thinking once again about new UAV designs and concepts. Then, early in
2003, Fire Scout was reinvigorated.74
Even UAV-related developments with regard to one of the Navy’s most highly
touted near-term transformation programs, the SSGN conversion, may repre-
sent less than meets the eye. In the winter of 2003, the Giant Shadow experiment
“absolutely validated that UAVs provide a great value, on the tactical and opera-
tional level of war, to an SSGN that’s operating as . . . an ISR home base,” accord-
ing to the commander of the experiment’s joint force maritime component.75
One element of the overall experiment tested the ability of a land-launched Boeing/
Insitu ScanEagle UAV to communicate with the submarine and other naval as-
sets. Yet Aerospace Daily quoted the maritime component commander as con-
cluding, “I’d like to pursue a UAV for submarines, although I’m not convinced
that [ScanEagle] is it. . . . Its wingspan is too big [and] the launching . . . was
sometimes problematic.”76 Modification of the ScanEagle, other competing
UAV designs, or the development of a UAV designed specifically to operate from
submarines may have to wait, however, given current programming.
Sea Shield. Much of Sea Shield, at least as described in publicly available docu-
ments, is not new. It prominently features traditional force protection missions—
air defense, mine countermeasures, and antisubmarine warfare programs—and
ensuring access to the littoral. Potentially more disruptive, however, are plans to
provide theater ballistic missile defense and ballistic missile defense from
sea-based platforms. In the words of Admiral Clark,
It [Sea Shield] is about projecting global defensive assurance, projecting defense. . . .
Traditionally, naval defense has been concerned with protecting our units or the
force, and the sea lines of communication. Tomorrow’s navy must of course do all of
that, but we must be able to do much more: projecting defensive technology beyond
the task force, providing theatre and strategic defense for the first time.77
In short, the U.S. Navy is preparing to play a central role in defending the
homeland not against the seaborne invasions of old but ballistic missiles armed
with weapons of mass destruction.78 The Navy’s sea-based “Mid-Course” system
is expressly intended to protect population areas from ballistic missile threats.
Navy assets committed to this homeland defense mission become “strategic” in
the same sense that the fleet’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) have been
strategic.79 Also like SSBNs, they are unlikely to be available for other missions.
Although the long-term effects of this aspect of Sea Shield on the Navy re-
main to be seen, stationing a picket line of ships to track and intercept ballistic
missiles aimed at the American homeland or an allied population center may
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very well change the culture of the service. Rather than engaging the enemy fleet
on the high seas or striking enemy forces in the littoral or far inland, Navy offi-
cers and enlisted personnel will be asked to wait and respond to an attack. Taken
to the extreme, crews onboard ships dedicated to missile defense will be akin to
missile launch officers sitting in silos waiting for the balloon to go up.80
Sea Basing. Since 11 September 2001 it has become apparent that the United
States may be involved in conflicts of longer duration than at any time since the
Vietnam War. Future operations in failed or failing states, for example, may re-
quire it to commit forces for years rather than months. Access to bases in neigh-
boring countries will not always be readily available; neutral states and even a
few allies have been reluctant to grant the U.S. military unrestricted access to fa-
cilities or overflight rights at various points during the war on terror and during
preparations for a potential invasion of Iraq. More of the same can be expected
in the future. As a result the United States may increasingly rely on sea-based
forces to conduct strike operations and support ground forces.
Sea Power 21’s emphasis on sea basing has reinvigorated discussions about
the need for mobile offshore bases (MOBs) that have continued since Admiral
William Owens first raised the idea in the mid-1990s.81 Thus, for example, some
planners want next-generation Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or
MPF(F), vessels to have “the ability to selectively onload and offload military
gear at sea.”82 One concrete means to accomplish sea basing that differs some-
what from the MOB concept involves combining the Joint Command and Con-
trol Ship, or JCC(X), with the MPF(F) program.
Although, again, it is too early to know what form Sea Basing will take as it
moves beyond the concept development stage, some form of a MOB could pro-
vide a transformational capability. At least for some missions and finite periods
of time, they would free American forces from the tyranny of land bases. They
would also tie the Navy still more closely to its Marine and Army counterparts,
placing it in a distinctly supporting role and making it joint in a way envisioned
only in rhetoric today.
ForceNet. The claim that the range of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing capa-
bilities are indeed transformational rests largely on ForceNet. ForceNet was pre-
sented in the Naval Transformation Roadmap as the Navy’s framework for
implementing network-centric warfare.83 Originally developed by the Chief of
Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group, it has been billed variously as
putting the “warfare” in network-centric warfare and as “the next generation
of NCW.” According to Admiral Clark, ForceNet is the plan for making NCW an
“operational reality”: it will integrate “warriors, sensors, command and control,
platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force.”84 This
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planned network of networks and system of systems is expected to be the
information-technology backbone of information-age naval warfare. Today the
ForceNet concept serves as an umbrella both for existing programs such as the
NMCI, IT-21, CEC, and NFN and for major future programs such as the ESG
and the Expeditionary Command and Control, Communications, Computers,
and Combat Systems Grid (EC5G)(see figure 2).
It is the connectivity and synergy to be provided by such efforts that is in-
tended to be the source of any transformation brought about by SP-21’s core
operat ional concepts . Sea
Strike’s time-sensitive strike;85
offensive information opera-
tions from the sea, shared situa-
tional awareness, simultaneous
strike, and sensor fusion; Sea
Shield’s layered theater air and
missile defense;86 the common
air, surface, and underwater pic-
ture;87 forward homeland de-
fense;88 Sea Basing’s distributed
and networked platforms;89 and
the interoperability touted by
SP-21 generally—all are to be
either provided or enabled by
ForceNet. The weight of Navy
transformation rests on ForceNet. Unless its promises are realized, the potential
of platforms such as CVN(X), DD(X), CG(X), LCS, and SSGNs; unmanned
aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles; and combat force structures such as “ex-
peditionary strike groups” and missile-defense surface action groups will not be
fully exploited.
A principal “enabling element” of ForceNet is the planned set of information,
sensor, and engagement grids capable of linking all elements of the network
with each other and with the wider information “back plane” that constitutes
the World Wide Web and Defense Department–specific networks. This is not a
single network but a network of networks, “a global grid of multiple,
interoperable, overlapping sensor, engagement, and command nets.”90 The suc-
cess of ForceNet requires the development, procurement, and deployment of
large numbers of more capable sensors to populate the sensor grid and provide a
common operational picture.
Among existing programs, as illustrated in figure 3, the Cooperative Engage-
ment Capability, IT-21, the Radar Modernization Program (RMP), the Web
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Centric Anti-Submarine Warfare Net (WeCAN), and the Navy–Marine Corps
Intranet will help the Navy evolve further toward the ability to conduct network-
centric operations.91 A critical step is the deployment of a multitiered—space,
air, surface/ground and undersea—expeditionary sensor grid combining,
among other things, invasive sensing systems, unmanned platforms, massively
distributed information systems, and computer network attack and defense ca-
pabilities.92 At its simplest, the ESG is a “toolbox of sensors and networks neces-
sary to build . . . real-time battlespace awareness.”93
A network-centric future has implications for the Navy’s doctrine, organiza-
tion, and relationship with the other services. In 1998, the Navy Warfare Devel-
opment Command was stood up as an institutional champion for innovation. It
was specifically tasked to develop new concepts of operations and new doctrine.
In addition to NCO, it is developing operational concepts for Sea Strike, Sea
Shield, and Sea Basing. Also in development are a range of supporting and func-
tional concepts for informational
operations, homeland defense, the-
ater air and missile defense, future
naval fires, high-speed lift, and the
Littoral Combat Ship. Whether the
impact of these new operational
concepts and doctrine will be trans-
formational remains to be seen. But
the Navy will not transform with-
out them.
In addition to the establishment
of the Navy Warfare Development
Command, there have been a num-
ber of other organizational initia-
tives. Under Admiral Clark, NWDC itself has been subordinated to the
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), Sea Trial’s designated lead
agent, to coordinate experimentation programs. To facilitate integrated plat-
form and network planning, the Navy Staff ’s N6 and N7 codes have been
merged under a new Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Require-
ments and Programs, who was designated the director of ForceNet. Information
operations have been added to the list of major warfare areas, and the Naval
Network Warfare Command has been established to coordinate information
technology and information operations activities.94 None of these initiatives,
however, yet poses a serious challenge to the dominance of the Navy’s platform-
centric baronies.
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The shift to a network-centric force could have profound implications for the
Navy’s relationship with its sister services. ForceNet and its NCW/NCO founda-
tion assume a high level of jointness and interoperability. The language of
jointness and interoperability actually suffuses all of Sea Power 21. Sea Strike’s op-
erational capabilities are to be employed in joint campaigns; Sea Shield is to pro-
vide protection for the joint force; and Sea Basing is to support joint operations.
The promise of jointness has serious implications for the implementation of
ForceNet. If jointness is to be taken seriously and the advantages of connectivity
and integration are to be exploited fully, all of the military’s offensive and defen-
sive capabilities, not just the Navy’s, must be networked. A common operational
picture, for instance, is not really common unless it is shared by the Air Force and
the Army as well as by the Navy and the Marine Corps. The difficulties of ensuring
a common operational picture should not be underestimated, however. How is it
to be achieved? Should the services pursue separate but coordinated capabilities?
If so, can they be confident that the resulting systems will mesh to form an inte-
grated system of systems with the seamless connectivity required for a joint COP?
Or should the approach be joint from the start, with system acquisition assumed
by the Joint Staff or Joint Forces Command and the services required to tailor
their new platforms to joint NCW requirements? There is an undeniable logic to
the joint acquisition of joint capabilities. That logic is particularly compelling in
the case of the network capabilities that are at the heart of the sought-after trans-
formation. The jointness required to realize fully NCW’s potential may be pro-
foundly transformational. A truly joint Navy would be a transformed Navy. But
that does not appear to be the transformation the Navy has in mind.
IS THE LACK OF TRANSFORMATION A PROBLEM?
Thus far, what passes for transformation within the Navy is less revolutionary
than official rhetoric suggests. Even under a best-case scenario—where most if
not all of the Navy embraces current transformation initiatives, the resources
necessary to implement transformation are readily available, and the technolog-
ical challenges inherent in developing new capabilities are met—it is difficult to
avoid concluding that the Navy after next will be a modernized version of the ex-
isting fleet. It is possible that over time the accumulation of small-bore changes
will yield a force that deserves to be characterized as transformed. However, the
prospects for discontinuous, disruptive change appear slim.
Programs billed as transformational will add important capabilities to the
Navy. The Navy’s abilities to collect and share information, sustain operations,
operate in a more stealthy fashion, and directly contribute to the defense of the
American homeland will improve. But these capabilities are unlikely to provide
the virtual “lockout” of competitor options envisioned by proponents of
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transformation. Nor will they prevent adversaries from devising asymmetric
strategies for countering U.S. naval power. But they may further ongoing
changes in the organization of the Navy, its culture, and perhaps even the nature
of the officers and enlisted men and women serving their country.
Is the lack of real transformation a problem?95 Not especially. In our view, no
compelling strategic rationale for transformation has yet been articulated.
Transformation that equates to a revolution in military affairs is not required for
the maintenance and extension of either U.S. military dominance specifically or
American primacy generally. Nor is it a requirement for fighting and winning
the global war on terror. Generic capabilities designed to meet generic threats
(as in capabilities-based planning) or old threats pumped up for a new millen-
nium (as in threat-based planning against a North Korean foe) in the service of
force protection will suffice in the absence of a clear and present danger on the
order of that posed by the former Soviet Union.
According to the NTR, the objective of naval transformation is “to achieve a
broad, sustained and decisive military competitive advantage over existing or
potential adversaries.”96 The Navy, however, already possesses that competitive
advantage. It is the world’s preeminent naval force. It already exercises virtually
unchallenged command of the seas and possesses unrivaled power projection
capabilities. There is nobody in the rear-view mirror. At worst, the Navy will face
asymmetric challenges in the littoral and perhaps the emergence of a regional
competitor, such as China. While these are difficult challenges, there seems little
reason to think that they constitute a “competitive challenge” to the dominance
of the U.S. Navy. That preserving and extending its preeminence requires “sub-
stantially extending boundaries of necessary military competencies and . . . dis-
covering fundamentally new approaches to military operations”97 remains to be
demonstrated. What future challengers require that the Navy embrace funda-
mentally new approaches that challenge it to reinvent itself?
The Navy that will gradually emerge from the naval transformation enter-
prise will be well suited to carry out the roles and missions implied by the evolv-
ing U.S. grand strategy initiated by the Clinton administration and more fully,
and bluntly, articulated by its successor. The Navy will be better equipped to
strike terrorists and rogue states posing either conventional or WMD threats to
the American homeland, installations abroad, or allies. It will contribute to both
active and passive defense against ballistic missile threats. And it will operate
more jointly than in the past and with a high level of connectivity.
Civilian officials in the Department of Defense intent on transformation may
indeed feel that attempting to change the Navy (and the rest of the military) is
like punching a pillow. But the Navy’s modernization-plus approach is likely to
provide the nation with the capabilities required for the future.
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FROM KADESH TO KANDAHAR
Military Theory and the Future of War
Michael Evans
Only the dead have seen the end of war.
PLATO
As the world enters the twenty-first century, it appears to be in the midst ofrevolutionary shifts in the character of international security, with the
forces of information technology and globalization seemingly transforming the
theory and practice of war. In retrospect, it is now possible to see the decade be-
tween the collapse of Soviet communism in August 1991 and the attacks on the
Pentagon and the World Trade Center in September 2001 as an era of the unex-
pected. No one in the West expected, still less predicted, the fall of the Soviet
Union; the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War; the Asian financial crisis;
the Indian and Pakistani nuclear detonations; or, of course, the events of 11
September.
Over the past decade, armed conflict has not remained within the traditional
parameters of conventional warfare between rival states. From Somalia through
Bosnia to Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan, the face of war has assumed be-
wildering expressions. Under new global security conditions, the postmodern
has collided with the premodern, the cosmopolitan has confronted the paro-
chial, while the Westphalian state system has been challenged by new substate
and transstate forces. Conventional high-tech Western armed forces have had to
come to terms with a world of failed states populated by ethnic paramilitaries; of
rogue regimes equipped with ballistic missiles and poison gas; and of radical ex-
tremists embracing a philosophy of mass-casualty
terrorism.
For Western policy makers and military profes-
sionals these are deeply perplexing times; war seems
more dynamic and chameleon-like than ever before.
There are pressing questions: What is the future of war
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in conditions of great flux? Can traditional ideas of military power continue to
dominate in an age of both globalization and fragmentation? What is the mean-
ing of Western military supremacy in an era when democratic civilization—as
demonstrated by the events of 11 September—is highly vulnerable to unex-
pected and unorthodox threats?
This article seeks to provide some answers to these questions. It adopts an
approach reflecting a conviction that while events are always impossible to pre-
dict, it is possible to undertake intelligent analysis of trends in order to make
some interim judgments about the kind of military conditions that might
emerge in the near future. The article explores four areas. First, the fragmenta-
tion of the international system in the 1990s is analyzed in an attempt to demon-
strate how new political conditions caused a diffusion of conflict modes that in
turn have brought great uncertainty to the world of military analysts. Second,
the main theories of war that emerged in the 1990s and the complexity these
brought to traditional military thinking are examined. Third, a snapshot is pro-
vided of some of the most important challenges facing the West in terms of the
theory and practice of the military art over the next decade and a half. Finally,
some of the likely characteristics of warfare over the next decade are identified
and subjected to tentative analysis.
WAR IN THE 1990S: THE DIFFUSION OF CONFLICT
In the 1990s there appears to have been a major transition in international rela-
tions away from a mainly state-centered system toward one marked by greater
interdependence and interconnectedness. This trend toward interconnected-
ness was propelled by the dual impact of globalization and its handmaiden, the
information revolution. Together, these two forces appeared to have altered the
context within which modern states operate, bringing about an apparent redis-
tribution of power among states, markets, and civil society.1
From a military perspective, the globalization of the last decade is perhaps
best described as a process in which space and time have been so compressed by
technology as to permit distant actions to have local effects, and vice versa. The
international system that emerged by the beginning of the twenty-first century
was an interconnected world order in which regional and local military develop-
ments could be of global significance.
Defense analysts quickly discovered that conflict and disorder anywhere in
the world could be quickly transmitted everywhere—and invested with crisis—
by a pervasive global communications media, epitomized by the Cable News
Network. It was also discovered that globalization is not a homogenous process
but contains a striking paradox in that it brings about both convergence and di-
vergence. The notion of interconnectedness and a heightened sense of global
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consciousness are paralleled by polarization and particularism. As President
William Clinton put it in April 1999, the West finds itself engaged in “a great bat-
tle between the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration; [between]
the forces of globalism and the forces of tribalism; [of the forces] of oppression
against [those of] empowerment.”2
In effect, by 2001 the contemporary international security system had bi-
furcated—that is, it had split between a traditional twentieth-century, state-
centered paradigm and new twenty-first-century substate and transstate strata.
The great change in the early twenty-first-century international system from
that of the last quarter of the twentieth century is the transition away from a
dominant state-centric structure toward one marked by a greater number of
substate and transstate actors. With bifurcation came a reduction in the relative
significance of strategic geography, simply because the globalization of the in-
formation era appeared no longer to allow any state or society to retreat behind
physical or moral borders.3
It is very important to understand clearly what is meant by the “relative de-
cline” of strategic geography. In no sense does such a phrase imply “the end of
geography” in the same sense that Francis Fukuyama famously spoke of “the end
of history.”4 In terms of logistics, campaign planning, and topographical analy-
sis, geography remains fundamental to the art of war, while geopolitics remains
an important component of state-
craft.5 Nonetheless, a shift away
from territoriality toward con-
nectedness has diminished the ef-
fect of strategic geography as a
primary rationale for defining a nation’s defense and national security postures.
The process of this transformation—in which older forms of linear conflict have
been supplemented by new forms of nonlinear conflict—has been recognized by
both Western and non-Western strategists. For example, the leading American
strategic analyst Phillip Bobbitt has observed, “National security will cease to be
defined in terms of borders alone because both the links among societies as well
as the attacks on them exist in psychological and infrastructural dimensions, not
on an invaded plain marked by the seizure and holding of territory.”6 Similarly,
two Chinese strategists have argued that we are entering an age of unrestricted
warfare in which “there is no territory that cannot be surpassed; there is no
means which cannot be used in . . . war; and there is no territory or method
which cannot be used in combination.”7
The result of globalization over the past ten years has been the development
of an unpredictable and complex pattern of armed conflict. Under conditions of
global strategic bifurcation the old distinctions—between civil and
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international conflict, between internal and external security, and between na-
tional and societal security—began to erode. It has become clear that in an era in
which various transnational and substate forces were greatly empowered by
technology, such issues as civil conflict, terrorism, and the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction could no longer be easily quarantined within states or
regions. From the early 1990s onward, these phenomena emerged as global stra-
tegic threats precisely because they acted to blur the distinction between internal
and external crises. Under new conditions, transnational and substate forces
threaten not just states but entire societies and thus the fabric of international
stability itself. Consequently, traditional ideas about warfare have come under
challenge as the political, economic, and military dimensions of security have
more closely merged and state-on-state war seems to have been supplemented
by new forms of substate and transstate conflict.8
The changing character of conflict and war mirrored the bifurcation of the
international security system in the 1990s. The various views expressed about
the future of military conflict reflected the post–Cold War fragmentation of in-
ternational security and the diffusion of contemporary war into a variety of dif-
ferent modes. War became at once modern (reflecting conventional warfare
between states), postmodern (reflecting the West’s cosmopolitan political val-
ues of limited war, peace enforcement, and humanitarian military intervention),
and premodern (reflecting a mix of substate and transstate warfare based on the
age-old politics of identity, extremism, and particularism).9 It is important to
note that none of these categories represents neatly divided compartments of
activity; they overlap and interact with each other. The U.S. Marine Corps’s re-
cent doctrine of the “three-block war”—in which troops may be engaged in a con-
ventional firefight, peace operations, and humanitarian relief simultaneously in a
single small area—captures the essence of this complex interaction.10
However, if modern, postmodern, and premodern forms of war overlap with
each other, each mode has distinctive features. Modern war remains symbolized
by a classical doctrine of “encounter battles,” collisions of rival states’ armed
forces moving on land, in air, and at sea. This is a mode of classical warfare that
can be traced back to the first properly recorded battle in history, in which the
Egyptians defeated the Hittites in a chariot and infantry battle at Kadesh in 1285
B.C. The most recent model (at this writing) of armed conflict by encounter bat-
tle is the 1991 Gulf War, when Western and Iraqi forces employing missiles,
tanks, and mechanized infantry clashed in the deserts of Kuwait.
In the West’s public consciousness, modern war is based on high technology
and the conventional force-on-force warfare of the kind associated with the two
world wars, Korea, and the Gulf. In contrast, postmodern war is mainly charac-
terized by the extremes of Western risk aversion, since for the Western powers
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the stakes seldom involve issues of vital security or national survival.
Postmodern war is based on high-tech aerospace power, casualty limitation, and
cautious exit strategies, such as we saw during the Kosovo conflict of 1999. In
many key respects, the war over Kosovo was the model of a postmodern conflict.
It was, to borrow David Halberstam’s ironic phrase, “war in a time of peace”—a
conflict carefully calibrated, enabled by high-tech weaponry, with its course de-
termined by Western opinion polls.11 However, postmodern conflict based
around high-technology aerospace power has created its own antithesis—asym-
metric warfare, including the threat of weapons of mass destruction, waged
against Western society.12
For its part, premodern war is symbolized by the images of “blood and iron”
the West now allegedly abhors. Premodern war is essentially social rather than
technological in character; it is an expression of the existential rather than the
instrumental aspect of warfare.13 Those who wage such struggles may choose to
sport middle-class suits and exploit the spread of advanced technology, but their
mind-sets are mixtures of the antimodern, the millenarian, and the tribal. Such
radicals embody what Pierre Hassner has called “the dialectic of the bourgeois
and the barbarian.”14 Premodern conflict merges unconventional—to use the
term du jour, asymmetric—warfare methods with the conventional or
semiconventional military activities of failed states. The premodern model of
conflict also tends to exploit the rise of nonstate actors, cultural identity politics,
and ethnopolitical conflict. In many respects, premodern war represents a cul-
tural revolt against the philosophy of Western liberal globalism; it is a conscious
rejection of the universal values based on cosmopolitan democracy that fol-
lowed Western victory in the Cold War. For many premodern radicals, the social
order offered by globalization is anathema; it appears to them a facsimile of the
secular, materialistic, and trivial world inhabited by Homer Simpson. For mille-
narian radicals of political Islam like Osama Bin Laden, the West’s alleged cults of
hedonistic individuality and intellectual relativism threaten societies that seek to
define themselves by collective spirituality and timeless cultural traditions.15
Premodern struggles embrace aspects of substate or intrastate civil conflict
and ethnic cleansing ranging from Bosnia through Somalia to East Timor. Un-
like the old national-liberation insurgents of the Cold War era, premodern radi-
cals are more concerned with age-old cultural identity than the universal class
ideology of Marxism; with a strategy of population displacement rather than
winning popular support; and with sectarianism and secession rather than
building inclusive model societies. One of the biggest changes in contemporary
military affairs, then, has been the obsolescence of the Cold War political model
of unconventional warfare and, as a result, of much of the West’s counterinsur-
gency theory.16
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When distilled to basics, these three overlapping models of modern,
postmodern, and premodern war provide us with two vividly contrasting im-
ages of future conflict—one that is mainly symmetric and one largely asymmet-
ric. On one hand, we have the blend of modern and postmodern war seen in the
1991 Gulf War and waged in the air over Kosovo in 1999 to serve as a grim meta-
phor of Western supremacy in any conventional conflict. However, on another
level, we are confronted with a strange mixture of premodern and postmodern
conflict—a world of asymmetric and ethnopolitical warfare—in which ma-
chetes and Microsoft merge, and apocalyptic millenarians wearing Reeboks and
Raybans dream of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. To use a Hollywood
analogy, it is as if the West’s Buck Rogers were now lined up against assorted road
warriors from the devastated society portrayed in the “Mad Max” films.
MILITARY THEORY IN THE 1990S
The fragmentation of war has been mirrored in the world of strategic analysis.
In the 1990s, military theory reflected the rapid diffusion of conflict following
the end of the bipolar Cold War world. Multiple new theories of armed conflict
appeared in the first half of the 1990s. At the beginning of the decade, the Ameri-
can analyst John Mueller gave us the “obsolescence of major war” theory, which
argued that war in the advanced West was as outmoded as slavery and dueling.17
The Israeli scholar Martin van Creveld followed Mueller by declaring that the
Gulf War was a historical freak, a throwback to World War II rather than a vision
of twenty-first-century war. Van Creveld argued that the long era of interstate
war first codified by the Prussian philosopher Carl von Clausewitz in the early
nineteenth century had ended. What he described as Clausewitzian “trinitarian
war”—based on the nexus between people, government, and armed forces—
was dead, and Western military theory derived from classical warfare had be-
come obsolescent.18
The American futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler then gave us the theory of
”third wave” high-technology information warfare that helped initiate the “revo-
lution in military affairs” debate.19 According to the Tofflers and the information-
age warfare theorists who followed them, the Gulf War provided a glimpse of
postmodern war as the realm of high technology. Precision strike, “dominant
battlespace knowledge,” and stealth platforms would shape future conflict. In the
1990s RMA-style ideas dominated American force planning for a future based on
fighting two major theater wars, as enshrined in the Pentagon’s blueprint Joint
Vision 2010.
In contrast, military writers like Robert Kaplan, Philip Cerny, and Ralph
Peters proceeded to give us a vision of future war in which the form of social or-
ganization involved was far more important than the level of technology
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employed.20 For Kaplan, the war of the future was the “coming anarchy” of a
Hobbesian world of failed states; for Cerny it was the “neomedievalism” of
warlordism and violent disintegration; and for Peters it was a struggle by West-
ern forces waged against a world of warrior cultures and paramilitaries from
Mogadishu to Grozny. In 1996 Samuel P. Huntington published his seminal
study of a coming “clash of civilizations” in which conflict between world cul-
tures and “fault-line wars” would dominate the geopolitical future.21 Finally, in
1999, the British analyst Mary Kaldor put forward a theory of “new wars” in
which identity politics and the privatization of violence would challenge the
new global order.22
By the turn of the century, the West was awash in a world of competing ideas
about the future of armed conflict. War and conflict had, in effect, split like an
unraveling rope’s end into a multiplicity of strands. War could be whatever one
sought in the cookbook of theory: it could be desert combat in the Gulf, street
fighting in Grozny, or something between the two. Armed conflict could be
asymmetric or low-intensity style “fourth generation” conflict waged by guerril-
las and terrorists against the West’s conventional military supremacy. In addi-
tion, the ominous New Terrorism of nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare
conducted by rogue nations and nonstate entities was also viewed by some ana-
lysts as representing a form of “nontraditional warfare.”23
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF FUTURE WAR
Given the proliferation of military theory and uncertain political conditions,
what are the possible contours of future warfare over the next decade? What cau-
tious speculations can we make about emerging trends? In September 1999, the
bipartisan U.S. (Hart-Rudman) Commission on National Security/21st Cen-
tury stated:
The future strategic environment will . . . be one of considerable turbulence. . . . The
international system will be so fluid and complex that to think intelligently about
military issues will mean taking an integrated view of political, social, technological,
and economic developments. Only a broad definition of national security is appro-
priate to such a circumstance. In short we have entered an age in which many of the
fundamental assumptions that steered us through the chilly waters of the Cold War
require rethinking. . . . The very facts of military reality are changing, and that bears
serious and concentrated reflection.24
If the Hart-Rudman Commission’s judgment about the facts of military real-
ity changing is correct—and many, including the present author, believe it is—
those concerned with preparing for armed conflict in the early twenty-first cen-
tury must expect to confront a range of old, new, and hybrid forms of armed
conflict. During the Cold War, the West confronted a unidimensional threat from
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the Marxist-Leninist Soviet Union—an adversary whose motives were certain
and whose moves were predictable. In the new century, such conditions no lon-
ger apply. In the words of the present U.S. secretary of defense, Donald H.
Rumsfeld, new military thinking is now required to arm Western societies
“against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected.”25
It has become imperative that all concerned with security issues pay greater
attention to the merging of previously discrete forms of war. The conceptual ba-
sis for the study of warfare in the West must now be broadened to include a rig-
orous study of the interaction between interstate, substate, and transstate
conflict and of the diffusion of
contemporary military capabili-
ties. We have to recognize that in
an interconnected age, linkage
and interdependence seem to per-
vade all aspects of armed conflict.
Military analysts and force-structure specialists need to concentrate on the
multifunctional use of force in highly complex operations. In addition, military
professionals must learn to embrace the challenges of proportion, coercion, and
dissuasion as well as the older tradition of battlefield destruction. In particular,
what the U.S. Hart-Rudman Commission has described as “the spectrum of
symmetrical and asymmetrical threats we anticipate over the next quarter cen-
tury” must receive increased attention from both military theorists and policy
makers.26 In short, the challenge is to prepare for full-spectrum conflict.
The task will be much harder than many defense analysts realize. The notion
of a spectrum of conflict is not a new idea, but for most of the Cold War the
Western understanding of war was based on generic intellectual categories of
“conventional” (high-intensity) and “unconventional” (low-intensity) conflict.
Most in the field of strategic studies thought in terms of separate worlds of con-
ventional interstate (or high-intensity) and unconventional intrastate (or
low-intensity) military activity. Unfortunately, the spectrum of conflict that is
emerging in the early twenty-first century is distinguished by merged categories,
multidimensionality, and unprecedented interaction.27
In an era when all security issues are interconnected and when the national
security of Western states has become critically dependent on international se-
curity, single-scenario strategies and rigid military force structures have become
anachronistic. Traditional concepts of deterrence and defense need to be supple-
mented by new doctrines of security preemption, security prevention, and expe-
ditionary warfare. Moreover, the clear separation of peace and war must be
supplemented by an acknowledgment that modes of war have merged. In a new
age marked by networks and instant communications, the need is for advanced
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military forces with skills useful across a range of tasks that may involve preven-
tive deployment, preemptive strike, war fighting, peace enforcement, traditional
peacekeeping and peace building, and counterterrorism.28
However, the intellectual challenge facing military professionals is not, as
Martin van Creveld would have us believe, to consign Carl von Clausewitz and
two thousand years of Western military knowledge to the dustbin of history.
Rather, the task is to learn how to fight efficiently across the spectrum of conflict.
No responsible Western military theorist can accept at face value the thesis of the
“obsolescence of conventional war” or the paradigm of asymmetric warfare as
primary force planning or doctrinal determinants. In a dangerous and unpre-
dictable world, military professionals and their political masters must prepare to
fight in conditions of a “high-low mix”—to be ready to tame the big wildcats
and not simply the vicious rodents, to be able to fight troops like Iraq’s former
Republican Guard as well as Taliban, al-Qa‘ida militia, and terrorists. As every
good operational commander knows, in the military art one can “trade down,”
but one can never “trade up.” Moreover, all the evidence indicates that success in
peace-support operations requires the kinds of conventional firepower, mobil-
ity, and force protection available only to military establishments that are opti-
mized for conventional warfighting.29
Readying ourselves for conventional war does not, however, absolve us from
undertaking a major transformation in the way we think about the use of mili-
tary force. The most pressing intellectual task at the crossroad of the old and new
centuries is rapid adaptation to new and merging forms of conflict. In the West
we have to reconcile how we would like to fight with how we might have to fight.
We must try to synthesize relevant features from the massive literature on the
classical Gulf War/RMA model of warfare with the changing reality of conflict—
both conventional and unconventional—as it presents itself. We have to under-
take an intellectual exploration of the growing interaction between interstate,
substate, and transstate conflict and conduct a rigorous investigation of the phe-
nomenon of merging war forms—internal, international, postmodern, modern,
and premodern.
The merging of modes of armed conflict suggests an era of warfare quite dif-
ferent from that of the recent past. Fighting in the future may involve conven-
tional armies, guerrilla bands, independent and state-directed terrorist groups,
specialized antiterrorist units, and private militias. Terrorist attacks might
evolve into classic guerrilla warfare and then escalate to conventional conflict.
Alternatively, fighting could be conducted on several levels at once. The possibil-
ity of continuous, sporadic, armed conflict, its engagements blurred together
in time and space, waged on several levels by a large array of national and
subnational forces, means that the reality of war in the first decade of the
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twenty-first century is likely to transcend a neat division into distinct categories,
symmetry and asymmetry.30
Indeed, it is arguable that the main reason for much of the intellectual confu-
sion surrounding war at the turn of the century stems from the lack of a concep-
tual synthesis between the requirements of traditional conventional war and the
emerging blend of interstate, transstate, and nonstate modes.31 It is no accident
that the most productive areas of military theory have been those that have at-
tempted to concentrate on the expanding phenomenon of war. The most inter-
esting new approaches have come from those who have endeavored to examine
the growing complexity of conflict, its holistic yet multidimensional character,
its sociological as well as technological dynamics. Conceptual progress has come
from analytical work into war’s connection to society as well as to the state; from
assessing the convergence of modes of conflict and the growing requirements to
control armed violence in an age of instantaneous media imagery; and from de-
veloping multipurpose forces that can wage warfare across the spectrum of
conflict.
In short, it is the interactive character of war—Clausewitz’s famous chame-
leon “that adapts its characteristics to the given case”—that has proven the most
original avenue for analysis.32 The immediate future of war lies perhaps in two
key areas. The first is the realm of multidimensional theories of war and conflict
that call for multifunctional forces for intervention missions; the second is the
evolving theory of counterwar, or “mastery of violence,” which may assist mili-
tary practitioners and policy makers to understand and deal with armed conflict
as a multifaceted phenomenon.
A Multidimensional Approach to War and Conflict
As twenty-first-century war becomes, in the words of the prominent Russian
military theorist Makhmut Gareev, “a multivariant,” advanced armed forces
need to develop multidimensional approaches to conflict.33 The most interest-
ing American and British military theory reflects a growing recognition that in a
new age of multiple threats, discrete categories of conventional and unconven-
tional conflict are eroding, along with corresponding legal and moral restraints.
Much of the West’s preparation to meet an accelerating convergence of mili-
tary challenges is shaped by three ideas. First, there is a general acceptance that
armed forces must be able to adapt to differing modes of war, to become
multifunctional. Second, as questions of both national and societal security
merge and interpenetrate, reactive operational strategies alone become inade-
quate as means of deterrence. Security in the new era of liberal globalism also re-
quires a willingness to undertake interventions, as well as, correspondingly,
proactive military forces. Third, if global political and technological conditions
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permit radical groups and rogue states to use ballistic or biological weapons to
inflict mass casualties on democratic societies, this new challenge must be met
by military preemption in ways not seen since the late nineteenth century. In
other words, those who espouse the mass murder of innocent civilians in cities
and suburbs must be destroyed wherever and whenever preemption is possible.
As President George W. Bush put it recently, it is necessary for the West to act de-
cisively against the new threat emanating from “the perilous crossroads of radi-
calism and technology.”34 Specifically, the diffusion of advanced technology,
from standoff missiles to commercial space systems to weapons of mass destruc-
tion, into the hands of smaller armies, paramilitaries, militias, and other armed
groups puts a premium on Western expeditionary warfare.
Two leading American military theorists, Huba Wass de Czege and Richard
Hart Sinnreich, have recently given an unequivocal view of the merging of con-
ventional and unconventional conflict:
Clear distinctions between conventional and unconventional conflicts are fading,
and any future major conflict is almost certain to see a routine commingling of such
operations. Similarly, once useful demarcations between front and rear or between
theater and strategic operations will continue to evaporate as the instrumentalities of
war become more interdependent and, as is increasingly true of communications and
space systems, less easily separable from their civilian and commercial counterparts.35
As a result, the future requirement will be for joint forces designed for multi-
dimensional, expeditionary-style operations—what the U.S. Army now refers to
as “operational maneuver from strategic distance.” Such operations are vital to
control theaters where “high-low” threats and varied forms of conflict might be
expected. Consequently, the main trends in contemporary Western military the-
ory are toward operations with multinational and joint task forces with simpli-
fied headquarters structures—not simply corps and division, but increasingly
force and formation. Smaller combat formations, such as the combined-arms bri-
gades to serve modular building blocks for forces in the field, are needed.36 Force
structures will become more modular and capable of rapid task force organiza-
tion from “golf bags” of varied military capabilities.37
In expeditionary warfare, the main need is to reconcile operational versatility
with organizational stability. Western forces must be capable of undertaking
joint, multidimensional missions ranging from shaping the environment to
air-ground operational maneuver, to all-out conventional warfare. The de-
mands of operational versatility are likely to place a premium on organizational
change.
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Multifaceted Conflict: Counterwar Theory and Mastery of Violence
Recent trends in European-American military theory toward multidimensional
operations have also been applied to what some European military thinkers now
call “counterwar theory,” or the “mastery of violence” as an operational military
strategy.38 In France, the development of counterwar theory reflects the percep-
tion that war in the twenty-first century has become “a mixture of phenomena.”
Some French military thinkers believe that in contemporary armed conflict it is
largely impossible to treat war as merely a clash between rival forces; that the
conventional cannot be separated from the unconventional; and that traditional
lines of authority between military control and political responsibility are be-
coming blurred.
A military force may now be required to conduct intervention operations in
conditions that correspond to neither classical warfare nor traditional
peace-support operations. Extremely complex political conditions may arise in
which law and order are lacking but the law of armed conflict must nonetheless,
and at all costs, be upheld; in such a case a counterwar strategy, the disciplined
control of violence, may have to be imposed. As French military analysts Briga-
dier General Loup Francart and Jean-Jacques Patry observe, “Military opera-
tions are now completely integrated with political, diplomatic, economic and
cultural activities. Strategy is no longer simply a matter of defense. The problem
is now, more than ever, to conceive military operations in a political framework.”39
General Wesley K. Clark, the American commander who prosecuted Nato’s
1999 war against Serbia over Kosovo, has argued that politics in modern war
now pervades all of the three levels of war—tactics, operations, and strategy. In
the past, politics was mainly a factor at the strategic level, where statecraft guided
the military instrument. However, in the early twenty-first century, politics also
now impinges on the operational and tactical levels of war, Clark believes, to the
extent that it may be necessary to speak of a “political level of war.” If General
Clark is right, the implications for future civil-military relations are profound.40
In an age of increased military-political integration and twenty-four-hour
electronic media, the goal of force may be not annihilation or attrition but cali-
brated “elimination of the enemy’s resistance” by the careful and proportional
use of counterviolence. The use of armed force in a surgical manner—the rapier
rather than the broadsword—would require that military thinking and action
be politically sophisticated, legally disciplined, and ethically correct. These needs
were among the main lessons of the Kosovo conflict.41 As French military theo-
rists have argued, the aim must be to ensure that the application of force in inter-
vention operations—especially in an age of instant images—can be modulated
and shaped by professional militaries to accommodate rapidly shifting politics
and flexible operational and strategic objectives.
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WARFARE IN 2015: A TENTATIVE ANALYSIS
Given the growing complexity of the military art and of the use of force in state-
craft, what are the characteristics of warfare most likely to be over the next de-
cade? Four basic sets can be tentatively offered. First, war is likely to remain a
chameleon, presenting itself variously in interstate, transstate, and nonstate
modes—or as a combination of these. However, a word of caution is necessary:
it would be a serious mistake to dismiss the possibility of interstate conventional
war. If in some areas of the world, such as Western Europe, it is highly improba-
ble, in much of Asia and the Middle East it remains a distinct possibility.42 None-
theless, in general terms, the merging of modes of armed conflict does suggest an
era of warfare in which national, transstate, and substate forces may coalesce or
find themselves in mismatched confrontations. Moreover, the conventional and
the unconventional, the symmetric and the asymmetric, may occur almost si-
multaneously, overlapping in time and space.
Second, advanced warfare will be largely joint-service in character. The revo-
lution in information technology, especially as applied to command and con-
trol, long-range precision strike, and stealth, has so compressed time and space
in military operations as to create an unprecedented nonlinear battle space char-
acterized by breadth, depth, and height. During the 1990s, the concept of “battle
space” replaced the linear battlefield that had defined armed conflict in the
Western tradition from Alexander the Great to the Second World War. In essence,
the concept of battle space has permitted a shift away from the organization
of linear mass toward a simultaneous and “full-dimensional” concentration of
effects.43 This is especially significant with regard to the cumulative impact of mis-
sile firepower from air, ground, and sea.44
Third, most Western military experts believe that future operations will favor
simultaneous attack by joint air-ground forces that are “situationally aware”—
that have substantially complete and current views of the battlespace via com-
puter and satellite. Advanced forces are also likely to be networked from “sensor
to shooter”—that is, surveillance capabilities will be electronically connected to
strike forces, and all of them to each other.45 There will probably be fewer troops
deployed on the ground, but the individual soldier—the “strategic corporal”—
will have a greater potential impact on events. Growing weapons lethality and
increased ability of soldiers to direct long-range precision “fires”—as seen in Af-
ghanistan, where ground forces acted as highly effective sensors for air strikes—
are likely to become features of warfare over the next decade.46
Fourth, the dominance of surveillance and strike means that joint operations
by technologically advanced forces, capable of deep precision attack and quick
maneuver, are likely to resemble large-scale ambushes. If an enemy can be re-
motely located, traditional movement to contact preceded by forward troops
1 4 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
148
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/21
probing for the enemy will be replaced by well-prepared, deliberate, “deep” at-
tacks using tactics that exploit rapid positioning for maximum effect. However,
precision munitions are likely to be of limited use in close operations, in which
infantry must be employed to finish off adversaries.47
In the close battle, armored forces and artillery are likely to remain extremely
useful in applying suppressive fire in support of troops in action. In the recent
campaign in Afghanistan, American forces put their faith in air cover at the ex-
pense of both artillery and tanks. It was soon discovered that while precision
munitions delivered from high altitude are effective against known point tar-
gets, they are much less useful in area attack, as is necessary against forces that
are scattered, not precisely located. The majority of American casualties
(twenty-eight out of thirty-six) in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM came from
enemy mortar fire that could have been suppressed by armor or artillery. The
lesson learned from fierce combat in the complex terrain of Afghanistan’s
Shah-i-Kot region is that for area suppression, field guns and tanks remain es-
sential in twenty-first-century warfare.48
The likely shape of war in the early twenty-first century essentially reflects the
consequences of a bifurcated global system between an older state-centric
world, on one hand, and new transstate and substate strata on the other. The
West has entered a period in which classical interstate war has been supple-
mented by borderless threats from nonstate actors operating with the power of
modern computers, ease of international travel, and, possibly, weapons of mass
destruction, with which they can deal lethal blows to any society.
These trends, particularly the unholy alliance between new nonstate actors
and advanced technology, collectively point to an urgent need for new strategic
thinking. The shift toward connectedness and nonlinearity at the relative ex-
pense of territoriality and linearity has become perhaps the central reality of
strategy in the opening years of the twenty-first century. Some international ob-
servers believe the strategic shift from territoriality to connectedness will be rev-
olutionary in its consequences:
We are at a moment in world affairs when the essential ideas that govern statecraft
must change. For five centuries it has taken the resources of a state to destroy another
state; only states could muster the huge revenues, conscript the vast armies, and
equip the divisions required to threaten the survival of other states. . . . This is no
longer true, owing to advances in international telecommunications, rapid computa-
tion, and weapons of mass destruction. The change in statecraft that will accompany
these developments will be as profound as any that the State has thus far undergone.49
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The great danger to Western countries is no longer the threat of military inva-
sion of the nation-state but an assault on the very foundations of our networked
society. Western societies are now most vulnerable not from external invasion
but from internal disruption of the government, financial, and economic insti-
tutions that make up critical infrastructures.50
It was this great weakness that al-Qa‘ida exploited with such devastating re-
sults on 11 September 2001. Increasingly, national security now depends on the
protection of a specific set of social institutions and the information links be-
tween them. However, our reliance on critical infrastructures vastly exceeds our
ability to protect them; it is therefore impossible to protect an entire society
solely by “homeland defense.”
To defend Western societies, the nation-state model of war based upon threat
analysis and against defined enemies will have to be supplemented by new
modes of strategic thought that
concentrate on alleviating the vul-
nerabilities of modern states to
new nonstate threats. As the
French military analyst Phillippe
Delmas has warned, “Today’s
world is without precedent. It is as different from the Cold War as it is from the
Middle Ages so the past offers no basis for comparison. . . . Tomorrow’s wars will
not result from the ambitions of States; rather from their weaknesses.”51
To meet the challenges of tomorrow’s wars, Western countries will need
highly mobile, well equipped, and versatile forces capable of multidimensional
coalition missions and “mastery of violence” across a complex spectrum of con-
flict. They will need new national security apparatus for threat and vulnerability
analysis and consequence management in the event of traumatic societal attack.
They will need enhanced international intelligence and diplomatic cooperation
to ensure that military force is employed with maximum efficiency. They will
need new norms of international law that allow joint armed forces to be used,
when the enemy can be located, in far-flung preemption operations.52
The reality of Western societal vulnerability in conditions of liberal globalism
represents a strategic transformation that obliges defense experts and politi-
cians to think rigorously about the kinds of war that might lie ahead. We are con-
fronted with a challenge of finding new ways of using force in merged modes of
conflict in an international system that must confront simultaneously both inte-
gration and fragmentation.
The problems facing policy makers, strategists, and military professionals in
the early twenty-first century, then, have changed dramatically and decisively
from those of the twentieth. Military power and capability have expanded into a
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network of transnational interconnections. As a result, preparing for armed
conflict is no longer only a matter of simply assembling battlefield strength to
destroy defined adversaries.
Increasingly, military power is entwined in politics—as an instrument that
shapes, polices, and bounds the strategic environment, that punishes, signals,
and warns. The task for strategists is now one of disciplining available military
power into a broad security strategy—one that embraces also diplomacy, intelli-
gence analysis, and law enforcement—in a calibrated, judicious, and precise
manner. In the prophetic words, written over thirty-five years ago, of the British
strategist Alastair Buchan, “The real content of strategy is concerned not merely
with war and battles but with the application and maintenance of force so that it
contributes most effectively to the advancement of political objectives.”53 At the
dawn of a new century, of a new and uncertain era in armed conflict in a global-
ized yet deeply fragmented world, these words aptly describe the many danger-
ous challenges that lie ahead.
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IN MY VIEW
IS THERE REALLY “EROSION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL”?
Madame:
Richard H. Kohn’s article [“The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in
the United States Today,” Summer 2002, pp. 9–59] is one of the most
thought-provoking pieces I have read in the Review. I have now read it three
times over several months and must comment.
Kohn acknowledges the oath of officers of the United States, “to support and
defend the Constitution . . . against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . and that
I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about
to enter.” However, I do not think he realizes that most military dissent is based
firmly on that oath, rather than in contradiction to it. Unquestioning obedience
and compliance with orders that are contrary to that oath are neither intended
nor expected by the Constitution. The United States is governed by a system of
separated powers, of course. In this, the military has two masters. Military offi-
cers are in the military chain of command that extends to the president as com-
mander in chief. But this subordination is not complete. The oath of office does
not specify “and obey the orders of the president and the officers appointed over
me,” as does the noncommissioned oath. Enlisted personnel are required to obey
strictly, but members of the officer corps retain moral, ethical, and legal respon-
sibility for their actions. The professional military officer is responsible not only
to his or her chain of command but to Congress, which represents the general
public to at least the same degree as does the president. In its role, Congress ex-
pects and requires honesty and professional judgment from military witnesses,
not simply a paraphrase of administration policy. Every congressman, and ev-
ery military officer who testifies before Congress, understands this implicit
ground rule. When one represents the administration or speaks from a role in
the administration, one is obligated to present the administration’s case as best
as one can, without personal or professional bias. But if officers are asked for
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their professional opinions, they are equally obligated to be frank and forthright
with the members of Congress.
I agree with Dr. Kohn that public statements by active-duty officers in oppo-
sition to administration policy are not appropriate; nor are leaks to “friendly”
newsmen (or academics) designed to undermine an administration program or
policy. But I would argue that Dan Ellsberg’s “leak” of the Pentagon Papers was a
similar offense against the administration and should be viewed in that light.
Ellsberg knew what he was doing but believed strongly enough in his position to
run the risk of, perhaps even to expect, prosecution. Was he a traitor or a patriot?
I suggest he was an organizational traitor but a fervent patriot and that he did
not violate his oath of office. Rather he honored it, despite the personal cost.
It seems to me that Professor Kohn’s prescription for professional military of-
ficers is not far from that required by Hitler of the Wehrmacht’s officer corps.
Unquestioning obedience and unconditional subordination of the military to
presidential control is inappropriate in a democracy. Rather, our admittedly
messy system, with its separation of powers and unclear demarcation of powers,
demands of our military leaders a dual organizational loyalty to support and as-
sist both the executive branch and the Congress, approval of which is required
by the Constitution on questions of defense, on peace and war. The ultimate refer-
ent for all the players in this continuing drama is the Constitution itself.
Honest men and women will disagree on serious issues. These require serious
consideration of alternative viewpoints. To this end, the Congress will not and
should not accept the muzzling of military dissent in their hearing rooms, when
those witnesses are asked for their personal or professional perspectives. Con-
gress has no difficulty sifting through controversial subjects. That is its primary
task, and although the sifting too is a messy process, it usually produces a solu-
tion better than the strictly bureaucratic one.
Military officers have a deep and abiding commitment to the oath of office, a
commitment that can transcend organizational loyalty and strict subordination
to the executive branch. This is emphatically not a denial of civilian control but
recognition that Congress is also a player in the game and that military officers
owe them loyalty and professional advice, too—always, when they are asked for
it, sometimes privately even when not asked. When officers retire, in my view,
they regain all their civil rights of dissent—just as former presidents do. We may
often deplore the result in both cases, but we should not try to muzzle either cat-
egory of former officials.
In 1948 the Marshall Plan was finally approved by the first Republican Con-
gress in twenty years, largely on the basis of a perceived East-West crisis, precipi-
tated largely by the coup d’état in Czechoslovakia. The mood was also used by
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to gain
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approval for the Harry S. Truman administration’s modest increases in military
spending. In closed-door testimony, when asked for their personal opinions on
how much was needed, the chiefs gave figures well beyond those requested by
the administration, which was deeply concerned with possible deficits and infla-
tion. Congress subsequently approved more than the administration wanted.
Truman allowed the services to use most of this windfall but sequestered the
funds for a seventy-group Air Force and returned them to the treasury at year’s
end. Were those chiefs disloyal to Forrestal and Truman? Neither man appar-
ently thought so. But the chiefs did not speak in advocacy outside the closed
hearings. They did their duty and allowed the separation-of-powers mechanism
to sort out the policy. Many of those officers in 1948 were Republicans confront-
ing a Democratic administration—Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lucius D. Clay,
Curtis LeMay, and most of the Navy hierarchy come to mind. No doubt many of
them had strong reservations about Truman personally. But they remained loyal
to the office of the president, as did Truman himself. Truman honored his mili-
tary subordinates publicly and privately, and he never expressed contempt for
them, as did William Clinton and some of his associates. One of the basic lessons
for young officers is this: Loyalty from your troops has to be required, but you
must earn their respect. Many of us (I am a retired officer) feel that Clinton never
earned our respect, then or now, but we readily transferred our institutional loy-
alty for the president to George W. Bush, with a sigh of relief in many cases.
Truman subsequently fired General Douglas MacArthur for insubordina-
tion, on the strong and unanimous advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Gen-
eral George C. Marshall, then secretary of defense. Truman could accept
MacArthur’s contempt for Harry Truman, but he could not and would not toler-
ate his insubordination to the commander in chief. Was MacArthur acting out-
side his oath of office? He clearly disagreed with national policy and sought to
change it via public pronouncements and private communications to members
of Congress. Was he a traitor to that oath and to the Constitution? I do not think
so. He was insubordinate and so had to be removed from his office, which was
the appropriate penalty. Significantly, there was never a thought of prosecuting
him for violation of his oath of office. I expect that MacArthur acted throughout
in the belief that he was in compliance with that oath.
Civil-military relations are a good deal more complex in our system than in
the Prussia of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or Germany in the early
twentieth century—thank goodness! Had we lived to Kohn’s prescriptions,
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concepts of seapower and Hyman Rickover’s marvelous
triumph of technology would have been stillborn in the Navy Department and
within the administrations of their day. We might still be fighting in Vietnam,
and in the Balkans. The Marine Corps might have been abolished. There are
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dozens of outcomes that have been affected by thoughtful dissent by profes-
sional military officers, who carry an inherent responsibility to the president,
the Congress, and the Constitution beyond.
The whole concept of a Praetorian coup d’état is so far-fetched that even a
good novel like Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey’s Seven Days in May
(1962) just did not ring true to anyone in the military. It seems to me that in the
current scheme the professional military is much more likely to be a hedge
against an attempted executive-branch coup.
At the end of this note, I’m reminded of the familiar bumper sticker: Question
authority. It is good advice, even for the professional military person. It is the stan-
dard required by the Constitution, morality, and the Nuremberg trials, after all.
DR. JOHN B. BONDS
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
History Department, The Citadel
Author of Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan
THE ITALIAN WAR EFFORT
Madame:
I noted in General Douglas Kinnard’s otherwise fine review essay on Eisenhower:
From Abilene to the Elbe in the Winter 2003 Naval War College Review [pp. 163–
68] that yet once again the Italian war effort is slighted.
On page 166 it is noted that the end of fighting in North Africa in May 1943
“[resulted] in the surrender of over a quarter of a million German troops.” No, it
was the surrender of 250,000 Axis troops, of whom over half were Italian. The
last general to surrender in North Africa, commanding the Afrika Korps and
other units, was Marshal Giovanni Messe (who was well thought of by the Ger-
mans). It sprang to my attention because one recent English-language book on
the fighting in North Africa after Operation TORCH barely mentions Messe, be-
yond a footnote.
On these lines, in the same issue is a review essay on Thomas G. Mahnken’s
Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–
1941 [by Francis G. Hoffman, pp. 155–58]. While reading that excellent book I
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noted no mention of the Italian development before World War II of what we
now would call SEAL operations. The operations of the Italian 10th MAS would
result in several sinkings in Algerian harbors during TORCH. Prewar Allied intel-
ligence completely missed this innovation.
The Italian war effort has often been denigrated, but an interesting theory is
being currently advanced in Italian and German historical circles. What would
have resulted had the Italian effort, as a decisive weight, been applied more to the
Eastern Front instead of North Africa? The Italian economy produced 33,500
trucks, 92,664 automobiles, and 12,800 airplanes in the 1939–44 period; had
most of it been sent east, could more Axis units have been motorized and more
easily supplied? Had the Axis effort to supply Rommel’s forces, along with fuel to
transport those supplies, been utilized in the East, could a different result have
been obtained?
Only a small handful of British and American historians are working in Ital-
ian military history. Until this interest is expanded and broadened, and until the
largely excellent Italian military historical resources are more fully exploited,
such errors and omissions will continue to plague the historical understanding
of the Second World War.
JACK GREENE
Baywood Park, California
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BOOK REVIEWS
SUCH IS WAR’S EFFECT
Hedges, Chris. War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. New York: PublicAffairs, 2002. 211pp. $23
Chris Hedges’s timely and moving re-
flection War Is a Force That Gives Us
Meaning is about how war destroys the
people who experience it. He elo-
quently argues throughout his short
book that no one who is caught up in
war ever emerges unscathed or un-
scarred. Hedges wants the reader to see
war for what it is—an evil designed by
humans to empower great violence
against other humans. Hedges depicts
this evil graphically, many times and in
many ways, throughout the book. He
feels compelled to make his case in ex-
tremely stark terms because he knows
that for all its wickedness, war is also a
most addictive psychological and social
drug. Worse, Hedges states, war is
sometimes a necessary evil, a poison
that civilized and humane peoples must
take to defeat horribly deformed na-
tions and peoples who have completely
surrendered their humanity to it.
Hedges knows of what he writes. For
over fifteen years, he covered wars for
various news agencies. He was one of
those reporters who, like Ernie Pyle of a
generation past, travel to the front to
get their stories. Hedges got something
else, for which he had not bargained—
an addiction to the “jag” of combat.
Michael Herr, a reporter during the
Vietnam War, summarized this addic-
tion: “[Under fire] maybe you couldn’t
love the war and hate it inside the same
instant, but sometimes those feelings al-
ternated so rapidly that they spun to-
gether in a strobic wheel rolling all the
way up until you were literally High On
War like it said on all the helmet covers.
Coming off a jag like that could really
make a mess out of you.”
As a “cure” for his addiction, Hedges
spent a year in self-reflection and study
at Harvard; the result is this book. He
argues that war is so attractive because
it provides meaning and purpose to our
lives and fills a void in our existence.
The Faustian bargain is that war also
demands sacrifice—the destruction of
everything and everyone who is impor-
tant to the combatants, including the
culture in which they live.
Hedges would have the reader believe that
war really expresses the Freudian notion
of Thanatos, or death wish—that humans
find meaning in their lives through their
self-sacrifice, through dying. One imme-
diately thinks of the suicide bombers in
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Israel or the hijackers of “9/11.” However,
he argues further that if Freud is correct,
the balance to Thanatos is Eros, or the
love of life. While Thanatos drives hu-
mans to self-annihilation, Eros drives
them to embrace each other with affec-
tion and support. The Freudian view is
that both concepts are real and in eternal
struggle; there can never be a lasting
peace between them.
Hedges closes with a plea: “To survive
as a human being is possible only
through love. And when Thanatos is as-
cendant, the instinct must be to reach
out to those we love, to see them all in
their divinity, pity and pathos of the
human.” Love alone, for the author, has
the ability to overcome human destruc-
tiveness. One feels almost compelled to
regurgitate the Beatles line, “All you
need is love.” Therein lies the serious
weakness of this book. Hedges is con-
vincing in his analysis and reflection on
war but superficial to the point of trivi-
ality about its necessary counterbal-
ance, love. It is as if he remains
addicted to the very thing that he recog-
nizes will destroy him.
Nevertheless, every civilian defense ex-
ecutive, soldier, sailor, Marine, and air-
man should read War Is a Force That
Gives Us Meaning. Those of us who
have known the intimate jag of war also
know its nightmares. Hedges’s work is a
cautionary tale implying that nations
and peoples should enter war most re-
luctantly. It warns that war should be a
last resort, and that tragic consequences
may result even so.
My father made four opposed landings
with MacArthur’s army in the South-
west Pacific theater, each one with the
first assault wave. He was never
wounded. After the war, he worked for
an aerospace company for over forty
years and never missed a day to sick-
ness. Every night, after work, he drank
himself insensate. That is my most sa-
lient memory of him. Now, after my
war, I know that his drinking was a
learned coping behavior that served
him well after each landing. It also got
him through the rest of his life. Such is
war’s effect.
With this book Hedges has rammed the
issue of morality and ethics of war in our
faces. Will we take heed, or simply strike?
JON CZARNECKI
Associate Professor of Joint Maritime Operations
Naval War College, Monterey Program
Henriksen, Thomas H., ed. Foreign Policy for
America in the Twenty-first Century: Alternative
Perspectives. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution
Press, 2001. 152pp. $15
A brief, clean-cutting compendium
with six well known scholarly contribu-
tors, Henriksen’s volume illuminates
the current cardinal directions in the
debate over American foreign policy—
unilateral versus multilateral interven-
tionism along one axis, and aggressive
promotion of democracy (or global
markets) versus conservative harboring
of national strength on the other. Be-
hind this compass hides the more theo-
retical discussion of whether the United
States needs or could possibly maintain
a grand strategy in the absence of an
immediate national security threat.
Henriksen’s own contribution (intro-
duction and chapter 5) is to lay out the
dynamics of the post–Cold War world,
emphasizing the rise of China, threats
from rogue states, a stumbling Russia,
and a series of regional crises that
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mandate “measured global activism” in
order to protect U.S. national interests.
John Lewis Gaddis stresses the need to
develop a coherent U.S. grand strategy
in the post–Cold War world—primarily
as a tool for managing foreign policy in
a disciplined, proactive fashion rather
than simply responding to crises on a
case-by-case basis. Gaddis argues, “A
country without a strategy is like a mis-
sile without a guidance system. It’s
likely to dissipate resources ineffectually
and spread potential damage far. It can
pose as many risks to those who build
and maintain it as it does to those at
whom it’s supposed to be aimed.”
Gaddis is known as a key historian of
the Cold War. Under current circum-
stances, he sees grand strategy as an
“endangered discipline,” suffering from
a shortage of generalists who under-
stand the “ecology” of the international
environment rather than narrow re-
gional or functional specialties.
Starting the directional debate, Richard
A. Falk argues that American grand
strategy should emphasize strengthen-
ing global economic governance via in-
ternational financial institutions,
support for European Union–type re-
gionalism as a means of international
security, and the transformation of the
United Nations toward a global parlia-
ment. In Falk’s view, all these develop-
ments are in sync with the natural
instinct of America, although thus far
“the United States’ position has exem-
plified the democratic paradox of favor-
ing democracy at the domestic level but
resisting its application at the global
level.” Those familiar with Falk’s writ-
ings over the past four decades, advo-
cating world federalism, might find
these familiar arguments repetitive;
what is unique here is Falk’s lack of
stridency and the absence of the near-
utopian rhetoric that marks his earlier,
longer works.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution
scholar and founding coeditor of the
Journal of Democracy, stakes out the ac-
tivist end of the other axis. He insists
that building a world of liberal democ-
racies, whether by unilateral or multi-
lateral means, should be the primary
objective of U.S. grand strategy. Not
only does Diamond subscribe to the
“democratic peace” theory (that real
democracies do not fight each other),
but he also argues that democratic in-
stitutions function as “elixirs” to all so-
cioeconomic ills. Unlike Falk, Diamond
finds the solution for abusive power
and brutality through domestic democ-
ratization rather than in democratizing
international institutions—the latter a
process that (by implication) is at best
moderately helpful and potentially dis-
tracting. At worst, “one nation, one
vote” (or votes cast in international fora
by rulers of people who are not free)
thwarts the process of true (internal)
democratization by allowing authori-
tarian states to subvert the evolving
global trend toward greater individual
freedom. Diamond identifies the Mus-
lim world, rogue states, and China as
having cultural “dilemmas” that resist
much direct U.S. support for demo-
cratic change, but he maintains that
they should remain the particular focus
of U.S. efforts.
Sebastian Edwards, UCLA business pro-
fessor, presents a scholarly defense of
the beneficial aspects of economic glob-
alization and concludes that the United
States must be the driver of free trade
and economic openness throughout
the global system. Pointing to the evi-
dence between openness and income
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distribution, Edwards sees an interna-
tional economic policy supportive of
globalization as a core aspect of U.S.
grand strategy. For Edwards, free capi-
tal is as important as free institutions.
Walter McDougall, Pulitzer Prize–
winning author and professor at the
University of Pennsylvania, simulta-
neously anchors both the unilateral and
noninterventionist ends of the twin
axes by arguing for “contra globaliza-
tion and U.S. hegemony.” His is not a
unilateralism of action but a conserva-
tion of American strength for vital in-
terests, of which strenuous efforts to
establish international institutions is
not one. McDougall also argues against
the need for an articulate and public
American grand strategy, since “strat-
egy is by its nature secretive, deceptive,
and counterintuitive . . . and partly
reactive” and “democracies are ill-
equipped to formulate or execute any
long-term strategy except in time of
war or obvious peril.” In his view, the
quest for a detailed grand strategy leads
nowhere, because quite simply “the
American people don’t want one.” He
equally refutes both the “Clintonian
vision of globalization” and “the neo-
conservative crusade.” America must
carefully husband its international polit-
ical resources (particularly military de-
ployments), since “the world today is in
a highly unnatural state” that will inevi-
tably lead to balance of power politics
and spheres of influence. Continually
strong U.S. economic development is
the soundest policy; since “the most
predictable and direct challenges to
U.S. security are the invasion of illegal
immigrants and drugs, and the prospect
of civil collapse in Colombia, Mexico,
and lands in between,” strengthening
pan-American relations should be the
main focus. As for the rest of the world,
“helping to prevent wars among the big
powers is the most moral task the U.S.
can perform,” a task that does not in-
clude humanitarian crusades, promo-
tion of free trade, or global democracy.
“I am for them, by and large,” states
McDougall, “but I know America can
live without their triumph abroad” and
should not squander vital, limited re-
sources in their pursuit. As in his book
Promised Land, Crusader State: The
American Encounter with the World
since 1776 (Houghton Mifflin, 1997),
McDougall compares the potential out-
come of America’s moral crusades
overseas with that of the ephemeral and
counterproductive results of the medi-
eval Crusades. He concludes that Amer-
icans should “cease calling for the
conversion of all nations in this genera-
tion . . . and husband the assets they will
need when and if strategic genius be-
comes necessary.”
As the most recent outline of America’s
ongoing foreign policy/grand strategy
debate, Foreign Policy for America in the
Twenty-first Century successfully
bridges the gap between one-sided me-
dia op-eds and cautious scholarly
tomes. Appealing to both the interested
citizen and policy specialist alike, this
book indeed delivers on its promise to
bring together major opposing “alter-
native views” in a succinct, highly read-
able way.
SAM J. TANGREDI
Captain, U.S. Navy
Arlington, Virginia
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Orenstein, Mitchell. Out of the Red: Building Cap-
italism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe.
Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2001.
184pp. $60
Historically, most countries first de-
velop a market economy, even under
oppressive conditions, before develop-
ing a democracy. However, the 1989
revolutions in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope produced a counter case—the ini-
tiation of simultaneous democratic and
economic reforms. Many policy makers
and academics outside the region have
recommended that stability lies in a co-
herent and rigid reform plan for all
such states. The United States, for ex-
ample, has suggested and still some-
times emphasizes a “cookie cutter” or
“one size fits all” recommendation for
economic reform, emphasizing stabili-
zation, liberalization, and privatization.
Economic reform, Washington argues,
should be placed above the “whims” of
politics and not fall victim to victories
of the left or right.
Mitchell Orenstein is assistant professor
of political science at the Maxwell
School of Syracuse University, where he
teaches courses on Central and Eastern
Europe, as well as on transitions to
democracy.
In this work, Orenstein tests these pre-
cepts for economic reform in the de-
mocratizing countries of Poland and
the Czech Republic. He asks the hard
question: Were the postcommunist
governments definitely less than demo-
cratic reform minded, hostile to eco-
nomic and market-oriented reforms?
Orenstein’s persuasive findings demon-
strate that the traditional model of the
stick-to-it economic plan may not be
the only answer. Indeed, policy learning
and fine-tuning result from the success-
ful alternation of the political parties in
power in these democracies, even when
a postcommunist party returns to take
control.
For example, some feared that the re-
surgence of a postcommunist govern-
ment in Eastern Europe could lead to a
total backlash of democracy in the re-
gion or, worse, pander populist solu-
tions to ease the pain of economic
restructuring. These fears did not mate-
rialize, and the postcommunists elected
in Poland did not massively change the
economic agenda. There was a slow-
down in some areas of reform when the
SLD, the Polish postcommunist party,
won in 1993, but there was no major at-
tempt to undo economic changes or al-
ter Poland’s Western-oriented path. In
the election of 1997, political power
once again changed, this time swinging
to the right and to Solidarity Electoral
Action. This not only further illustrated
Poland’s economic success despite al-
ternation of power but also showed
how that change resulted in a more effi-
cient and centrist economic policy.
Government officials adapted and re-
sponded creatively to the wants and
needs of the electorate.
Interestingly, it was in Prague that the
traditional neoliberal “cookie cutter”
reforms were implemented and re-
mained unchanged for eight years, be-
tween 1989 and 1997. Orenstein argues
that the Czech Republic was not as suc-
cessful as Poland because of the rigidity
of its reforms and its lack of ability to
change or adapt. He adds the other di-
mension of the Czech economic prob-
lem—vouchers. In the 1990s, in an
attempt at rapid privatization, the
Czech Republic gave citizens vouchers
to restructure nationalized industries.
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The voucher program failed largely be-
cause of government corruption, which
led to a loss of public support.
This book is insightful but incomplete.
Orenstein’s arguments are concise and
persuasive, but he only examines two
cases that neatly support his argument.
Hungary would have been an excellent
additional test, as would have the fledg-
ling economies of the Balkans, where
the process of democratization is af-
fected even more directly by domestic
and international constraints.
With possible entry into the European
Union just around the corner for most
of Central and Eastern Europe, the
United States and Europe must look
carefully at these practical experiments
in democratic and economic liberaliza-
tion. With democracies emerging in
Southeast Asia and perhaps the Middle
East, it is important to develop and test
models of economic reform to see what
works and how best to implement them
in democratizing countries.
EDWARD WAGNER
Watson Institute
Brown University
Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars
and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic
Books, 2002. 428pp. $30
If the story of the military history of the
United States could somehow be pre-
sented in a single museum, the most
grand and widely visited halls would be
those dedicated to the American Revo-
lution, the Civil War, and World War
II. Less visited, but still of interest,
would be much smaller exhibits de-
voted to World War I, Korea, Vietnam,
and DESERT STORM. Conflicts such as
the War of 1812 and the war with Mex-
ico might rate a single dusty showcase
in some obscure corner. Tucked out of
sight, rarely seen, and all but forgotten
would be cabinets, crates, and cartons
packed with the jumbled stories of bush
wars, expeditions, occupations, paci-
fications, and reprisals—the often
sanguinary and surprising “small wars”
of the U.S. military experience.
Reporter and Wall Street Journal editor
Max Boot provides us with a long-
overdue survey of the all too often
slighted and neglected realm of these
lesser conflicts. His work is of necessity
an overview, but it is eminently read-
able and entertaining. Along the way,
Boot reminds us that the conduct of
these small conflicts is as much an
“American way of war” as that which
mobilizes and employs mass citizen-
armies in protracted combat. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, Boot
suggests that many of the lessons learned
from these small wars may be applied to
the security dilemmas of today.
This work deserves praise on several
levels. To begin with, Boot has rescued
the history of these conflicts from a re-
grettable level of obscurity (as far as the
general reading public is concerned). As
the merits and limitations of the United
States taking on the role of an imperial
police force are increasingly debated, it
is useful to recall that this is not the first
time America has attempted to do so.
The author has the courage to suggest
that under certain conditions, imperial
police forces may provide a much
higher quality of life for indigenous
people than would otherwise be possi-
ble. Boot notes that Haiti’s greatest pe-
riod of prosperity arguably occurred
during its long occupation by the U.S.
Marine Corps. He also points out that
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the Dominican Republic actually bene-
fited when forcibly placed on a fiscal
diet by the United States. Although the
U.S. Marines were ensuring that nearly
half the Dominican Republic’s revenues
went to repay foreign creditors, their
honesty in disbursing the remainder
was so notable that the country received
more funds than it had under its own
rulers. Boot also points out that
Veracruz reached a record standard of
cleanliness and hygiene, with an atten-
dant improvement in public health,
than it had known previously. Boot re-
minds us that far from resulting in
quagmires of despair and failure, many
of these conflicts have to be seen as U.S.
successes.
There are, however, several criticisms
that might potentially be leveled at this
work. Some may say that like so many
correspondents before him, Boot
excessively admires the U.S. Marines,
extolling their triumphs at the expense
of the other services. However, while
there is no denying that Boot has high
regard for leathernecks, he does provide
ample examples of Navy and Army ac-
tions. It is also important to remember
that the Marines were the service of
choice for the great majority of these
conflicts. A significant portion of the
Marines’ senior leadership in the 1930s
felt that the future of the Corps should
be bound up in mastering the chal-
lenges of these conflicts. This resulted
in the Marines’ Small Wars Manual,
published in 1941. It was later shelved;
Boot believes that it would have bene-
fited the United States in Vietnam had
those in charge read the dusty tome.
Another criticism that might be made
by some is that Boot glosses over the
darker aspects of small wars, focusing
on the successes and personalities. For
example, the first charging of a serving
flag officer with a war crime, the use of
torture to extract information, and mu-
tinies of such U.S. trained units as the
Nicaraguan National Guard were part
of the small-war experience. However,
Boot discusses these events in clear and
unequivocal terms, leaving the reader
to come to grips with how these aspects
of war played in U.S. successes.
What make this book so timely and one
that should be read by almost anyone
with an interest in political-military
issues, are the tie-ins that Boot identi-
fies as existing between the wars of the
past and the realities of the present. Is-
sues such as exit strategies, expected ca-
sualties, the difficulties of working with
local allies, and the complexities of state
building are not things the United
States is facing for the first time. In-
deed, as Boot demonstrates, the nation
has been dealing with these dilemmas
since the beginning of its existence.
Well written, timely, and provocative,
Savage Wars of Peace is well worth
attention.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Vidal, Gore. Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace:
How We Got to Be So Hated. New York: Thun-
der’s Mouth Press, 2002. 160pp. $10
It would be difficult to find a book on
world affairs more contrary to the opin-
ions of most readers of the Naval War
College Review or other members of the
American national security community
than Gore Vidal’s Perpetual War for
Perpetual Peace.
As a military officer myself, I disagree
with many of Vidal’s assumptions and
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propositions, but the book is worth-
while because it challenges one to think
about inconsistencies and issues in
American foreign policy as well as do-
mestic security. The book is extremely
well written, as one would expect from
a writer of Vidal’s caliber. It is highly
engaging, and most military profes-
sionals interested in American national
security will probably find it easy to
read (although fewer may find it easy to
agree with).
Gore Vidal is a noted novelist, perhaps
one of the most prominent living
American authors. In 1943 he enlisted
in the Navy and served in World War
II, so his background lends relevant ex-
perience in military affairs. He wrote
his commentary shortly after the 11
September attack, but after both Vanity
Fair and The Nation declined it, a ver-
sion of this book was printed in Italy,
where it became a best-seller. After
subsequent publication in Europe,
Vidal was finally able to get the book
published in its present form.
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace con-
tains seven chapters and an introduc-
tion, but much of the material predates
“9/11,” which is one of the book’s chief
weaknesses. Three chapters were re-
printed from his The Last Empire
(Doubleday, 2001), and these were re-
cycled from earlier articles. Another
chapter, “The Meaning of Timothy
McVeigh,” appeared in the September
2001 issue of Vanity Fair. There are
sparse updates throughout the older
chapters, including asterisked footnotes
and comments, such as one briefly
comparing the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing to “Dark Tuesday” (“9/11”). How-
ever, the meat of the new work appears
in the first chapter, “September 11,
2001 (A Tuesday).”
Vidal’s sharp mind and readable writ-
ing style make his arguments on the
World Trade Center attacks and the af-
termath compelling. For instance, the
declaration of an ambiguous “war” on
terror has been the subject of much dis-
cussion in the pages of foreign affairs
journals and newspaper editorials.
Vidal notes that insurance companies
benefit from a state of war due to ex-
ception clauses in insurance agree-
ments, although previous U.S. case law
has established that “acts of war” can
originate only from “a sovereign na-
tion, not a bunch of radicals.”
Some of his other comments lean more
toward “Swiftian literary exaggeration,”
of which he accuses H. L. Mencken in a
letter to Timothy McVeigh. His por-
trayal of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
and Vice President Dick Cheney as ea-
ger for a police state seems excessive.
Also, he compares the terrorist attacks
in the United States to such state-
sponsored atrocities as the burning of
the Reichstag (secretly perpetrated by
the Nazi government in order to con-
solidate Hitler’s police power) and
rapes by bogus Vietcong squads to dis-
credit the communist insurgency. This
paranoid proclivity toward conspiracy
theory is revealed in his assertion that
Opus Dei is a conservative Catholic
conspiracy in the United States. He
makes a point about Thomas Jefferson’s
and John Adams’s opposition to Jesuit
activity in America, which is probably
more an indicator of American
anti-Catholic bigotry several hundred
years ago than any prescient warning of
the dangers of religious incursion into
state affairs.
There are, however, several arguments
that are more convincing. Vidal con-
tends that terror attacks caused more
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damage to civil liberties than to the na-
tion’s physical well-being. “Once alien-
ated, an ‘unalienable right’ is apt to be
forever lost.” He documents this asser-
tion with a list of police killings of in-
nocent people in their homes and of
indefensible searches and seizures.
While a reasonable reader may dismiss
these discomforting examples as well
researched exceptions to normal law
enforcement activity in the United
States, Vidal also brings up the chang-
ing nature of the law. He refers to U.S.
v. Sandini (1987), which established
that police were able to seize property
permanently from an individual if the
property has been used for criminal
purposes, even if the individual has had
no involvement with any crime. This
ruling has highly negative implications,
considering that 90 percent of Ameri-
can paper currency has traces of narcot-
ics on it from use in the drug trade.
Vidal also points out a common prob-
lem that is not commonly pondered—
the incidence of homosexual rape in the
U.S. prison system, a violation of the
cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause
of the Bill of Rights. For anyone who
doubts that such punishment is state
sanctioned, Vidal quotes a state attor-
ney general who refers to this practice
in a public statement made in the
course of his official duties. He is remi-
niscent of the military author Colonel
Charles Dunlap, U.S. Army, in his ref-
erences to blatant disrespect to Presi-
dent Bill Clinton on a naval vessel by
seamen, who called Clinton “the Prae-
torian Guard of the Pentagon,” and our
“ruling junta.”
There is one other weakness: the book
fails to address properly the meat of the
issue that its title promises—“how we
got to be so hated.” The Federation of
American Scientists has published a
twenty-page listing of American mili-
tary operations dating from 1948 to
1999, documenting how the United
States (like the nations of Orwell’s
1984) has an “enemy of the month
club” and thus engages in a “perpetual
war” hoping for “perpetual peace.” This
theme is underdeveloped, however, and
Vidal’s discussion of the United States
emphasizes domestic repression, while
his reprinted chapters focus too exclu-
sively on an apology (in the Platonic
sense of an explanation) of Timothy
McVeigh.
Altogether, Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace presents a provocative argument
that will be of intellectual appeal to
professional military officers. It is ad-
mittedly an alternative perspective, but
it may give members of the American
national security community insight
into how our European allies think, as
well as our Third World adversaries,
who often share Vidal’s perspective.
Vidal’s arguments are intriguing, but
the brevity of the new parts of this
work ultimately leaves his thoughts
incomplete.
MICHAEL MORGAN
Captain, U.S. Army
Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau, eds. The
Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in
the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico, Va.: U.S. Ma-
rine Corps Studies and Analysis Division. 416pp.
(no price given)
What could be both more poignant and
ludicrous than Commander Abdul Baqi
Balots’s account of his survival of a
firefight in which his closest friend was
killed? “I saw a lot of Soviets coming at
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me and they were all firing (they put
ten bullet holes through my baggy trou-
sers). . . . Habib Noor told me that, un-
less we crossed the stream to the north,
we would not be able to engage the So-
viets. . . . I ran across and jumped but
landed directly into the stream. ‘Oh, Al-
lah,’ I cried, ‘you have killed me with-
out dignity.’ Then I made a big jump, I
don’t know how since even a tank can’t
clear it, but I did and got out of the
stream.”
This episode is recounted in Ali Jalali
and Lester Grau’s book The Other Side
of the Mountain. The two editors are
well known for a sequence of publica-
tions on unconventional warfare going
back to the early 1990s. For those who
follow this field, it is no surprise that
they are employed at the U.S. Army’s
distinguished Foreign Military Studies
Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Their highly readable compilation is a
significant contribution to the literature
on guerrilla warfare, and it has im-
mense implications for the contempo-
rary (at this writing) U.S. intervention
in Afghanistan.
The work consists of ninety-two “vi-
gnettes” of tactical action, with a few
longer accounts of more protracted op-
erations, all based on interviews with
mujahideen participants. The book was
inspired by a Russian text used at the
Frunze Combined Arms Academy, de-
tailing Soviet tactical action in Afghani-
stan. Jalali and Grau earlier produced
an English translation of that book un-
der the title The Bear Went Over the
Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Af-
ghanistan (National Defense Univ.
Press, 1996). The Other Side of the
Mountain points out when one of its
short stories covers the same actions or
operations as in Bear, but the works are
not parallel texts.
The present work consists of fourteen
chapters and a conclusion, composed of
two to sixteen stories apiece. Each
chapter illustrates a different type of
tactical combat. There is a short discus-
sion of the tactic before each chapter
and a commentary at the end. This for-
mat has been used in military writing for
many years (such as in the study Infantry
in Battle, edited by George Marshall,
Military History and Publications sec-
tion of The Infantry School, 1934).
However, in recent decades the implicit
analysis this approach provides has
been greatly strengthened by the more
explicit case-study method. If these sto-
ries had been written and presented as
formal case studies, some existing
weaknesses could have been avoided—
the chief one being burying the chapter
“Blocking Enemy Lines of Communica-
tion” halfway through the book, despite
the editors’ and contributors’ amply
demonstrated contention that logistics
dominated the Soviet war in Afghani-
stan and was its chief strategic (not tac-
tical) factor.
The thematic organization of the chap-
ters is a powerful approach, but it
means sacrificing any sense of chrono-
logical development. As a result, there
is little sense of the evolution of
mujahideen tactics during the war or of
their interaction over time with Soviet
tactics, despite occasional references
to such evolution in the chapter com-
mentaries. In fact, the work places
unreasonable expectations on the back-
ground knowledge of the reader. A
summary of the war’s origins, conduct,
and outcome is badly needed. A table
listing each major mujahideen faction,
with its leader, ideology, and sponsors,
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would also be helpful, as these factions
are referred to throughout the narrative.
The book might also have addressed
popular myths or conceptions about
the war—for example, the U.S. view
that distribution of Stinger antiaircraft
missiles to the mujahideen broke the
back of Soviet air support and hence
was the decisive point of the struggle.
The editors at a number of points indi-
cate their disagreement with this view
but never provide a formal rebuttal.
On the other hand, the book capri-
ciously provides detailed background
information on such relatively trivial
points as the official U.S. Army load
weights for mules, Central Asian horses,
and camels.
The book has a strong geographic
bias—most of the actions it describes
are in the vicinity of Kabul or on the
route connecting Kabul and Jalalabad.
Most of the remaining actions are in
the Kandahar area. There is nothing
from the Herat region, or the area
around Mazr-e Sharf, or the Panjshir
Valley. This bias may be explained by a
point the editors make in their intro-
duction, that a number of interviews
could not be completed because of the
1996 Taliban advance on Kabul and the
north. Still, they need to explain how
they have compensated for this imbal-
ance in their material, especially in view
of their own contention that the con-
duct of the war varied by region and by
the ethnicities involved.
There may be an issue in this book with
language as well. Good interpreters are
well aware of the temptation to tidy up
the haphazard use of specialized termi-
nology by speakers of a foreign lan-
guage, by rendering it in precise,
professional English usage. The editors
remark in the introduction that
although their contributors always re-
ferred to “Russians,” they have changed
this throughout to “Soviets.” Did the
same process occur in transcribing the
interviewees’ descriptions of guerrilla
operations? In this book even the most
irregular of mujahideen commanders
seems to have a perfect grasp of U.S.
military terms and phrasing, implying
an equal grasp of the concepts behind
the words.
Unfortunately, the book’s proofing and
editing is distractingly bad, which is a se-
rious handicap in a work containing so
many foreign words and names. An end
sheet includes production credits for the
book—it seems only appropriate that
one is listed for “Book Editing and
Desing.” A particularly unfortunate re-
sult of this hasty editing is found in the
commentary following a chapter on ur-
ban combat. On first reading, this evalu-
ation of a mujahideen bombing of a city
market appears actually to be a defense
of terrorist attacks on civilian noncom-
batants. Closer attention, however,
shows that the editors were attempting
to contrast this particular incident with
the Soviet aerial bombardment cam-
paign aimed at driving the population
from the Afghan countryside, but the
text certainly reads as though it is equat-
ing any air strike with terrorism.
These flaws detract from but do not
negate the high value of this book. In
addition to its major strength of first-
hand accounts of the most significant
guerrilla war of our time, the book has
many other useful features. Its use of
maps is particularly adept, and consis-
tent references to Defense Mapping
Agency map sheets give a sense of detail
and nuance to the work. While it is ex-
ceptionally riddled with typographical
errors, the glossary covers nearly all the
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specialized and foreign terms used in the
book, at exactly the right level of detail.
In sum, The Other Side of the Mountain
is a unique and valuable contribution to
the study of unconventional warfare. In
view of the ongoing U.S. operations in
Afghanistan, the editors would be per-
forming a civic service were they to
produce a revised and reedited version
for general publication.
WILLIAM C. GREEN
Department of Political Science
CSU San Bernardino
Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam
and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking Pen-
guin, 2002. 498pp. $29.95
For Americans who were adults during
the Vietnam War, the name Daniel
Ellsberg is portentous; it either suggests
a whiff of treason or connotes heroic
patriotism. Ellsberg is a Marine Corps
veteran, Harvard Ph.D., former senior
official in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, a highly regarded analyst for
the RAND Corporation, and a civilian
observer of platoon-level combat in
Vietnam who defiantly chose to “walk
point” with the troops he was observ-
ing. In March 1971, Ellsberg released to
the New York Times a seven-thousand-
page, highly classified Department of
Defense history of American involve-
ment in Vietnam. Covering the war
from the Truman administration
through the Tet offensive of early 1968,
this study became known as “The Pen-
tagon Papers” when the New York
Times began publishing it on 13 June.
Ellsberg’s action earned him federal fel-
ony indictments and a protracted crim-
inal trial. On 11 May 1973 the judge
abruptly dismissed the government’s
case, because in the last few weeks evi-
dence had materialized showing that
agents of the Richard M. Nixon admin-
istration had denied Ellsberg his right
to a fair trial by burglarizing his psychi-
atrist’s office in search of material with
which to blackmail him into not releas-
ing more documents. This revelation
became part of the unfolding drama of
the Watergate scandal, the surreptitious
forced nighttime entry into the Demo-
cratic Party headquarters by the same
agents of the administration. President
Nixon attempted to buy the silence of
one of the burglars, E. Howard Hunt,
with a seventy-five-thousand-dollar
bribe. Facing impeachment for at-
tempting to cover up the break-in,
Nixon wailed about Ellsberg: “The
sonofabitching thief is made a national
hero. . . . And the New York Times gets a
Pulitzer for stealing documents.”
Secrets is a book that must be read by
anyone seeking to understand how the
United States formulates its strategy
and policy. Ellsberg demolishes the
“quagmire” thesis favored by such in-
fluential liberal interpreters as Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. By that interpretation,
beginning with Harry S. Truman up to
the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson,
each president made a deeper commit-
ment of American military power and
clandestine activity, under the convic-
tion that his actions would achieve a
South Vietnamese victory over the in-
vaders from the communist North.
From Ellsberg’s perspective, there was
no quagmire, only endless presidential
deception of Congress and the public,
who were led to believe decade after de-
cade that surely the next step would re-
sult in the successful establishment of a
permanently independent South
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Vietnam. Ellsberg served as the action
officer for Vietnam, reporting person-
ally to John McNaughton, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara’s princi-
pal assistant for Vietnam. Ellsberg be-
came convinced that every president
knew that his commitments would
prove insufficient to accomplish the
goal of preserving South Vietnam’s in-
dependence. However, none of them
could withdraw American support—
because a communist victory in South
Vietnam would create an unbearable
political liability in the Cold War climate
of “wars of national liberation” backed
by the Soviets and China.
Ellsberg went to work as McNaughton’s
aide for Vietnam on 4 August 1964.
On that day his office was receiving
live reports of North Vietnamese
patrol-boat attacks on the U.S. de-
stroyer Maddox, the presence of which
off North Vietnam was one of several
provocations staged by the Johnson
administration to elicit a military reac-
tion from Hanoi. The administration
publicly claimed that two distinct sets
of attacks were made, first on the
Maddox and a short time later on the
Maddox and a sister ship, USS Turner
Joy. Drawing on his direct experience
in the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense, Ellsberg demonstrates that Mad-
dox’s skipper raised doubts about the
second set of attacks within a few hours
of announcing them. The Johnson ad-
ministration nonetheless went to Con-
gress describing both attacks as bona
fide, because together they appeared to
justify a long-planned escalation of the
air war. Once armed by Congress with
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson
made a few direct retaliatory air strikes
and then posed as the presidential peace
candidate. He was running against
Republican Barry Goldwater, who was
advocating precisely the kind of sus-
tained air campaign that Johnson had
already planned and would begin once
safely reelected president.
One can applaud or condemn Daniel
Ellsberg for what he did in 1971. What
one cannot do is ignore the power his
memoir has to inform Americans about
how the executive branch conducted its
foreign policy and military strategy
from the 1940s until 1974. As the
United States apparently heads (at this
writing) toward another major war, the
skeptic is entitled to wonder if things at
the top have really changed.
KEN HAGAN
Professor of Strategy
Naval War College—Monterey, California
Rohwer, Jürgen, and Mikhail S. Monakov. Sta-
lin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and
Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953. Portland,
Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 334pp. $57.50
The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the opening of major Russian archives
have provided an opportunity to add
greatly to our understanding of the
character of the Soviet navy. Eminent
researchers Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail
S. Monakov have contributed much to
this understanding with their study of
Soviet naval shipbuilding and strategy
when Josef Stalin controlled the devel-
opment of the Soviet Navy, from 1935
until his death in 1953. They have un-
covered extensive details of the massive
shipbuilding program, most of which
never came to fruition. Strategy, how-
ever, remains as murky as ever. This
study complements but does not re-
place Monakov’s series of articles on
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Soviet naval doctrine and Stalin’s fleet
in Morskoi sbornik, 1992–98, or Robert
W. Herrick’s Soviet Naval Theory and
Policy: Gorshkov’s Inheritance (1989).
At the end of 1935 Stalin personally
yanked the Soviet navy from littoral de-
fense through air, submarine, and light
surface forces into a grandiose ship-
building program centered on large
battleships and battle cruisers, while
retaining “Young School” craving for
submarines. Stalin took naval strategy
into his own hands but never divulged
any strategic precepts or plans to his
naval leaders, who in fear of Stalin’s
wrath dutifully adapted themselves to
the imposed scheme, several falling to
the purges anyway. The result was a
massive shipbuilding program and a
naval officer corps stranded in a strate-
gic wilderness, with silent misgivings
about the apparent dissonance between
the projected force structure and opera-
tional commitments arising from the
Soviet Union’s particular geostrategic
position.
By 1939 an immense program had
evolved to build twenty-four powerful
battleships by 1947, with fifteen for the
Pacific Fleet and the rest divided among
the Baltic, Black Sea, and Northern
Fleets. Concurrent plans called for a
submarine force intended to reach 438
units, of which 219 were earmarked for
the Pacific. These fleet goals, along with
a modicum of light surface forces, were
impossible for Soviet shipbuilding ca-
pacity, even by halting merchant ship
construction. With the onset of the
Great Patriotic War, all long-term proj-
ects were suspended; only submarine
and light surface projects continued, as
circumstances allowed. The defeat of
the Axis saw the prewar schemes re-
duced to three battleships and three
battle cruisers, all of which were cancel-
led when Stalin died. The Sverdlov-class
cruisers and a new submarine force of
284 boats became the shrunken legacy
of Stalin’s naval dreams.
The navy of Admiral Nikolai
Kuznetsov, under army operational
control but without strategic direction
from the General Staff or the top, con-
tinued to orient itself before, during,
and after World War II toward tradi-
tional defensive roles—defeating at-
tacking enemy fleets and amphibious
expeditions in the near seas—with only
a limited submarine offensive on adja-
cent enemy sea lines of communica-
tions.
Stalin’s motive for building a battleship
fleet, according to the authors, was the
vision of the Soviet Union gaining su-
premacy in the four near seas and then
becoming an oceanic power, with the
battleship or battle cruiser “a symbol
of the highest grade of power, a most
powerful and mobile instrument of
power politics, that the world had
ever known,” the direct predecessor of
the atomic bomb in attaining super-
power status.
Stalin, however, left no direct evidence
of his reasons, whereas several indica-
tors point toward a dominant mental
construct of positional strategic de-
fense still guiding Stalin and his admi-
rals. He and his naval leaders agreed
on a defense strategy but diverged on
preferred force structure. Stalin re-
jected the aircraft carrier, despite all
the evidence from the Second World
War of the importance of airpower at
sea for a blue-water navy. Kuznetsov
often pleaded in vain with Stalin for
stronger shipboard antiaircraft de-
fenses on ships, for aircraft carriers to
cover surface forces from enemy air
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attack out to three hundred miles from
naval bases, and to limit Soviet
land-based air support. In 1946,
Kuznetsov’s close associate Admiral
Vladimir Alafuzov developed a posi-
tional scheme of supremacy under
land-based air cover up to one hun-
dred miles from naval bases, and con-
ditional sea control by large surface
vessels with limited air support in a
“far zone” out to three hundred miles.
This fell short of command of the ex-
panses of the Barents, Baltic, and Black
Seas or of most of the Sea of Japan.
Only submarines with long endurance
could operate in the open ocean, but
Stalin preferred medium submarines,
conceived for operations in near seas
against an amphibious threat. The pro-
jected battleships would have had an
operational radius only half that of
their contemporaries in oceanic na-
vies. Only current Italian battleships,
also designed for near seas, had such
limited autonomy. To operate across
the open ocean was a ludicrous con-
cept to Stalin in 1945, arguing for a
defensive posture for at least ten to fif-
teen years to come. Stalin’s projected
“large sea and oceanic navy,” to use
the Soviet term, was likely created for
a hoped-for more robust traditional
strategic defensive in contiguous seas.
The evidence in this book, if not its
title, lends support to Herrick’s judg-
ment of a Stalinist strategy of limited
command of the near seas. To suggest
that it was “the first step on the road
to global naval power,” as does series
editor Holger Herwig in the preface,
would require Stalin and his navy to
demonstrate a conceptual leap for
which neither had shown a proclivity.
Mind-sets resist change. Even in the
navy of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who
inherited Stalin’s schemes and built up
Kuznetsov’s fleet, extensive deploy-
ments did not replace deeply held
positional and defensive assumptions.
Had Stalin’s “oceanic” fleet actually
been built, whether a shift of orienta-
tion by him or his admirals toward
“global naval power” would have oc-
curred remains undemonstrated and
problematic.
WILLARD C. FRANK, JR.
Old Dominion University
Buker, George E. The Penobscot Expedition: Com-
modore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspir-
acy of 1779. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2002. 195pp. $32.95
In the various history books on the
American Revolution, the Penobscot
expedition is rarely mentioned in any
detail, being overshadowed by the more
widely known and successful battles
and campaigns. Perhaps this is due to
the dismal outcome of this early joint
amphibious operation and to the desire
by some, especially Massachusetts poli-
ticians of the time, to forget what had
happened.
This hastily conceived expedition was
launched from Boston in July 1779. The
expedition was given the task of ex-
pelling the mounting British military
presence on coastal Maine, centered
around Penobscot Bay, but specifically
at Castine. The expedition set off with
full expectation of success on the part
of the Massachusetts political leader-
ship. But from the beginning, the force
assembled was hampered by inadequate
leadership, divided command author-
ity, poor training and support, and a
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significant lack of understanding of the
tactical situation. In this book, George
Buker, a retired Navy commander, pro-
fessor of history, and an accomplished
author, provides a significant account
of this much overlooked effort by the
combined forces of the Massachusetts
and Maine militia, Continental Navy
and Marines, and various privateer
groups. Buker also provides an interest-
ing glimpse of the internal politics and
personalities of the colonies, especially
in Massachusetts during the American
Revolution. He further provides a com-
plementary argument that the Massa-
chusetts political authorities, when
confronted with the dismal failure of
the expedition, set in motion an inquiry
that may have been a conspiracy of po-
litical self-interest.
The book appears well researched, with
significant endnotes and bibliography.
Reading almost like a novel, it tells the
story of the Penobscot expedition in
great detail and addresses the issues that
led up to its failure and the resulting in-
quiry. In appropriately titled chapters
Buker provides a historical overview
leading up to the expedition, including
the British policy, orders for military
operations along coastal Maine, and,
of course, the colonial response to the
threat to the extended territory of
Massachusetts, now the state of Maine.
As expected, the majority of the book
deals with the actual operations, from
outfitting and the order of battle to the
assaults and resulting siege at Castine,
to the hasty retreat and then rout of co-
lonial forces when superior Royal Navy
forces arrived, and finally to the sequel,
in which the expedition’s personnel
walked back to Massachusetts from
Maine after burning their ships. After
the failure of the expedition and the
loss of almost forty ships, recrimina-
tions were made against various leaders,
including allegations against naval force
commander Captain Dudley Saltonstall
of responsibility for the overall result;
and against Paul Revere, an icon of the
Revolutionary War who served in the
expedition as a lieutanant colonel in
charge of the artillery, of unsoldierly
conduct. In the end, it was Captain
Saltonstall who bore the brunt of the
smear campaign by Massachusetts poli-
ticians to shift the blame.
In the final chapters, and through the
lens of history, Buker argues that in-
deed a conspiracy by the Massachusetts
politicians, through their committee of
inquiry, manipulated the results of their
investigation and attempted to influ-
ence the outcome of the court-martial
of Saltonstall by Continental Navy au-
thorities. Their efforts ensured the de-
sired results of exonerating their native
son, militia general Solomon Lovell,
and provided the justification needed to
assess the Continental government for a
portion of the monetary cost. Buker,
however, provides technical and tactical
reasons that may have led to the failure
of the expedition. Further, he indicates
that only Captain Saltonstall fully ap-
preciated the tactical and operational
circumstances, as well as the limited ca-
pability of his resources and ships in the
confined waters around Penobscot Bay.
These considerations were evidently ex-
cluded or ignored by the politicians in
their single-minded desire to find a
scapegoat for the failure.
Overall, this is a fine historical account-
ing of this chapter in American history.
My one large criticism is that the one
simple map provided is inadequate for
a full understanding of the operations.
This reviewer has the benefit of having
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been stationed in Castine, Maine, and is
geographically aware of the area; I have
walked the earthen ramparts of Fort
George and the various other entrench-
ments around Castine. It would have
been most helpful to the general reader
had additional detailed military maps
been included with each phase of the
expedition. Well placed photographs of
the area would have further added to
the historical understanding of the
events, as would photos of the various
earthworks, trenches, the defensive
canal, and Fort George, which all still
exist as historical landmarks.
JAMES B. GOODMAN
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
West, Bing. The Pepperdogs. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2002. 365pp. $25
The Pepperdogs ranks with The Hunt for
Red October. It is a work of fiction con-
structed around reality, brimming with
action and genuine insight into the
emerging warfighting capabilities of the
new ground soldier. West develops his
story around a Marine reconnaissance
team. That team, the “Pepperdogs,” is
made up of six reservists of varying ci-
vilian backgrounds; all have extraordi-
nary courage, physical and mental
strength, expert tactical skills, and total
team commitment.
The Pepperdogs set out on their own to
rescue a team member captured by
rogue Serbian guerrillas who specialize
in casual atrocities. West’s story takes
place in Kosovo, mostly in mountainous
terrain and in the harshest of winter
conditions. In pursuit of the kidnappers
the team undergoes nearly constant
attack, endures brutal weather, and cre-
ates an increasingly difficult political
situation for senior national security
leaders who believe the Pepperdogs are
risking diplomatic solutions. There is at
one point the suggestion that even the
murder of one Marine would not be
worth upsetting diplomatic peace ini-
tiatives. The Pepperdogs make political
matters worse by leaving a path of de-
struction while ignoring direct orders
to end their chase.
Setbacks are many, but perseverance
and tactical teamwork always (well, al-
most always) gets them out of tight
spots. One remembers those great mo-
ments when the cavalry arrived and
everyone cheered. But this team is dif-
ferent from the cavalry; the Pepperdogs
take performance-enhancing drugs and
rarely need to rest. One team member
creates an Internet website that pro-
vides the public with real-time informa-
tion on their progress and problems.
The public cheers them on, reducing
the policy-making flexibility of political
leaders. West skillfully introduces the
Internet as a source of potential direct
information from individuals in the
battle to the public. That information
would have obvious constraining effects
on future national security decision-
making latitude and would yield differ-
ent perspectives on progress and
problems.
The suspense and many sudden turns
of fortune keep the reader glued to the
story. One cannot help but choose sides
between the Marine team and political
leaders who wish to halt the pursuit of
the kidnapped Marine. Even if the team
succeeds and its members become pub-
lic heroes, they may be court-martialed
for disobeying orders.
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Bing West is well qualified to write an
insider’s story of modern small-unit
tactics, having had experience of Oval
Office–level decision making and the
conflicts faced by senior military leaders
between political direction and unnec-
essarily risky situations. West was a Ma-
rine reconnaissance leader in Vietnam
and has studied small-unit action since
the 1960s. He was a Naval War College
professor and a former assistant
secretary of defense. West has main-
tained a close relationship with the Ma-
rine Corps through his design of
combat decision-making simulations.
The Pepperdogs is a great read—as was,
by the way, West’s earlier Vietnam-
centered book The Village (Pocket
Books, 2003, paperback).
WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE
Professor Emeritus
Naval War College
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BOOKS RECEIVED
U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Pro-
cesses, and Politics, by Sam C. Sarkesian,
John Allen Williams, and Stephen J.
Cimbala. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, 2002. 330pp. (no price given)
World History of Warfare, by Christon
I. Archer et al. Lincoln: Univ. of Ne-
braska, 2002. 626pp. $29.95
United States Military Assistance: An
Empirical Perspective, by William H.
Mott IV. Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood, 2002. 384pp. $69.95
Shadow of the Dragon: Vietnam’s Con-
tinuing Struggle with China and the Im-
plications for U.S. Foreign Policy, by
Henry J. Kenny. McLean, Va.:
Brassey’s, 2002. 176pp. $24.95
Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stale-
mate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899–1940,
by Robert M. Citino. Lawrence: Univ.
Press of Kansas, 2002. 372pp. (no price
given)
Red Sky in the Morning: The Battle of
the Barents Sea 1942, by Michael
Pearson. Shrewsbury, U.K.: Airlife,
2002. 154pp. $24.95
International Order and Individual Lib-
erty: Effects of War and Peace on the De-
velopment of Governments, by Mark E.
Pietrzyk. Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of
America, 2002. 245pp. (no price given)
Wedge from Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How
the Secret War between the FBI and CIA
Has Endangered National Security, by
Mark Riebling. New York: Simon &
Schuster, repr. 2002. 580pp. $16
The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean.
Vol. 2, November 1940–December 1941,
with an introduction by David Brown.
Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2002.
318pp. $59.50
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FROM THE EDITORS
FORTHCOMING NEWPORT PAPERS
The sixteenth in our eleven-year series of Newport Papers (and the first of a new
generation of papers, in a handsome new design) is now in press—The Third
Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Subma-
rines, by Owen R. Cote, Jr. In each of two world wars, control of the sea was
threatened by the then new and revolutionary submarine; the Cold War, argues
Dr. Cote, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was effectively the third
battle against the submarine. When in the mid-1980s the first truly quiet Soviet
nuclear submarines were deployed, the U.S. Navy was forced to contend with
critical new antisubmarine warfare challenges. Our sixteenth Newport Paper is
an examination of those events.
Watch also for Newport Papers 17, 18, and 19:
• The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in
Military Affairs, by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds.
• Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense
Industrial Implications of Network-centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski,
Eugene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross.
• Second Global War Game Series, by Bob Gile.
To obtain copies of Newport Papers or subscribe to the (complimentary)
series, contact the editorial offices, at (401) 841-2236, press@nwc.navy.mil, or
Naval War College (Code 321), 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I. 02841-1207.
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Watch in future issues, beginning with Autumn 2003, for a series of articles on a
subject of particular interest to anyone associated with the Naval War College or
the Navy’s other service colleges—professional military education. We plan to
offer the views of a wide variety of highly qualified observers. We look forward
to an energetic and fruitful exchange between the authors, as well as, through our
“In My View,” “Research & Debate,” and “Commentary” departments, between
them and our readers.
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
THE EDWARD S. MILLER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP IN
NAVAL HISTORY
The Naval War College Foundation intends to award one grant of one thousand
dollars to the researcher who has the greatest need and can make the optimum
use of research materials for naval history located in the Naval War College’s Ar-
chives, Naval Historical Collection, and Henry E. Eccles Library. A guide to the
College’s manuscript, archival, and oral history collections may be found on the
Naval War College’s website, www.nwc.navy.mil (click on “Library,” “Library
Publications,” then “Naval Historical Collection”). Further information and
copies of the registers for specific collections are available on request from the
Head, Naval Historical Collection, e-mail cherpake@nwc.navy.mil.
The recipient will be a Research Fellow in the Naval War College’s Maritime
History Department, which will provide administrative support. Submit a de-
tailed research proposal, c.v., one letter of recommendation, and relevant back-
ground information to Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, Naval War
College Foundation, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I. 02841-1207, by 1 August
2003. Employees of the U.S. Naval War College or any agency of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense are not eligible for consideration; EEO/AA regulations apply.
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